Often, tractates end on a positive note. That’s why the last Mishnah in Chullin (142a) reads: One may not take the mother bird with her offspring (but rather must send the bird away) even to purify the leper. And, if regarding a minor mitzvah (of shiluach haken) whose performance is simple, as the bird’s value is an issar coin, the Torah (Devarim 22:7) states “that it be well with you and you will prolong your days”, all the more so regarding the more demanding mitzvot in the Torah.

The gemara on this Mishnah elaborates on this idea by quoting a brayta. (A) Rabbi Yaakov, a fifth-generation Tanna, states that every place the Torah lists the reward next to a mitzvah, that reward is actually resurrection of the dead. (B) As evidence, he cites the commandment of honoring one’s parents, where the reward (Devarim 5:16) is “That your days may be long / יַאֲרִיכֻן יָמֶיךָ, and that it may go well with you / יִיטַב לָךְ”, as well as the commandment (Devarim 22) to send away the mother bird, whose reward was so that יִיטַב לָךְ and וְהַאֲרַכְתָּ יָמִים. (C) Now consider a hypothetical in which a father instructs his son to ascend a building and fetch fledgling birds. He ascends, sends away the mother bird, takes the chicks, and as he returns, falls and dies. Where is the length of days, and where is the goodness? (D) Rather, referring to Devarim 5, יַאֲרִיכֻן יָמֶיךָ means in the world that is entirely “long” / אָרוֹךְ while יִיטַב לָךְ means in the world that is entirely good. While segment [C] is a downer, [D] seems like an excellent place to end the masechet.

Rashi here notes that, at the end of the first perek of Kiddushin (39b), the gemara describes a scenario in which a father sends his son to fetch fledglings, and that (E) this was an actual incident which Rabbi Yaakov observed. This is strange, because our printed gemara in Chullin makes the same observation, and then (F) launches into a sophisticated analysis of putting oneself into situations where danger might be expected and whether people engaged in a mitzvah might be harmed. Indeed, this span of Talmudic text (A, B, C, D, E, F) appears identically in both Chullin and Kiddushin1. Why should Rashi point us there?

The answer is that this additional Talmudic span is really only based in Kiddushin. That is also why Rashi does not comment on any of the additional text in Chullin, only in Kiddushin. In some unknown manuscript, which formed the basis of our printed text, a scribe took Rashi’s advice to look to Kiddushin, and copied the Kiddushin text here, perhaps initially only in the margins. Eventually, it migrated to the main column of Talmudic text. This process of sugya transfer is called ha’avarah. That is also why, in almost all manuscripts on Hachi Garsinan (Munich 95, Vatican 120-121, Vatican 122, Vatican 123), the text of the gemara is only (A, B, D), skipping (C, E, F). The Firkovich 293 manuscript is missing some text, but we can see that it has (A, B, C, D) and skips (E, F). Thus, all manuscripts end on the positive note.

The Hidden Derasha

I like to claim that many derashot have a hidden aspect – a feature Chazal saw in the pasuk that led them to interpret it in a particular creative way. The most obvious explanation here is that the pasuk asserts a feature of Divine reward and punishment that is contradicted by the evidence seen by our own eyes. Therefore, we need to kvetch the pasuk so that “good” means ultimate good, not seen in our natural mortal lifetimes and so that “long life” means a different lifetime which is longer. However, aside from [C] not existing in our actual sugya, who says that such a kvetch is legitimate? What did Rabbi Yaakov see that we are missing?

I have two answers. First, I’m not sure that, on a peshat level, the reward for heeding one’s parents actually refers to a personal good and long life. The fuller context is “that you may long endure, and that you may fare well, in the land that Hashem your God is assigning to you”. Enduring long on the land may refer to the nation of Israel keeping up residence in the Land of Israel. So too, faring well in the land may refer to national success. A moral nation is rewarded collectively with goodness and residency on the land. The prior Canaanite nations were ejected for their sins. Once that meaning is established in Devarim 5, it bears the same meaning in Devarim 22, where the context is absent.

Rabbi Yaakov may notice this continuation of עַ֚ל הָֽאֲדָמָ֔ה “upon the land”, and take that land as referring to the World-to-Come – especially if we join resurrection of the dead with the World-to-Come, as is the case in some rabbinic sources. He may interpret אֲשֶׁר… נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ as “the land which Hashem will grant in the future” – not future days to the Israelites in the wilderness hearing these words, but future days even to those reading the pasuk nowadays. We could of course reference another derasha where “days” refers to messianic days, such as kol / “all the days of your life” in the Haggadah. Thus, Rabbi Yaakov’s interpretation is a peshat move.

The second answer is a lexical one. Aruch does not always mean “lengthy”. There is a secondary shoresh of ארכ which means “healing of a wound” or a “restoration”. See the Brown-Driver-Briggs dictionary entry for אֲרוּכָה, where the word means “healing of a wound, restoration (properly the new flesh that grows at the wounded spot)”, pointing to Arabic أَرِيكَةٌ, or restoration in general, such as to the nation of Israel or to the Temple. See for instance Yirmeyahu 30:17, where Hashem will give you an אֲרוּכָה – Rashi explains this means healing – and cure you of your wounds. Similarly, in II Divrei Hayamim 24:13, under the direction of the overseers, the אֲרוּכָה – restorative work on the Temple – went well. Indeed, Bava Kamma 91b notes that flesh will heal – מַעֲלֶה אֲרוּכָה – if scratched, but not so a garment if scratched. In Chullin 77a, Rav discusses making an incision with a sharp bone so that a wound will heal – מַעֲלֶה אֲרוּכָה.

Indeed, my father once related an explanation of Rav’s post-Shemoneh Esrei prayer, which appears in Berachot 16b and forms part of the Birkat Hachodesh liturgy. We ask Hashem for חַיִּים אֲרוּכִּים, then a life of peace, goodness, blessing, sustenance, and so on. All these are qualitative aspects of that requested life, so why do we lead with long life, which is a quantitative aspect? The answer may be that חַיִּים אֲרוּכִּים may also be a qualitative measure, of a healthy and restorative life. Further, though this might not be grammatically true, this might be the difference between אֲרוּכִּים with a dagesh chazak in the kaf and אֲרוּכִים without the dagesh. Indeed, that’s how Rav’s prayer is rendered in Bialik’s Sefer HaAggadah, as a healthy life. Still, if חַיִּים אֲרוּכִּים means healthy or restorative life in Rav’s prayer, it supports that reading in Rabbi Yaakov’s derasha. The Divine promise is of restorative days, which is precisely the resurrection of the dead.

On Bechorot 17a (via my Girsology website), the Gemara on the Mishnah of a ewe that gave birth to a kid says:

אֲתָא רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ: רָחֵל בַּת עֵז וְעֵז בַּת רָחֵל — רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

Rav Oshaya came from Nehardea and brought a brayta in his hand.

There's an inherent ambiguity here. Is it "Rav Oshaya came, from Nehardea," that is, he arrived from Nehardea? Or is it "Rav Oshaya-of-Nehardea came," that is, a Nehardean named Rav Oshaya arrived, say, from the Land of Israel?

The second parse is not far-fetched. We have the familiar כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, when Rav Dimi came (from the Land of Israel). And we also have a Rav Dimi of Nehardea, רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, who is a different and later person. As Rav Aharon Hyman puts it in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, it is "clear that plain Rav Dimi is not Rav Dimi of Nehardea," as we see in Avodah Zarah 11a, where כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי comes first, and then רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא מַתְנֵי אִיפְּכָא. That Rav Dimi of Nehardea later headed the academy in Pumbedita.

Hyman's reading

Rav Hyman takes our phrase the first way. In his entry for Rav Oshaya (vol. 1, pp. 116–117), he writes that "while Rav Oshaya was still in Bavel, it was his way to bring braytot," and cites כִּי אֲתָא רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ in Shabbat 19b, Beitzah 26b, our Bechorot 17a, and Niddah 21a. The same brayta about crushed olives and grapes also appears in Shabbat 145b, and the one about a miscarried piece of flesh recurs in Niddah 21b.

(A small aside: Hyman's printed text actually says "ברכות יז." rather than "בכורות יז." Berakhot 17a has no Rav Oshaya, so it's a misprint. Wikisource had already fixed his "ברכות לז:" a few lines earlier to Bechorot 37b, but not this one. I've now corrected it in our digital copy.)

Who is this Rav Oshaya? Per Hyman, he was a Babylonian Amora of the third generation, a student of Rav Huna (in Bechorot 37b he asks Rav Huna directly), and above all of Rav Yehuda, who called him "Oshaya my son" (Gittin 25a). Following the Yuchasin and the Maharsha, Hyman identifies him as a brother of Rabbah bar Nachmani. Together with his brother Rav Chanania, he eventually went up to the Land of Israel, where they worked as shoemakers, and where he died in Tiberias.

And the habit continued there. In the Yerushalmi, אַיְיתֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מַתְנִיתָא דְּבַר קַפָּרָא מִדָּרוֹמָא: Rav Hoshaya brought a brayta of Bar Kappara from the Daroma. He seems to have been a collector of braytot, who went where they were.

Our sugya fits this nicely. Two lines after he brings the brayta, אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא לְרַבָּה: כִּי עָיְילַתְּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ: "Rav Hoshaya said to Rabbah: when you go in before Rav Huna, ask him…" So the man who just arrived "from Nehardea" is in Babylonia, talking with Rabbah (perhaps his brother), and sending a question to Rav Huna in Sura. (Munich 95 has לְרַבָּה בַּר שִׁילַת here instead of plain Rabbah.)

What the manuscripts say

Here are the variants on Al HaTorah for our line:

The manuscripts (British Library 402, Vatican 118–119 and 120–121, Florence 7) all have the full formula: כִּי אֲתָא רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי. Our printed text has dropped the כִּי and the second אֲתָא, and has אוֹשַׁעְיָא for הוֹשַׁעְיָא. Munich 95 lacks מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא altogether.

Beitzah 26b is even more striking:

Every manuscript that preserves the line has מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא. Only the printed editions (Soncino, Venice, Vilna) dropped it, as Dikdukei Soferim already noted, and as Hyman cites. Across all six passages, the only manuscript that regularly lacks the word is Munich 95, which omits it in four of them.

So the phrase is stable: כִּי אֲתָא רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ. Notice also that "Rav Hoshaya of Nehardea" never appears anywhere else, in any other kind of sentence. Rav Dimi of Nehardea, by contrast, appears in all sorts of contexts: teaching a reversed version, bringing figs by boat, ruling in Moed Katan and Bava Batra. For Rav Hoshaya, "from Nehardea" belongs to the arrival, which is Hyman's reading.

Why Nehardea?

Does it make sense that an Amora rooted in Sura and Pumbedita, a student of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda, would be coming from Nehardea?

I think it does, as a visit. Nehardea had been Shmuel's city, and it remained a center of learning even after Papa bar Nazer destroyed it in 259 CE (per Rav Sherira Gaon). According to Hyman, Rav Nachman, a contemporary of our Rav Hoshaya, eventually returned there with his students once the city was rebuilt. A scholar who made a habit of collecting braytot, and who later went to the Daroma to bring back Bar Kappara's, could well have gone to Nehardea to hear what was being taught there, and come back to Sura or Pumbedita with a brayta "in his hand." The repeated phrase may even be how his colleagues described those trips.

This is speculative. Still, it fits better than imagining a separate "Rav Hoshaya of Nehardea" who appears only in this formula, and only when bringing braytot.

A correction on Girsology

Until today, Girsology had identified this Rav Oshaya, in all of these passages, as Rabbi Oshaya Rabbah, the first-generation Amora of Caesarea. That's a different person, from a different generation and a different country. Following Hyman, I've now re-identified him as the Babylonian Rav Oshaya in Bechorot 17a (twice) and 37b, Shabbat 19b and 145b, Niddah 21a and 21b, and Beitzah 26b, with Hyman's explanation attached. In Shabbat 19b, where his name is split across two lines, the "Rav" had even been tagged as Rav himself.

Enjoy, and chag sameach!

On occasion, Amoraim will use an expression one way and the Talmudic Narrator, who is post-Amoraic, will use that expression in a different way. I like to say that the Narrator is bold yet humble. He’ll add his own analyses and objections, overturning our understanding of a sugya, but often does this by channeling ideas expressed elsewhere by named Amoraim. Spoken in a different era and applied to new scenarios, those expressions may take on new meanings. One such instance is the expression תָּא חֲזִי מָה בֵּין תַּקִּיפֵי אַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לַחֲסִידֵי דְבָבֶל.

The primary sugya in which this expression occurs is Taanit 23b. There, Rabbi Zerika (an Amora of the Land of Israel) said to Rav Safra (an Amora who moved back and forth between Bavel and the Land of Israel): Come and see what the difference is between תַּקִּיפֵי דְּאַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל / the powerful men of Eretz Yisrael and חֲסִידֵי דְבָבֶל / the pious men of Babylonia. By the pious men of Babylonia, I mean Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda. When the world is in need of rain, these Sages say: Let us assemble together and pray for mercy, and perhaps the Holy One, Blessed be He, will be appeased and bring rain. By contrast, the powerful men of Eretz Yisrael, such as Rabbi Yona, the father of Rabbi Mani, acted differently. When the world was in need of rain, he enters his house and says to his household: Give me my sack [gevalki] and I will go and buy myself a dinar of grain. When he went outside, he went and stood in a low place, as it is written: “Out of the depths I have called You, O Lord” (Psalms 130:1). And he would stand in a secluded place, and cover himself with sackcloth, and pray for mercy, and rain would come. When he would come home, they would say to him: Did the Master bring grain? He said to them: I said to myself, since rain has now come, there will be relief in the world. (Translation slightly edited from English translation under Rav Steinsaltz’s guidance.)

Nothing in this primary sugya elaborates why Rav Huna and Rav Chisda are pious and Rabbi Yona, father of Rabbi Mani, is powerful. Instead of pointing to any external sugya, Ben Yehoyada explains that these labels stem from their actions in praying for rain. Neither Rav Huna nor Rav Chisda trusted in themselves that their solitary prayers would be effective, so each wished for help from his colleague’s prayer, and this was an aspect of their piety. Meanwhile, the Sages in the Land of Israel were strong and trusted in their own merits. (If so, takifei means “powerful”.) Maharsha instead applies the label to the reputations of the entire populace of these two countries – that the piety of those in Bavel was well known, while in the Land of Israel, they were not established by reputation as pious but rather takifei. (If so, takifei is a contrast to chasidei and may mean “harsh”.) ArtScroll renders takifei here as “aloof”.

The Eulogy

The expression appears a few other times in the Talmud. In Megillah 28b, Reish Lakish eulogized a young Torah scholar who died in the Land of Israel, who would study halacha all the way in the back – the 24th row – and said, “Alas, the Land of Israel has lost a great man!” In contrast, there was a man who had studied halacha, Sifra, Sifrei, and Tosefta, who died. People asked Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (so in manuscripts, instead of the printed Rav Nachman, who would be bar Yaakov), a fifth-generation Babylonian Amora, to eulogize him. He declined, saying “How can I eulogize him? By saying that a basket of books is lost?” He meant that this person did not integrate his learning. The Talmudic Narrator borrows Rabbi Zerika’s expression and says תָּא חֲזִי מָה בֵּין תַּקִּיפֵי אַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לַחֲסִידֵי דְבָבֶל.

Here, the counterintuitive harsh and pleasant might be appropriate. Rashi explains that Reish Lakish was harsh (or maybe aloof), pointing to Yoma 9b. There, Reish Lakish was swimming in the Jordan River and Rabba bar bar Chana gave him a hand to help him out. Reish Lakish exclaimed, “My Gosh! I hate you Babylonians!” and gave a scriptural basis for this. The gemara asks whether Reish Lakish, who was reticent, would have spoken to Rabba bar bar Chana in public, for he would not even speak to Rabbi Eleazar ben Pedat. So much so that if Reish Lakish spoke to a man in public, people would give a loan to, or conduct business with, that man without witnesses. Rather, Rav Pappa switches out one of the participants in the story – Reish Lakish with Ze’iri, or Rabba bar bar Chana with Rabbi Eleazar. Rashi points specifically to Reish Lakish’s reticence.

Regarding Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, Rashi points to the very end of Sota (49b). A Mishnah had stated that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi died, humility and fear of sin were nullified from the world. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (again the manuscript reading; our printed texts erroneously omit the patronymic) said to the one reciting it, “Don’t teach that fear of sin ceased, for there is still me!” Thus, he’s a chassid.

Honoring Students

We discussed another occurrence of this phrase last week, regarding Chullin 122a. In separate incidents, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Zeira (either I or II) were sitting with students and posed the question of how to define the tender camel mentioned in the Mishnah, whose hump skin had the same law as its flesh. There was a tradition, tracing back to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that it meant one that had not carried a burden. Reish Lakish honored his student by having him sit alongside him, while Rabbi Zeira (a Babylonian) did not honor him, and in fact snapped at him. The Talmudic Narrator again channels Rabbi Zerika’s expression תָּא חֲזִי מָה בֵּין תַּקִּיפֵי אַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לַחֲסִידֵי דְבָבֶל. While not the same as the primary case of praying for rain, Chullin and Megillah share that they are about Sages honoring lesser scholars or students.

Once again, Rashi explains how Reish Lakish is aloof, in that he was selective in whom he spoke to in public. Assuming that we’re dealing with Rabbi Zeira I, he points to Bava Metzia 85a, where Rabbi Zeira moved to the Land of Israel and fasted 40 fasts (our text has 100, but this is מ for 40 read as מאה for 100, or the reverse) in order to forget the Torah of Bavel. He would also fast another 40 / 100 fasts so that the fires of Gehinnom should not impact him. And, every thirty days, he would test himself by sitting in a hot oven. (The gemara continues that one day the Sages were envious of him, and his legs became singed from the oven. From then on, they would call him “the short one with singed legs”.)

Holy Bandits

There’s a derivative expression in Avodah Zarah 26a. Several of Rabbi Akiva’s students were traveling in the Land of Israel, to Keziv. They encountered bandits, who asked where they were traveling. Cleverly, they said that they were on their way to Akko, a farther destination. When they reached Keziv – and thus in a populated area – they separated from the bandits, thus depriving the bandits of the opportunity to rob them. The bandits asked whose students they were, and they named Rabbi Akiva. The bandits admiringly replied, “Fortunate are Rabbi Akiva and his students, as they were never harmed by an evil person!”

In contrast, Rav Menashe was traveling in Bavel to Bei Torta. He encountered thieves, rather than armed bandits. They asked him where he was going, and he named a farther destination, Pumbedita. He separated from them at Bei Torta. They said to him, “You are the student of Yehuda the Swindler.” (This would be Rav Yehuda bar Yechezkel who founded Pumbedita academy.) He said, “Do you know him so well? Yehi Ratzon that these people should be excommunicated.” Nebach, they worked hard at thieving for twenty-two years but were not matzliach. They all came and claimed their curse – meaning they asked forgiveness. However, one weaver among them did not ask forgiveness and was eaten by a lion. The Talmudic Narrator then quotes an aphorism that “regarding a weaver who isn’t shy, a year is deducted from his allotted years”. The Narrator follows this with the observation: Come and see the difference between the thieves of Bavel and the bandits of the Land of Israel. This is clearly a derivative phrase, and runs counter to our intuition, because bandits are violent while thieves are not.

Ultimately, this is all the Talmudic Narrator channeling the statement of the named Amora, Rabbi Zerika, and he can use it to slightly different effect. Therefore, I don’t think we need to discover Reish Lakish’s harshness, or Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak / Rabbi Zeira I’s piety. Their nationality suffices to trigger the expression.

The quoted Tannaitic source describes one who purchases shards from the gentiles and finds an idol therein.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַלּוֹקֵחַ גְּרוּטָאוֹת מִן הַגּוֹיִם, וּמָצָא בָּהֶן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה

If you were to read this in a Vilna Shas, or in an ArtScroll gemara, instead of goyim, you would see oved kochavim, worshiper of the stars. And instead of avodah zarah, you would see avodat kochavim. That parallel language just rolls off the tongue and sounds right. But it was not the wording of Chazal. It was put in place by the Christian censor. Not because “goy” is a slur, I think, unless that is what the Christians back then though. Generally, instead of saying anything about non-Jews in general, the Talmud only talks about backwards pagans who worship the stars. That way, nothing is said about Christians, who worship Jesus as part of a trinity including or encompassing God. Note that whether particular laws in the Talmud apply to Christians depends on which laws and which Rishon discusses it. But casting this as worshiping stars rather than simple gentile accomplishes the distancing.

The same for avodah zarah, “foreign worship”, and changing it to star-worship.

Note that the censorship still pertains to the Rashi and the Tosafot, which is why, for instance, the bottom red arrow points to avodat kochavim instead of avodah zarah. So less censored text, not no censored text.

This censorship can sometimes change meaning. Like, when we are discussing concerns of idolatry, does the Talmud call the person an idol-worshiper? Here, it might well not matter.

Also interesting, and worthy of research in case it has not been done, is when specific replacement words are used. For instance, Canaani in a recent sugya as a censorship term (rather than true instances where they indeed actually occur) might have more force to make clear that the law is non-operative to current non-Jewish neighbors.

On today’s daf, Bechorot 12a, the Mishnah lists what you may not use to redeem a firstborn donkey. Not a calf, not a wild animal, not a slaughtered animal, not a treifah, not kilayim (a sheep-goat cross), and not a koy. Then:

וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַתִּיר בְּכִלְאַיִם מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא שֶׂה

Rabbi Eliezer permits kilayim, because it is still a seh.

Here we have Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishnah. And here we have Tosafot on the same page, whose dibbur hamatchil is that same Rabbi Eliezer.

Tosafot, in full:

רבי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַתִּיר בַּכִּלְאַיִם – ר’ אֶלְעָזָר גרסינן וְלֹא גָרְסִינַן רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְכֵן מוֹכַח במרובה (ב”ק דף עח.) דְּאָמַר ר’ אֶלְעָזָר דְּמַתִּיר בְּכִלְאַיִם שֶׂה דְּאֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְהוֹצִיא כִּלְאַיִם לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? ומשני לטמא שֶׁנּוֹלַד מִן הַטָּהוֹר ועיבורו מִן הַטָּמֵא וּדְלָא כר’ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דְּאִי כר’ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ משה כבשים ושה עִזִּים נָפְקָא וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן דְלָא כר’ אֱלִיעֶזֶר דשרי לְעֵיל בפירקין, אַלְמָא דר”א פליג עַל ר’ אֱלִיעֶזֶר בַּר פלוגתיה דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

“Rabbi Eliezer permits kilayim”: We read “Rabbi Elazar,” not “Rabbi Eliezer.” And so it is proven in Perek Merubah (Bava Kamma 78a). There, it says that according to Rabbi Elazar, who permits kilayim, [Rava’s rule that the word] seh comes only to exclude kilayim [needs some other use], so for what halacha was it said? And it answers: for a non-kosher animal born of a kosher mother that was impregnated by a non-kosher animal, and not in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua, since Rabbi Yehoshua derives that from “the seh of sheep and the seh of goats.” All the more so, it is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who permits such an animal earlier in our perek. So we see that R”A [here] argues with Rabbi Eliezer, the disputant of Rabbi Yehoshua.

In short: Bava Kamma calls the one who permits kilayim Rabbi Elazar, and sets his view against an earlier dispute. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, the Yavneh-generation pair, argue about this animal on 7a: Rabbi Eliezer permits it, and Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it from “the seh of sheep and the seh of goats.” The later Rabbi Elazar (presumably ben Shamua, a couple of generations on) is lined up against that earlier dispute. He forbids the animal like Rabbi Yehoshua, but from his own verse, and so certainly not like Rabbi Eliezer. That fits only if the one permitting kilayim in our Mishnah is not Rabbi Eliezer himself.

(This is the corrected [mugah] Tosafot text, as shown when you click מוגה on Girsology. It follows the Tzon Kodashim, who deletes מפני שהוא, and the Shitah Mekubetzet’s fix of the last line, which in our printings reads אלמא דרבי אליעזר פליג על רבי אלעזר ור׳ אליעזר. The nikkud is Girsology’s, and not every word is pointed yet.)

What does Bava Kamma say?

I checked the manuscripts of Bava Kamma 78a on Al HaTorah (the כ״י button, drawing on the Friedberg Project’s Hachi Garsinan). Two things.

First, no witness has וכל שכן דלא כר׳ אליעזר. So I take that as Tosafot’s own step, not part of the Gemara they are quoting.

Second, the name. Here is the line where the Gemara quotes our Mishnah:

Florence 8–9, Hamburg 165 and Vatican 116 have Rabbi Elazar throughout. Escorial has Rabbi Eliezer throughout. Munich 95 has ולר׳ אלעזר and then, a few words later, quotes the Mishnah as ר׳ אליעזר. The Soncino and Venice printings do the reverse. Vilna writes ולרבי אלעזר once and then just ר״א, which doesn’t help anyone.

And the next line, where Rabbi Yehoshua comes in:

Every witness has ודלא כר׳ יהושע. So yes, Bava Kamma still brings in Rabbi Yehoshua, and in a way that fits a third Tanna. The one who permits kilayim agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua that this animal is excluded, but not about the verse it comes from. Rabbi Eliezer does not exclude it at all. If the permitter were Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara would have him using Rava’s rule to forbid an animal that he himself permits on 7a, without any comment.

So the spelling in Bava Kamma is as mixed as anywhere else, but the structure of the sugya is on Tosafot’s side.

And our Mishnah?

For Bechorot 12a itself, the כ״י button at the top right of the Mishnah (via al hatorah) opens this:

Vatican 118–119 has ר׳ אלעזר, in red. Vatican 120–121 has ר׳ אליעזר, Munich 95 abbreviates ר׳ אליע׳, and the Venice and Vilna printings have ורבי אליעזר. On the same Al HaTorah page, the commentary attributed to Rabbeinu Gershom quotes the Mishnah as ור׳ אלעזר מתיר בכלאים.

The Mishnah on its own leans harder. Kaufmann, Parma, the Rambam’s commentary manuscript and Casanatense have ר׳ אלעזר, and Cambridge has ר׳ לעזר. Only Paris 328–329 has ר׳ אליעזר written out.

But then the Gemara on our daf discusses this opinion three more times: אליבא דרבי אליעזר לא תיבעי לך, אילימא רבי אליעזר, and לא, לעולם רבי אליעזר היא. In every Bavli witness for those lines it is Rabbi Eliezer, usually abbreviated ר׳ אליע׳ or ר׳ אליעז׳. That includes Vatican 118–119, which had אלעזר in the Mishnah just above. So if Tosafot are right, the correction has to reach four places on the daf, and none of our Bavli witnesses carries it through.

Who are these two?

Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus is the plain Rabbi Eliezer of the Mishnah. Along with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya, he was one of the two leading students of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, in Yavneh after the Churban. Girsology lists him as a third-generation Tanna, and Rabbi Yehoshua as second-to-third. The Mishnah in Avot calls him a plastered cistern that doesn’t lose a drop. He and Rabbi Yehoshua argue so often that “the bar plugta of Rabbi Yehoshua” is a perfectly good way for Tosafot to say which Rabbi Eliezer they mean.

Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua is later. He was one of the students of Rabbi Akiva (fourth generation) who carried Torah on after the Bar Kochba revolt, together with Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon. Girsology lists him as a fifth-generation Tanna. In the Mishnah, plain Rabbi Elazar is usually him.

So this is not only a question of a yod. Depending on the reading, the dissent in our Mishnah comes from Yavneh or from Rabbi Akiva’s students, a couple of generations later.

What I did on Girsology

The site tags names from the text as we have it, and here the text says Rabbi Eliezer. Tosafot’s reading is an inference from another sugya, and as we saw, the Bavli witnesses do not carry it through the daf. So Girsology keeps Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus as the identification on this daf, at least for now. But if you click on his name in the Mishnah, the card now shows Tosafot’s reading of Rabbi Elazar and their proof, along with the manuscript evidence.

End quote of Claude, lightly edited.

I think that the Mishnah manuscripts with so many Eleazars is quite dispositive, so Tosafot are surely right. I am also not convinced that וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן דְלָא כר’ אֱלִיעֶזֶר דשרי לְעֵיל בפירקין is Tosafot providing a summary, even though le’eil bepirkin is there, implying some meta-discussion of what exists. Would a Tosafot rooted in Bechorot use the term bepirkin (our perek) where that perek is something in Bava Kamma? Also, I’m not so persuaded because Tosafot reason from this with אַלְמָא דר”א פליג עַל ר’ אֱלִיעֶזֶר בַּר פלוגתיה דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, which is a flimsier source.

Also, I had it add a disambiguation card in the Rabbi Eliezer biography popout here, which reads as follows.

What do you think of the style? Would you want to see more of this sort of content, where the LLM was guided by me, to perform this kind of analysis?

Please weigh in in the comments.

Here we Have Rabbi Yehuda Nesia. And here we have Rabbi Tarfon. And the former sends a peter chamor to the latter.

But how can this be? Isn’t Rabbi Yehuda Nesia an Amora? And Rabbi Tarfon a Tanna who is not really that late. They could not have interacted. Luckily, we can click on Rabbi Yehuda Nesia here and see an identification together with a disambiguation note:

Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim witness: «ובבכורות יא. מצינו ר’ יהודה נשיאה הוה ליה פטר חמור שדריה לקמיה דר’ טרפון, ודבר פלא הוה» — Rabbi Tarfon is a Tanna, so the received text is chronologically impossible for any of the three Nesi’im; מבוא המשנה suggests emending the name. Source: Hyman, Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, s.v. ר’ טרפון.

By “the three Nesiim”, the note means any of the three called nesia. Not referring to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

I would point that these explanations are often not reflective of my own position, but are drawn from the texts I am programmatically processing. Personally, I have an easy way to explain this instance. It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but rightly referred to by the Aramaic coded Rabbi Yehuda Nesia. This is because the entire story is written in Aramaic rather than in Mishnaic Hebrew. Hava. Shadar. de- prefix. Leih. So, the name was translated alongside it, and it is no scribal error.

Really, as a result, I would personally override this instance to be identified as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the Tanna, and append that personal text to the existing explanation. We will see. I will probably not get to it before you see this Substack post.

Regardless, if you want to be aware of the people on the page, this is useful site to use.

(While I am being self-critical, there is another mess-up I spotted with רַב נַחְמָן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף , thinking it is plain Rav Nachman. That is because the underlying text is messed up and should be Nechemia instead of Nachman.)

The Mishnah on Chullin 122a teaches that, while hide in general has a different status than meat, the skin of the hump of a young camel (gamal haraka, literally “soft camel”) imparts tum`ah just like its meat. What is the definition of a young camel? Ulla, a second- and third-generation Amora (from the Land of Israel), quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, a first-generation Amora (same), explaining that it is considered “young” so long as it has not been loaded with a burden. Rabbi Yirmeya and Abaye raise opposite sides of an inquiry. If it reaches the age at which camels are typically loaded but it practically never has borne a burden, is it still considered young? What if it was loaded before that typical age of loading? They are both tapping into a potential implication, that it is not a specific age at which the hide naturally toughens, so that people feel it acceptable to start putting loads on its back. Rather, the carrying of the burden on its hump is what toughens the hide. These inquiries remain unresolved. Note also that, in Chullin 59a, a young camel (ben gamal) is one that has not yet developed its upper incisors. Here, the definition of “young” seems purposefully related to the hump, rather than tied to an irrelevant though observable detail.

Reish Lakish, a second-generation Amora in the Land of Israel, sat and inquired regarding this Mishnah as to the definition of gamal haraka. Rabbi Shimon bar Abba, a third-generation Amora who ascended from Bavel to the Land of Israel, quoted Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi (directly) with the above definition. Reish Lakish responded, “sit next to me,” thus according him promotional honor.

Rabbi Zeira also sat and raised the same definitional query. This might be Rabbi Zeira I, a third-generation Amora from Bavel who ascended to the Land of Israel, in which case he stands (or sits) parallel to Reish Lakish. Alternatively, this might be Rabbi Zeira II, a fourth- and fifth-generation Amora associated with Mechoza, who traveled back and forth between Bavel and the Land of Israel. In Rabbi Zeira’s presence was Ravin bar Chinena, who spoke up and quoted Ulla who quoted Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi with the definition. Then, הֲוָה קָתָנֵי לַהּ, whatever that means – Rashi says he repeated it. Rabbi Zeira snarkily responded, חֲדָא הָוְיָא לָךְ אֲמַרְתְּ, whatever that means – Rashi expounds it as: “Do you have but one novel matter in your possession that we lack? Behold, you’ve said it, so why do you return and repeat (ותשננו) it a second time, to show off your wisdom?” Note that קָתָנֵי is ambiguous and could mean that he taught it, perhaps independently as an explanation of a Mishnah.

The Talmudic Narrator concludes that we should observe the difference between the harsh / strong scholars of the Land of Israel (here Reish Lakish) and the pious ones of Bavel (here Rabbi Zeira). That is, we should note the irony, that the strong / harsh Sage acted in a positive manner while the pious Sage sniped at the man who brought the same tradition.

In Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, Rav Aharon Hyman claims that there were two Ravin bar Chinenas. The first sat before third-generation Rav Chisda quoting Rabbi Eleazar (ben Pedat) while the second had a case come before fourth-generation Rava and directly told sixth-generation Rav Ashi about the assemblage of the Shulchan of the Beit Hamikdash. In Chullin 75b and Menachot 30b, Ravin bar Chinena quotes Ulla who quotes Rabbi Chanina that the halacha in the present case is like the Tanna, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, and indeed the halacha is universally like him. Presumably, this is the same Ravin bar Chinena in our sugya quoting Ulla.

Rav Hyman understands our sugya (and all Ulla-quoters) as involving Ravin bar Chinena I and therefore Rabbi Zeira as Rabbi Zeira I. He says that the incident occurred in the Land of Israel, for it was there that they called Rabbi Zeira “the pious of Bavel”, as Rashi explains. Furthermore, when Rabbi Zeira (I) was in Bavel, he did not reach that stature, and was simply one of Rav Yehuda’s students.

I remain unconvinced. First, Ravin bar Chinena II seems like a fine candidate for an Ulla quoter. After all, fourth-generation Abaye speaks to Ulla, and Ravin bar Chinena, as one appearing before fourth-generation Rava and speaking to sixth-generation Rav Ashi, is positioned as a fifth-generation Amora. It is a stretch, but he could repeat Ulla statements. Second, Rabbi Zeira II as a fourth-generation Amora in Mechoza, Rava’s domain, seems a perfect match to interact with Ravin bar Chinena II. Both Rabbi Zeiras are Babylonians, so are valid candidates. Third, while the gemara Rashi cites, Bava Metzia 85a, details Rabbi Zeira I’s fasting to be spared from the fires of Gehinnom and testing his spiritual level by climbing into a lit oven to see if it impacted him, neither Rashi nor the Sages in the gemara there specifically refer to him as “the pious ones of Bavel.” Rather, Rashi explains why our gemara here – which is Talmud Bavli – refers to Rabbi Zeira I as “the pious ones of Bavel.”

Fourth, and to expand on this point, no named Amora in our sugya labels him the pious ones of Bavel. It is the anonymous Talmudic Narrator, who may be Savoraic or Geonic, who applies an aphorism uttered in Taanit 23b by Rabbi Zerika, a third-generation Amora of the Land of Israel, addressed to Rav Safra, a third- and fourth-generation Amora who came to Bavel in Rabba and Rav Yosef’s days and later returned to the Land of Israel. The gemara there gives a different identity to the strong ones of the Land of Israel and the pious ones of Bavel. The Talmudic Narrator often borrows ideas uttered by named Amoraim and applies them to new situations, sometimes with novel or slightly modified meanings. Thus, an applied label of pious should not fix the story as occurring in the Land of Israel.

Next week, we’ll explore the three occurrences of תָּא חֲזִי מָה בֵּין תַּקִּיפֵי אַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לַחֲסִידֵי דְבָבֶל, who is tagged as strong / harsh or pious, and how takifei and chasidei may differ between the original expression and the Narrator’s applications.

The difference is both in the Sage mentioned, Rav Acha vs. Rav Achai, and the objecting verb used, matkif vs. parich.

Without bothering to look at manuscript variants, I would say that parich Rav Achai is original. The weirder version is stronger, a kind of lectio difficilior. This is an infrequent Sage and an infrequent attack verb.

But yes, the manuscripts on Hachi Garsinan (as shown at Al HaTorah) all agree.

Who is Rav Achai? It is either an early Savora or an early Gaon. On the sidebar which clicks out from the hyperlink, we see him listed as an 8th generation Amora, thus a Savora.

Wherever we see him, we see this unique verb, either parish (explained) or parich (asked / attacked).

So this is late material. The alternative is that this is really late material, by Rav Achai Gaon. I wrote an article a while ago about it. See here.

Anyway, with Rashi’s reading, he is Rav Acha, who is (according to Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim) Rav Acha bar Rava (no, a different Rava), contemporary of Ravina. So really late Amora, so a bit earlier. And matkif goes along with it. And, the fluidity of the Talmud in terms of things like attack verbs allows for that clarifying modification. Note that Rashi disagrees here in the dibbur hamatchil with his teacher, Rabbeinu Gershom, who has this:

פריך רב אחאי. היכי מצית למעט פיטרי סוסים וגמלים מכל דבר דהא פטר חמור אחרינא לא מייתי להכי אלא תרוייהו צריכי:

According to the displayed Sefaria text, Rabbi Chanina says: I asked Rabbi Eliezer in the great study hall. However, this is corrected to Rabbi Eleazar by Masoret Hashas.

Why?

Plain Rabbi Chanina is assumed to be Rabbi Chanina bar Chama, a 1st generation Amora, so approximately parallel to Rav.

Plain Rabbi Eliezer is Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, a third-generation Tanna. The gap is 4th generation, 5th generation, 6th generation Tanna, transitional generation, and then we reach 1st generation Amora. How could the Amora speak to such an early Tanna?

Plain Rabbi Eleazar, if a Tanna, is typically 5th generation Rabbi Eleazar ben Shamua, and if an Amora, is 2nd-generation Rabbi Eleazar ben Pedat. Either would be a good candidate, but let us go with the Tanna.

So that is how the identity and scholastic association is tugged towards the later Sages.

The potential problem with that — or confound, if you will — is that the gemara continues to associate the positions uttered by this ר״א with one side of a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus) and his usual disputant, Rabbi Yehoshua (ben Chanania). Thus:

So each of these positions uttered to Rabbi Chanina by ר״א matches one side in a Tannaitic dispute, and that is the side of Rabbi Eliezer. So maybe this really is Rabbi Eliezer! We are dragged towards earlier Sages.

Even so, Rabbi Chanina really sounds like this known Amora, even as I am unsure whether the Rabbi Eleazar is a late Tanna or an early Amora. Two bits of evidence support this, namely the introductory word אמר rather than תניא, and the Talmudic Narrator associates this position to one side of a Tannaitic dispute with the word כתנאי. This usually is used to connect an Amoraic position to a Tannaitic position.

Manuscripts have a mix of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Eleazar, so we cannot determine from that.

On the other hand, Rav Aharon Hyman, in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, has an easier fix. Don’t emend Rabbi Eliezer to Rabbi Eleazar, because you just were thinking of the wrong Rabbi Chanina!

This is not the Amora. Rather, it is the Tanna we see in a brayta. He points us to Nazir 29b:

לֵימָא הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא שֶׁהִדִּירוֹ אָבִיו בְּנָזִיר, וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. וְהָיָה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בּוֹדְקוֹ לֵידַע אִם הֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, אִם לֹא הֵבִיא.

With regard to the dispute concerning the time period for a father’s vow on behalf of his son, the Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute between these tanna’im is like the dispute between those other tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 5:9): An incident occurred involving Rabbi Ḥanina in which his father vowed that he should be a nazirite when he was a minor, and they brought him before Rabban Gamliel, and Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern if he had already developed two pubic hairs, in which case the vow would not take effect, or if he had not developed them, which would mean that the vow was valid.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: לֵידַע אִם הִגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים, אִם לָאו. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי, אַל תִּצְטַעֵר לְבוֹדְקֵנִי, אִם קָטָן אֲנִי — אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל אַבָּא, אִם גָּדוֹל אֲנִי — אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל עַצְמִי. עָמַד רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וּנְשָׁקוֹ עַל רֹאשׁוֹ, אָמַר: מוּבְטָח אֲנִי בָּזֶה שֶׁמּוֹרֶה הֲלָכָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. אָמְרוּ: לֹא הָיוּ יָמִים מוּעָטִים עַד שֶׁהוֹרָה הוֹרָאָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

Rabbi Yosei says that Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern whether he had reached the age of vows or not, which he maintains is the decisive factor. The child said to Rabban Gamliel: My teacher, do not go to the trouble of examining me, since if I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father’s vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. Rabban Gamliel arose and kissed the child on his head. He said: I am certain of this child that he will eventually become an authority of halakha for the Jewish people. They said: In fact, it was only a few years later that the child issued rulings for the Jewish people.

With the Tosefta filling in details and that this was Rabbi Chanina beRabbi Chanina.

Also, in Berachot 2b, after Rabbi Meir:

וְעָנִי וְכֹהֵן חַד שִׁעוּרָא הוּא? וּרְמִינְהוּ: מֵאֵימָתַי מַתְחִילִין לִקְרוֹת שְׁמַע בָּעֲרָבִין — מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁקָּדַשׁ הַיּוֹם בְּעַרְבֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁהַכֹּהֲנִים מְטוֹהָרִים לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָתָן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁהַכֹּהֲנִים טוֹבְלִין לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָתָן. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: וַהֲלֹא כֹּהֲנִים מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם הֵם טוֹבְלִים? רַבִּי חֲנִינָא אוֹמֵר מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁעָנִי נִכְנָס לֶאֱכוֹל פִּתּוֹ בְּמֶלַח. רַבִּי אַחַאי וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁרוֹב בְּנֵי אָדָם נִכְנָסִין לְהָסֵב.

And is the time of the poor person and the priest the same? The Gemara raises a contradiction to this approach from another baraita, in which other opinions regarding the time for the recitation of the evening Shema are cited: From when does one begin to recite the evening Shema?
From the time when the day becomes sanctified on the eve of Shabbat, this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, who established an earlier time for Shema.
Rabbi Yehoshua, like our mishna, says: From the time when the priests are eligible to partake of their teruma.
Rabbi Meir says: The time for the recitation of Shema begins before the priests were purified, from when the priests immerse themselves in order to partake of their teruma.
Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Meir: How is it possible that the time for the recitation of the evening Shema corresponds to the time of the priests’ immersion? Do the priests not immerse themselves during the day, so that with nightfall and the onset of a new day they will be purified? If so, how can that time be called night?
Rabbi Ḥanina says that the time for the recitation of the evening Shema begins when the poor person enters to eat his bread with salt.
But Rabbi Aḥai, and some say Rabbi Aḥa, says: From the time when most people enter to recline at their meal during the week.

Also, Shabbat 110b:

וְהָתַנְיָא, מִנַּיִין לַסֵּירוּס בָּאָדָם שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבְאַרְצְכֶם לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״ — בָּכֶם לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא.

Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that castration of a man is prohibited? The verse states: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or torn, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24), meaning that you shall not do it to yourselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina.

A fifth-generation Tanna speaking to a third-generation Tanna is certainly possible.

Even so, we should note that the אמר and the כתנאי would be problematic.

Can taste (ta’am) exist in some material absent any actual substance (mamash)? If it can, do we grant the taste halachic prominence on a Biblical or Rabbinic level, or ignore it? If it cannot, then do we say that mere taste, accompanied by a minuscule amount of actual substance, has halachic prominence, on a Biblical or Rabbinic level? These are two ways of thinking about whether ta’am ke’ikkar, taste is like substance, in turn based on competing scientific theories of matter.

In a prior Jewish Link article, “Rabbi Yehuda and Scientific Nullification“ (December 4, 2025), I discussed the Atomists and the Continuists, whose scientific theories overlapped with Chazal. To quote / summarize myself: The Atomists, such as Democritus, maintained that “everything is made of indivisible atoms moving in the void, and these atoms differ in properties like shape, size, arrangement and motion. And macroscopic qualities (such as hot, sweet and red) are emergent from how atoms are arranged and move.“ Continuists, such as Empedocles, said that “every substance can be construed as a vector of four roots: (x_earth, x_water, x_air, x_fire), where each component is a fractional contribution.” Other Continuists such as Aristotle made it a vector of intensities of qualities, such as (q_hot, q_cold, q_wet, q_dry).

Within the Continuist model, we could explain bittul as a physical reality, at least for liquid mixtures. Say you have water and wine. Water might be (10, 15, 4, 0) and wine might be (100, 30, 8, 10). If mixed in equal amounts, the resulting mixture would be ([10 + 100] / 2, [15 + 30] / 2, [4 + 8] / 2, [0 + 10] / 2). This would not be a description just of the mixture, in terms of the ratio of particles of water and wine. Rather, every drop of the liquid would have these characteristics, and every drop would intrinsically have a quality somewhere between water and wine. And, if the liquids were mixed in drastically unequal amounts – say, a drop of wine into the Mediterranean Sea – Continuist scientists were divided as to whether every drop of seawater would have infinitesimal qualities of wine, or whether they would stay the same and the wine drop would just be vanquished and turn into water, that is, transformation towards the dominant instead of true mixis. Either one could be a physical understanding of bittul. Additionally, it accounts for Rabbi Yehuda’s position that for liquids of like kinds – min bemino – nullification does not occur. There is no change in the vector’s values, so the liquid retains its initial identity, and any associated halachic category has no mechanism by which to shift.

In follow-up articles on my Scribal Error Substack, I discussed how this works well for named Tannaim and Amoraim, and for liquid mixtures – what we call lach belach and the scientists called mixus. It should not apply to yavesh beyavesh, dry mixtures of different kinds of grain, flour, or pieces of meat. Here, even the Continuists would become Atomists and say that each particle retains its identity, something called aggregation instead of mixis. Chazal would agree about the physical reality and only might apply bittul by fiat, under halachic rules of following majority label. The only exception could be one Tanna, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who advanced the idea of bila, true mixture, by solids such as flour.

With the above in mind, many sugyot become clear. However, the Talmudic Narrator of specifically one masechta, Menachot, conflated bittul in dry mixtures and bittul in liquid mixtures. Note that the anonymous Aramaic Talmudic Narrator – the Stamma – might well post-date the Amoraic era, and Ravina and Rav Ashi who are sof hora’a, and could be speaking in the Savoraic or even Geonic era. Rabbenu Tam (Tosafot Zevachim 73a) first attempts to distinguish between lach belach and yavesh beyavesh, but retracts when confronting the sugya in Menachot. All Rishonim feel constrained by the full Talmudic text, and Acharonim follow Rishonim, so the modern picture of the mechanisms of bittul follow a somewhat difficult and forced system and interpretation of the various sugyot and Tannaitic / Amoraic positions.

Exuding Taste

This is all lengthy background to this article’s related topic, which is whether taste (ta’am) can be transferred without accompanying substance (mamash, ikkar, be’ein), assuming that there is heat and moisture involved. My proposal is this. For those following the Atomic view of matter, any transfer must involve some be’ein, actual material, and taste would accompany that material. “Taste” would simply be a threshold of perceptibility. For those following the Continuum view of matter, it is plausible for taste to transfer independent of physical material.

To explain, consider how, in a liquid mixture, material A with one quality vector (q_hot, q_cold, q_wet, q_dry) impacts material B with which it interacts and mixes. The material did not transfer. Rather, its qualities transfer. Now imagine two liquids (or two solids with a liquid acting as a transfer-enabler) A and B sitting beside one another without mixing, but we apply heat. Here as well, within this scientific framework, we could imagine that A’s qualities could impact B’s qualities, so that B becomes more A-like. That would be ta’am.

By way of analogy, Einstein quoted his friend Marcel Grossmann as saying “I must admit that studying physics has actually benefited me considerably. Before, when I sat down on a chair that felt a bit warm from the person who had occupied it previously, I used to feel rather uncomfortable. This feeling has completely gone now, because physics has taught me that the heat is something totally impersonal.” That is, heat is not transferred from one person’s buttocks to another by way of the chair. Rather, the first person’s jostling molecules set the chair’s molecules jostling, and the chair’s in turn set the second person’s. Nothing passes from body to body — no stuff, no substance, not even a “warmth.” What propagates is a state of agitation. Similarly, when ta’am transfers from one substance to another via liquid and heat, there is no transfer of substance, just a modification of the quality vector.

Abaye’s Position

The term ta’am is overloaded, and in many instances refers to physical substance whose ratio allows for its presence to be discerned. However, consider Chullin 108a, where Abaye, a fourth-generation Amora in Pumbedita, says טַעְמוֹ וְלֹא מַמָּשׁוֹ בְּעָלְמָא – דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. “Taste without accompanying substance in the general case is Biblical.” By “Biblical”, Abaye means that it is real, either by Divine dictate or rooted in physical reality, rather than a rabbinic ordinance. He gives a proof which his contemporary, Rava, rejects. It is unclear whether Rava rejects the principle or just the proof.

Rashi explains Abaye’s statement, writing “this that we forbid in all prohibited substances once they give their taste in the permitted, even though there is no actual food (אוכל ממש), such as where he removed the prohibited item (סילק האיסור) and there is only its taste (טעמו) – that is Biblical.” From the perspective of an Atomist, this is troubling, because if there is taste, then there must be some minuscule substance present.

Similarly, Ramban in his Chiddushim on Chullin 98b explains ta’am ke’ikkar: “for instance, where the actual substance (גופה) of the prohibited item isn’t mixed , similar to grapes which one steeped in water, and there is in the water the taste of wine, that there is no wine in it at all; alternatively, that there is wine init, except it was lost (אבד) in its tiny amount, such as a drop of wine that fell into water and there is no appearance of wine, for its substance was lost; and such as meat (cooked) in milk, that the meat gives taste to the milk or the milk to the meat.” I believe the middle case is transformation towards the dominant where the substance disappears. The other cases are not that liquid taste exudes into the water, for that would be substance. Rather, Ramban is best aligned with the scientific theories I explained above. Ramban was well aware of scientific theories.

Ran on Chullin 98b distinguishes between three types of ta’am ke’ikkar, with the first being where the permitted substance only absorbed the ta’am from the prohibited substance, not its material (גופו) nor its exuded material (פליטתו), which is derives from the verse and case of grapes steeped in water; the second, where it absorbs its exuded material, which he connects to gi’ulei nochrim; and the third, where the actual material (גופו) is mixed with the permitted material, connected to basar bechalav. Thus, for Ran, it is an overloaded term, a quasi-misleading homonym. Still, he does acknowledge the idea of ta’am without actual exuded material in some cases. See also Aruch Hashulchan Yoreh De’ah 98 for an excellent rundown of competing theories of the meaning and status of ta’am ke’ikkar, including explanations I didn’t include here.

When studying Chullin and Yoreh De’ah in YU semicha, I’d venture that most of my fellow students mentally mapped every ta’am ke’ikkar onto the Atomic model. That is, that we are dealing with a minuscule amount, and that this is different from actual discernible substance or fats that dissolved into the mixture, which are be’ein. That is because we mostly didn’t have the language and background in the history of science to know of the continuum model and to consider otherwise. Even if we did, we’d need to grapple with halacha which was grounded in debunked scientific theory. Indeed, that’s a question we’ll have to consider in a future article.

Agra, father-in-law of Rabbi Abba, appears in two sugyot in the Talmud. In Menachot 29b, he had tefillin in which the leg of the heh of הָעָם was severed by a perforation. He asked his son-in-law about its validity, and Rabbi Abba clarified in which situations it would be acceptable. He had a sefer Torah with extra letters, and asked his son-in-law, who said that while we cannot correct by adding letters, we may erase extraneous letters. This second ruling matches a position of Rav that was refuted by a brayta, so perhaps Rabbi Abba is second-generation Rabbi Abba I, who was Rav’s student. This is how Rav Aharon Hyman understands it in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim.

We hear from him again on Chullin 104b, in a teaching role. He taught a brayta that עוֹף וּגְבִינָה נֶאֱכָלִין בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן, bird meat and cheese can be eaten be`apikoren. He taught it, and he said about it that this means without washing one’s hands and without wiping one’s mouth. Rav Yitzchak bar Mesharshiya visited Rav Ashi’s house. They served him cheese and he ate. They served him meat and he ate, without washing his hands. They said to him, “But Agra, Rabbi Abba’s father-in-law, said עוֹף וּגְבִינָה נֶאֱכָלִין בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן, implying that this behavior pattern is acceptable for fowl and cheese, but not meat and cheese!” He replied that that law pertained only at night, but not during the day, when one could see food residue on one’s hands. Note that Rabbi Abba III came from the Land of Israel to Bavel in the time of Rav Ashi, so perhaps Agra is that Amora’s father-in-law.

Background

The core Biblical prohibition of meat with milk, associated with “thou shalt not cook a kid in its mother’s milk”, is directed at kosher mammals, which give milk, rather than fowl, which don’t. A threefold repetition of the verse teaches that not only may one not cook it, but also one may not follow through with the logical purpose of cooking it. Thus, one may not eat such meat cooked with milk, nor benefit from such meat cooked with milk.

Atop this Biblical injunction are rabbinic or in some cases customary pious practices to create further distance from such mixture. Uncle Moishe sings that we will never never never eat milk and meat together – note the clever threefold repetition – but note that cold cheese upon cold beef is prohibited only on a Rabbinic level. The perek’s opening Mishnah stated that “meat” could not ascend the table with cheese, carving out only fish and locusts, and leaving fowl ambiguous for the dispute in the next Mishnah.

That Mishnah (Chullin 104b) presents a dispute between Beit Shammai, who stated that fowl could ascend the eating-table with cheese but may not be eaten with it, and Beit Hillel, who stated it could neither ascend nor be eaten. A later fifth-generation Tanna, Rabbi Yossi, noted that this is one of Beit Shammai’s leniencies and Beit Hillel’s stringencies. Actually, the anonymous voice of the Mishnah might explicitly rule like Beit Shammai. While the printings and many manuscripts have דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, the Mishnah as appearing in the Munich 95 Talmud manuscript and the Kaufmann Mishnah manuscript have כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי.

This brayta stating that fowl and cheese may be ne`echalin be`apikoren seems like a leniency stacked upon Beit Shammai’s leniency, that they may be eaten with abandon. However, as clarified by Agra, it doesn’t mean that they can be eaten together, but that they can be eaten in sequence, without concern of remnants on one’s hands or mouth1. One shouldn’t deliberately set out to eat them together, as a rabbinic decree, but if it happens in the course of normal eating, this is unproblematic.

Apikoren Definition

What does apikoren mean? Recall that Agra said עוֹף וּגְבִינָה נֶאֱכָלִין בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן. The Rif records a slight variant, as עוף וגבינה נאכלין באפיקורין וי”א באפקוליס, that some texts have be`apikolis. Rashi defines apikoren as “in a manner of hefker, that he is not careful about it, and as is subsequently explained” by Agra. Thus, he sees a trace of the famous word hefker. Relatedly, Rashi defines והוא אמר לה, “and he said about it”, that Agra, from his own logic, defined the word apikoren. The Ran explains the Rif’s version of באפקוליס as referring to a cloth, a מטלית.

Tosefta Chullin 8:1 contains a compelling and tempting alternative. It reads in part: א”ר יוסי זה מקולי ב”ש ומחומרי ב”ה ב”ש אומרים עולה ואין נאכל וב”ה אומרים לא עולה ולא נאכל ר”א ברבי צדוק אומר העוף עולה עם הגבינה על השולחן אפיקולוס אומר אין נאכל אחרים אומרים משמו אף נאכל. This might be difficult to parse. My first attempt is this: Fifth-generation Rabbi Yossi presents the Beit Shammai / Beit Hillel leniency vs. stringency in which no one says fowl and cheese may be eaten but Beit Shammai does say fowl and cheese may ascend, Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok simply said that fowl may ascend, without elaborating whether it may be eaten. Apikolos said it may not be eaten. Others say in his (meaning Apikolos’) name that it may even be eaten. This is an easy oral confusion between `ein and `af.

Note that according to Rav Aharon Hyman in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, the names of Tzadok and Eleazar continued to alternate among father and son, so that there were three Tannaim by the name of Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok. The first Rabbi Tzadok lived in the days of Hillel and Shammai, and his son, Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok I was a student of Rabbi Yochanan HaChorani, in turn a student of Shammai. If this is the right identification in the Tosefta, then we have a member of Beit Shammai echoing the Shammai position. Alternatively, his grandson, Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok II, was a student of Rabbi Akiva and thus a contemporary of Rabbi Yossi. He’d be weighing in on how to rule practically in this dispute. Alternatively, his grandson, Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok III, was a sixth-generation student of Rabbi Meir, a scholastic generation later than Rabbi Yossi who weighs in. I would favor either the second or third Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok.

Then, Apikolos, presumably an otherwise unknown Tanna who is a contemporary of Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok II or III, chimes in, either that it’s not eaten – the default assumption from Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok’s simple statement that it (merely) ascends – or disagreeing and saying it may even be eaten. I find the latter version of Apikolos’ statement more compelling.

Note that lamed and resh, part of the phonological lamnar group, often switch off – consider almana vs. armalta, a Hebrew and Aramaic cognate. Thus, Apikolos and Apikoren might be alternative names. If so, I’d suggest two ways in which the Tosefta reading can work within our sugya in Chullin. First, with no manuscript evidence, there’s a scribal error at play and the word should be ke-Apikoren, so that Agra is saying that we rule like Apikoren / Apikolos. Second, we preserve the letter bet and say that, “within” the two alternatives attributed to Apikolos in the Tosefta, we select the one in which he says that they may be eaten.

Further, a survey of the phrase הוּא תָנֵי לַהּ וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ across Talmud shows that the phrase in the vast majority of instances expands on how to practically apply the ambiguous tradition in the brayta, or else states with whom we rule. Granted, Chullin 22b makes it a definition of מִשֶּׁיְּעַלְעוּ. However, we could well understand Agra as elaborating on ne`echalin’s meaning – see Temura 29a defining ma’aseh rather than defining an existing unknown word.

At least two scholars disagree with me. Jastrow’s entry on Apikolos takes it as a name in Tosefta, to be compared with another name, Avkolos. Meanwhile he deems be`apikoren to mean without restraint. A marginal note referring to the opinion of Apikolos in the Tosefta was taken as a variant text of apikoren and that “another glossator, probably thinking of facialis, φακίολης, added פי׳ מטלית—all of which was interpolated in Alfasi.”

Rav Aharon Hyman takes Apikolos as the Tanna of the Tosefta. He is tempted to read the same into our sugya. However, he notes Rashi’s explanation, Agra’s explanation of be`apikoren, the later interpretation of matlit. He concludes that these must not have had our girsa of the Tosefta before them and that, doubtless, they are right. Personally, I am not persuaded, though I hope that you don’t label me an Apikolos for that.

Alternative Parse

I could see a reading in which Apikolos / Apikoren is not a Tanna anywhere. The Vienna manuscript skips אומר after the word apikolis.

This alternative parse would then be: Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok says fowl can ascend with cheese on the table apikolis (“with abandon”) [but] cannot be eaten; Others say in his – Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok’s – name that it can even be eaten. That’s plausible if a bit forced. After all, what does “with abandon” add to ascending on the table, and the word אבל / “but” should be present. I’d rather say the omission of אומר is haplography, skipping similar words, because of the word אין, rejecting this parse.

Thus, I think that Apikolos / Apikoren was a late Tanna whose lenient position was quoted lehalacha by Agra. Even so, Agra imposed a limitation on the word ne`echal to mean not full eating together, but just without restrictions of separating cleansing found in other contexts.

See Tosafot who identifies this with the exiled Rav Kahana, thus Rav Kahana I, who states he was exiled for marrying a kohenet. But Tosafot says based on another gemara that there must be a different Rav Kahana who was a kohen.

What I want to call attention to is the Masoret HaShas who quotes the Sheiltot’s version of the gemara where this is Rav Huna, not Rav Kahana. This variant would not be introduced to solve a problem, I think. It is just an orthographic similarity. And it might solve certain problems.

See my recent two articles about the five Rav Kahanas, produced via certain constraints and assumptions. I don’t necessarily agree with all the constraints and assumptions.

followed by:

To quote the relevant segment of my first article about Rav Kahana I vs II:

I believe we can resolve Rav Hyman’s contradictions without splitting an Amora in twain. First, in Pesachim 113a, when Rav said to Rav Kahana that one should not say כָּהֲנָא אֲנָא וְגַבְרָא רַבָּא אֲנָא, he may have been engaging in wordplay on Rav Kahana’s name, rather than a kohanic identity. Second, even if that Rav Kahana was a kohen, the exiled Israelite Amora married to a kohen’s daughter in Pesachim 49a and Chullin 132a was another exiled Rav Kahana. This may seem farfetched, but consider that the Amoraic era was unfortunately turbulent. Let us add that, in both Chullin and Pesachim, this Rav Kahana is discussed as marrying a kohen’s daughter in the context of fifth-generation Rav Pappa. Sugyot generally proceed in chronological order of Amoraim’s scholastic generation, yet in Chullin, Rav Kahana precedes and, in Pesachim, Rav Pappa precedes. Third, Tosafot only discuss two Rav Kahanas, but consider that in Kiddushin, when Rav Kahana accepts the turban, it is sixth-generation Rav Ashi who reacts, restricting it to one such as Rav Kahana who is a great man (gavra rabba). One of the later Rav Kahanas was actually Rav Ashi’s teacher, so maybe only this later one was a kohen. (On the other hand, consider the matching of kohanic status and gavra rabba status with the earlier moral instruction from Rav.) The constraints needn’t force us to divide one early Rav Kahana as student-colleague into two figures.

I also am not sure (though did not argue the point) that we should split off the Rav Kahana who was teacher and who was colleague of Rav Ashi, or that we should necessarily assign certain sugyot to particular ones. That would be IV and IV, discussed in the second article.

The preceding Mishnah (93b) had stated that a (Jewish) person may send an animal thigh to a gentile even though the sciatic nerve (prohibited in consumption only to Jews) is within it, because its place is conspicuous. The Talmudic Narrator analyzes the Mishnah, pointing out that it speaks of a complete animal thigh, meaning that a cut-up thigh where the sciatic nerve is not conspicuous may not be sent. The Narrator offers several possible explanations for the Mishnah’s concern, with the last alternative being geneivat da’at. That is, the Jew would be misleading the gentile into thinking that the gift was more valuable than it was, and he would have been more appreciative – that the Jew had troubled himself to remove the sciatic nerve and cut it up, and could have eaten it himself, and instead sent it as a gift1. In justifying this last alternative, the Narrator invokes Shmuel’s statement about the scope of the prohibition extending to gentiles, and then uses it as a bridge to an entire sugya about geneivat da’at, the prohibition of misleading people.

Shmuel, a first-generation Amora, did not explicitly make the statement. Rather, Shmuel was once crossing the river in a ferry and told his attendant to compensate (פַּיְּיסֵיהּ, appease) the ferryman. His attendant did so, and Shmuel was displeased with him. Filling in the details, Abaye, in the fourth generation of Amoraim, had one tradition – that the attendant had given the gentile ferryman a treifa chicken and the ferryman believed it to have been properly shechted. His contemporary, Rava, had a different tradition – that Shmuel told the attendant to give the ferryman (wine) for drinking in an anpaka (a quarter-log vessel), and the attendant gave him (less valuable) diluted wine, thus misleading him.

Importance of Attribution

The Narrator wonders why we bother mentioning that Shmuel’s statement was merely inferred, if the effect is the same. He explains that, according to Abaye’s tradition, that it was a treifa, Shmuel may have been upset because the attendant had kept the chicken in his possession. (That could have led a Jew to accidentally eat it.) According to the Rava tradition, that it was an anpaka of wine, it is because the word “anpaka” refers to undiluted wine. (This might mean that it was more than simply misleading to give the ferryman a different item. Rashi explains that Shmuel could have been concerned with his own honor, as the attendant had thus disobeyed him.) Thus, the Shmuel story need not prove that he actually held this position about geneivat da’at.

While the Narrator fleshed out exactly why, in this case, it was important to distinguish explicit statement from inference, this concern for accurate attribution permeates the entire Talmud. There could always be an alternative impetus for an action or cryptic statement.

Similarly, Amoraim express the importance of giving proper attribution. See Rabbi Yochanan quoting Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai in Yevamot 97a, or Rabbi Eleazar ben Pedat citing Rabbi Chanina in Megillah 15a. Amoraim also dislike when someone is wrongly credited with a statement. In Chullin 50a, some sages mistakenly related a position of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rav Nachman, in front of Rava, who was Rav Nachman’s primary student. Rava chastised them, saying “Have I not told you not to hang empty bottles on him?”

Within our sugya, note how, rather than having Shmuel himself proffer the explanation of our Mishnah, the Talmudic Narrator offers it himself. He points us to Shmuel’s position, via דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, as justification for his own idea. (We see this concern often, taking the form of “like Rabbi X said, for Rabbi X said”, or when the Narrator suggests how a Sage would answer a challenge, taking the form of “Rabbi X would say to you” instead of a simple “Rabbi X says”. This also follows the Narrator’s typical pattern of almost exclusive reuse of ideas expressed by earlier sources.) And, even there, he notes that Shmuel did not make the statement explicitly.

Import of Anpaka

We might investigate the Narrator’s suggestion that anpaka may connote specifically the more expensive, denser, undiluted wine. In Bava Metzia 86a, refers to an employer’s obligation to provide for his laborer according to local custom, and explains that this means the local custom of workers eating bread and drinking an anpaka (quarter log, or revi’it) of wine. This is ambiguous – since wine is drunk diluted, it might refer to a measure which they then dilute. On the one hand, since this is the drink for a single meal, diluted makes sense. On the other, this meal is a form of payment, much like that to a ferryman.

In Gittin 69b, Rabbi Yochanan states that the cure for drinking uncovered water is to drink an anpaka of undiluted wine, but for a pus-filled wound, one should drink an anpaka of wine steeped in red ice plant. For roundworm, it is an anpaka of wine steeped in laurel leaves. I suspect the Talmudic Narrator drew his possible “undiluted” definition from Gittin, but the fact that anpaka takes a qualifier – a shem levai that does not always accompany it – suggests the opposite to me. The Narrator may respond that, after the first instance, “undiluted” was implicit. Undiluted wine may be generally called for in cures.

Finally, Kiddushin 70a-b records a potentially polemical clash between Rav Nachman and Rav Yehuda. A Nehardean visiting Pumbedita was forced to wait in a butcher shop for the attendant of Rav Yehuda (founder of Pumbedita academy) to be served. He insulted Rav Yehuda, who heard of it and placed the man in cherem and declared that he had slave status. Rav Nachman, who took over Nehardea academy after Shmuel’s death, summoned Rav Yehuda to appear before him to justify himself. Rav Nachman and Rav Yehuda’s interaction can be understood as a competition as to who is more authentic, and who represents the true rabbinic heir to their mutual teacher Shmuel.

One aspect of their competition is linguistic, as Rav Nachman, representing the sophisticated and acculturated Nehardea, uses words like gundarita (little fence), karfita (bench), etronga (citron), and anbaga (cup). In each case, Rav Yehuda, representing the culturally frummer Pumbedita, chastises him for not using the Biblical, Rabbinic, or common folk’s term.

In the last instance, Rav Nachman says “let Master drink an anbaga (of wine)”. Rav Yehuda responds, “Do you detest the word ispargus, which the Sages use, or anpak, which the common people use?” Note that anbaga is linguistically related to anpaka, since the bet and peh are both bilabial plosives (produced with both lips), the difference only being that bet is voiced and peh is unvoiced. Similarly, gimel and kaf (not kuf) share a place of articulation, again with the gimel being voiced. Regardless, it is a loanword. Still, the elite speech was anbaga.

One might argue that anpak and anpaka are distinct. However, the final kametz aleph is usually just a difference in definite vs. indefinite form “the” vs. “a”). Also, while the Vilna and Guadalajara printings, plus the Munich 95 manuscript, have anpak, the Venice printing has the abbreviated אנפק׳. The Constantinople printing and Oxford 367 and Vatican 110-111 manuscripts have anpaka. An abbreviated anpak’ seems like an intermediate scribal step between anpaka and anpak.

The Amoraim typically drank mixed, diluted wine, so if Rav Nachman offered Rav Yehuda an anpaka of wine at the meal, he meant the diluted one. When their mutual teacher, Shmuel, promised the ferryman an anpaka of wine, he used an ambiguous term. In some contexts, like certain cures, and implied as a payment to a ferryman, it means the denser and dearer undiluted wine. In other contexts, such as in meals offered to rabbinic colleagues and perhaps to workers, it means diluted wine. Rava, as Rav Nachman’s primary student who moved to and took over leadership of what was Pumbedita academy, would know the respective connotations, so that the attendant’s action was merely misleading rather than outright theft via non-payment.

In the sidra of Vayishlach, Yaakov wrestles with an angel and then limps on his (perhaps dislocated) thigh. Bereshit 32:33 explains that, “Therefore, the children of Israel do not eat the displaced tendon, which is on the socket of the hip, until this day, for he touched the socket of Jacob’s hip, in the hip sinew.” These “children of Israel” might be his literal children and grandchildren, in which case the custom or prohibition was operative almost immediately, or might refer to later descendants, and is setting out a practice to take place after Mattan Torah. The opening Mishnah of the seventh perek of Chullin (on 89b) lays out the breadth of the application of this mitzvah, including that it is operative regardless of whether the Temple is standing and whether he is in the Land of Israel or outside. It applies both to sacrificial and non-sacrificial animals.

After a lengthy Stammaic analysis of the Mishnah, the first named Amoraic analysis begins in Chullin 90a. Rav1 Chiya bar Yosef (a second-generation Amora) says that the Mishnah only intended a sciatic nerve (gid hanasheh) consumption prohibition to sacrificial animals that are consumed (such as chatat, asham, and shelamim). Rabbi Yochanan (same) says it applies even to those that are not eaten (such as olah). Some time later, a fifth-generation Babylonian Amora, Rav Pappa, harmonized their dispute, but there are two versions of this harmonization. His contemporary, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, says that there is indeed a dispute.

The first version of Rav Pappa’s harmonization is that Rav Chiya bar Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan don’t actually disagree, but are dealing with different cases. “This” statement was לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ while “this” statement was לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ. I’ll expand the concise wording. Even though in the original presentation of the dispute Rav Chiya bar Yosef went first, we are reversing the order of Sages. This statement of Rabbi Yochanan was לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ, that he would be lashed for consuming even korbanot like olah that are not generally consumed. And, the pronominal suffix of תוֹ pertains to the human. This statement of Rav Chiya bar Yosef was לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ, that is, bringing it up on the altar. Elsewhere we see a concept that burning on the altar is a form of “eating”, and Rav Chiya bar Yosef is saying that burning an olah on the altar with its sciatic nerve is not problematic2.

The second version of Rav Pappa’s harmonization, expressed as an אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, is that Rav Chiya bar Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan don’t actually disagree, but are dealing with different cases. “This” statement was לְחׇלְצוֹ while “this” statement was לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ. I’ll expand the concise wording. We keep the original order of dispute and consistently take the pronominal suffix as pertaining to the korban. As Rashi explains, the statement of Rav Chiya bar Yosef, that the prohibition of gid hanasheh does not apply to korbanot which are not eaten, merely means that one need not remove (choletz) it from the thigh before bringing the entire korban onto the altar3. Rabbi Yochanan, who says that the prohibition applies even to non-eaten korbanot, refers to putting it on the altar as an independent item.

Rav Chiya bar Yosef

Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa are famous, but who is Rav Chiya bar Yosef? As Rav Hyman explains in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, he was a Babylonian Amora who studied primarily under first-generation Amora Rav, as evidenced by his always quoting Rav4, and his relating Rav’s action of sustaining wheat for orphan girls’ dowries. Later, he came before first-generation Shmuel to study. Where Rav and Shmuel disagreed – regarding whether animals can go out with a fodder basket or with a saddlecloth (Shabbat 53a), or whether a tiny puncture in the aorta renders an animal treifa (Chullin 45b), he related Rav’s position before Shmuel. Shmuel’s reaction in both cases was, “If Abba (meaning Rav) said this, then he knows nothing about the laws of Shabbat / treifa.” Elsewhere, he inquires of Shmuel or attacks Shmuel’s position. In Eruvin 90b, he asks Shmuel, “is the halacha like you or like Rav” about treating a large ship like a single domain, and Shmuel says the halacha is like Rav.

He was the leader in the city of Sichra, as we see him issue a decree in Sichra about legal responsibilities of porters who accidentally break the items they were transporting (Bava Metzia 83a). He moved to the Land of Israel in the days of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish and repeated Rav’s teachings before Rabbi Yochanan (Gittin 39a, Chullin 54a). He seems to have been appointed as a judge in the city of Teveria, for we see (Yerushalmi Bava Metzia 4:2) a case coming before Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef5 and Rabbi Yochanan, in which someone paid for raw silk and then reneged. He teaches braytot before Rabbi Yochanan. Elsewhere, he objects before Rabbi Yochanan and asks before Rabbi Yochanan. He argues with Rabbi Yochanan in our sugya of Chullin 90a, as well as in Zevachim 20b, 21b, where I would note that his position precedes that of Rabbi Yochanan. Rav Hyman also lists Bava Kamma 106b where he maintains עֵירוּב פָּרָשִׁיּוֹת כָּתוּב כָּאן, but that is the Talmudic Narrator creating the juxtaposition. He responds to Reish Lakish’s objection to a brayta in Temurah 7a, indicating (for Rav Hyman) that they were colleagues.

Which Harmonization?

Rav Pappa harmonized the dispute out of existence, but what was his true harmonization? I presented the two versions above as an אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, which is a way of having both variant traditions of the correct statement or sugya embedded within the single Talmudic text. A traditional assumption is that אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי is fairly early, stated by Ravina and Rav Ashi as redactors, or at least by Savoraic redactors. This has repercussions, as some Rishonim take the listing order of the traditions as indicating which Rav Ashi felt was primary and lehalacha – that is, hilcheta kelishna batra.

I am not as convinced of the antiquity of אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, and suspect that many or all may arise from medieval scribes becoming aware of an alternate textual tradition, then copying those alternatives into the margins and ultimately into the main body of text. There are ways of determining that this is the case. Do all Rishonim have both variants? Can the variation be explained as an aural error, indicating an issue in oral tradition, or an orthographic one, indicating a later miscopied text? Do we have Talmudic manuscripts that have the variant in the margins, or with the variant missing?

For the Rav Pappa variant of כָּאן לְחׇלְצוֹ וְכָאן לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ, Rashi doesn’t quote it as אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי but as לישנא אחרינא, a variant text, which might indicate something different, and something that scribes write on the margin. Ritva writes ואיכא דגריס כאן פי’ לחלצו כאן להעלותו, implying that there are those people or texts with a variant girsa, rather than both girsaot appearing in a single text. The Vilna printing records both via אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, but the earlier Venice and Soncino printings only provide the first version, with “to lash him”. As for manuscripts, Munich 95 only has the “lash” variant (though also seems to attribute the variant with “removal” to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak). Several others – Hamburg 169, Vatican 120-121, Vatican 122, and Wien, SB: Cod. 251 primarily have the “lash” variant and only include the “removal” variant in the margins, in a different handwriting, marked with לישנא אחרינא instead of אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי.

Also noteworthy is that several manuscripts have a different version of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s statement than we have, where instead of saying לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ פְּלִיגִי and invoking a brayta involving being choletz meat from bones and gidin, he says לְחׇלְצוֹ פְּלִיגִי, either as the the only and primary text, or as a marginal variant. That suggests to me the potential of bleeding from Rav Nachman bar Yizchak’s statement into Rav Pappa’s statement. In terms of the relative merits of the Rav Pappa variants, the “lash” variant is awkward in the ways I outlined above – the reordering of Amoraim and different meanings of the pronominal suffix. Still, difficult readings are often original, and the lyrical quality and internal logic of the phrase כָּאן לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ כָּאן לְהַעֲלוֹתוֹ adequately justify the introduced difficulties.

The general assumption is that Chachamim (“the Sages”) in a Mishnah or brayta represents the position of multiple Tannaim, and thus reflects the consensus viewpoint. It is regularly set up in opposition to the view of an individual Tanna, the da’at yachid. The majority usually wins, as we might invoke acharei rabbim lehatot, but there are exceptions for specific cases and specific Tannaim. This assumption gets opened up for closer examination in Chullin 81b and 85a.

This pertains to the status of ineffective shechita – where one properly shechted but the animal was found to be a tereifa – in distinct domains of Biblical law. Mishnah Chullin 5:3, appearing on 81a, discusses the one who shechts a mother and offspring on the same day (אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ) but it turned out to be ineffective. It doesn’t refer to otah ve’et benah explicitly; that comes from the preceding Mishnaic context. Rabbi Shimon exempts him from lashes and the Sages deem him liable. But, if it was invalid shechita leading to neveila, all agree he’s exempt.

A Mishnah in a later perek, Chullin 6:2, appearing on 85a, perfectly echoes the earlier Mishnah’s language. Thus, it does not make its domain, covering the blood, explicit; that comes from the preceding Mishnaic context. For such a shechita, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated (to cover the blood) and the Sages exempt. But, if it was invalid shechita leading to neveila, all agree he’s exempt.

The anonymous Chachamim in these two Mishnayot seem to take contrary positions. In the first Mishnah, they hold the shochet liable, granting validity to the ineffective shechita. In the latter, they declare him exempt, thus deeming ineffective shechita invalid. Addressing this stark contradiction, on Chullin 85a, third-generation Amora Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba quotes second-generation Rabbi Yochanan that Rabbi (Yehuda HaNasi) “saw” (was persuaded by) the position of Rabbi Meir, and taught it using the term “Chachamim”; and saw the position of Rabbi Shimon, and taught it using the term “Chachamim”.

That is, Rabbi Meir, a fifth-generation Tanna, disagrees with his colleague, Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, consistently in both Mishnayot; they both make no distinction between the two Biblical domains. Rabbi, a sixth-generation Tanna who redacted the Mishnah1 did draw a distinction. The usual pattern of Mishnayot is “Case: Rabbi X says A and Rabbi Y says B”, or “Case: A. These are Rabbi X’s words, but Rabbi Y says B”. Here, because he disagrees with a Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi presented that Sage’s opinion together with the name, showing it is an individual opinion, followed by the opposing position presented as that of the plural Chachamim.

Disturbed by the Lie

The Dor Revi’i, Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner (921), was bothered by Rabbi Yochanan’s statement. I will roughly translate and expand upon his thoughts. He points to a similar idea expressed in Pesachim 48b. The Mishnah there discusses si`ur, which is the beginning of the leavening process. Dough reaching that stage must be burned but one eating it does not incur karet. At a later leavening stage, sidduk, the dough must be burned and eating it does carry karet. Then, Rabbi Yehuda defines si`ur as [B] cracks that resemble locust antennae and sidduk as [C] the cracks (sedakim) intermingling. But the Sages would consider both these signs as sidduk incurring karet and the earlier si`ur stage as [A] the dough’s surface becoming pale, like the face of someone whose hair stands on end in fright.

That was the Mishnah. A brayta quotes Rabbi Meir defining si`ur as [A] and sidduk as [B]. But the Sages say that si`ur is [B] and sidduk is [C]. Thus, we have a contradiction between the Sages of the Mishnah and the Sages of the brayta. Indeed, it seems clear, as Rashi writes, and is implied by the gemara’s subsequent give-and-take, that this is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, and different Tannaitic sources simply leave the opponent as the anonymous and plural Chachamim.

Dor Revi’i found this surprising – that Rabbi changed the truth and attributed an individual’s words to the many so that it would be accepted, to establish the halacha like the “majority” against an individual. He distinguishes this from the common occurrence of an individual opinion being presented as the stam unattributed position, because that involves no substitution, just a deletion or withholding of the speaker’s name, in order to teach that he (Rabbi) rules like him. (This echoes the other idea attributed to Rabbi Yochanan that the halacha is like a stam Mishnah.) Here, however, he’s modifying it in order to state that the majority argue on the individual, which is not true.

He further points to a disturbing case in Pesachim 27a. Rav Yosef quoted Rav Yehuda who quoted Shmuel regarding a case where someone lit an oven with peels of orla fruit. If bread was baked in it, Rabbi permits the bread and the Sages forbid it. The Talmudic Narrator challenges this by noting that a brayta exists with the attributions reversed. The Narrator first suggests that Shmuel had a different version of the brayta with reversed attributions. Alternatively, the Narrator suggests that Shmuel had the same text of the brayta. However, Shmuel held that, generally, we rule like Rabbi over a colleague but not over plural colleagues. In this singular instance, since Shmuel thought the halacha accorded with Rabbi over his colleagues, he reversed the attributions. This is a confounding idea – how is it permitted to change the truth in order to strengthen one’s own opinion and halachic position?!

The Narrator’s Suggestion

I’m not entirely convinced that we are dealing with falsified attributions. Yes, for Shmuel, the Talmudic Narrator suggests it in Pesachim 27, and Dor Revi’i considered that alternative (the אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא) as primary. However, the Narrator’s first suggestion simply involves a differing tradition, something quite common. The second suggestion, if understood as falsification, merely reflects what the Narrator – often post-Amoraic – thought was a valid approach, rather than reflecting what Shmuel or other named Amoraim felt was acceptable.

Also, consider that our printed gemaras have a wonderful feature called Ein Mishpat Ner Mitzvah, by Rabbi Yehoshua Boaz, which hyperlinks Talmudic statements to where it is invoked in halachic literature. Even without actually looking up the Semag, Rambam, Tur, or Shulchan Aruch, we can crudely note the mere presence of the small superscript Hebrew letter to know that, in a particular case, we probably rule like Rav Sheshet and not Rav Yosef.

The Amoraim in Shmuel’s era lacked this convenient notation for the orally transmitted Tannaitic collections. If they decided that, in a specific curated collection of braytot, rather than going to fealty to attribution, they would accurately note the speakers but assign the identities in order to indicate how we decide halacha – and if they were transparent about the nature of these attributions – then it would not be lying. That supposition could work well with established rules of who wins. We hold like Rabbi Yossi over his colleague, not by fiat, nor even by description of result, but because he mostly did win, and we massaged the corpus so that it was always the case. Even so, this seems problematic and apologetic, and at odds with how certain named Amoraim (such as Rav Yehuda and Rav Yosef, involved in this very sugya in quoting Shmuel) felt about keeping attributions perfectly accurate.

That’s What ‘They’ Say

Chullin 85a and Pesachim 48b seem like the easier case, because no named Tanna has been flipped, and no Narrator states that the purpose was to mislead. I am unsure whether Chachamim really was understood or intended as the plural, or whether it was understood or intended as the decided law.

Aside from Chachamim, we have Acheirim and Yesh Omerim. Those terms refer to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Natan, fifth-generation Tannaim, as punishment after their unsuccessful attempt to depose Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel II as Nasi (Horayot 14b). They are individuals but both are phrased in the plural. This is not a lie, but a linguistic convention. As such, maybe Chachamim also needn’t imply multiple people.

Rabbi did not compose this text from scratch. He inherited an earlier text, perhaps with provenance from Rabbi Meir, a generation earlier. Sometimes, he splices together earlier Tannaitic texts to form a joined text. Say he encountered a text with an attributed position, such as Rabbi Yehuda says A. Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda was simply the one who historically expressed the position2, but many others silently agree. Perhaps he staked out the position because at least one other Tanna took a contrary position. However, it is important to elucidate the details of the contrary position, and in what way Rabbi Yehuda’s position is novel. Consider the distinction the Chachamim in the first Mishnah make between ineffective shechita (on a tereifa) and a botched shechita (creating neveila).

Rabbi Yochanan’s point may therefore be narrower: in general, or perhaps restricted to these two parallel Mishnayot, Rabbi used “Chachamim” to mark the accepted ruling, even when that ruling represented a single Tanna, and this was known. On this reading, “Chachamim” is an editorial designation rather than a literal headcount, and no deception is implied.

Here is a Jewish Link article from a few week’s back. We will start with the backlog.

When studying Talmud, disagreement is common. What is the status of an animal with this injury? Rav says it’s a tereifa, but Shmuel says it’s kosher. Somewhat less common, but still often encountered, are competing traditions traced to a single Amora. What is this injured animal’s status? Rav Dimi reports that Rabbi Yochanan says it’s a tereifa, but then Ravin reports that Rabbi Yochanan says it is kosher.

How should we understand conflicting reports? Possibilities abound, some more likely than others. Did Rav Dimi (selected arbitrarily as a stand-in for the quoter) lie in order to advance a halachic position he thought was correct? Did he not actually hear the statement from Rabbi Yochanan directly but rather infer it from an incident or a different statement? Was he not paying close attention in shiur, and generally the poorer student? Did he only hear the hava amina (initial supposition) and leave to drink before hearing the resolution? Did he misunderstand the details of a case that came before Rabbi Yochanan? Did he misremember the identity of the Amora he was quoting? Did Rabbi Yochanan later retract? Or are Rav Dimi and Ravin (or Rabbi Yochanan in separate instances) discussing different cases, with details that did not come through in their respective reports? Many of these have been concretely proposed.

Concurring Reports

An instance of concurring reports appears on Chullin 73b, with the concurrence strengthening acceptance in Rav Yosef’s mind. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef was a third- and fourth-generation Amora, traveling between Bavel and the Land of Israel, and a student of Rabbi Avahu. He arrived in Bavel reporting Rabbi Yochanan’s effective ruling about hanging flesh. To wit, where a limb or flesh was partially cut off, and the animal was shechted, the shechita does not render that dangling limb as if it had fallen off prior. Thus, it was not Biblical ever min hachai.

Rav Yosef, a third-generation Amora, said that we should take Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef’s report in our hand, because another Amora’s report supports it. A brayta cited a Biblical verse to prohibit consumption in this very instance. Rabba bar bar Chana was a third-generation Amora and primary student of Rabbi Yochanan, and he frequently brought reports of Rabbi Yochanan’s positions. He quoted Rabbi Yochanan that the brayta’s Biblical citation was a mere asmachta, a support or allusion to what is ultimately a rabbinic prohibition on consumption. Thus, for Rav Yosef, concurrence or an additional attestation strengthens a citation. Perhaps Rabba bar bar Chana was the more established figure, or slightly earlier, or more likely to have heard this directly.

Conflicting Reports

The follow-up on Chullin 74a pertains to Rav’s position. Recall that Rav Yosef was a third-generation Amora and primary student of Rav Yehuda (bar Yechezkel). Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda were second-generation Amoraim and students of first-generation Rav. After Rav and Shmuel died, Rav Huna presided over Rav’s academy in Sura while Rav Yehuda established an academy in Pumbedita. Eventually, Rav Yosef took over leadership of the Pumbedita academy.

In the incident, a younger Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, presumably in Sura. He quoted Rav Yehuda quoting Rav that if one ate a hanging limb of an animal, he is flogged (for the Biblical violation of ever min hachai). One of the Amoraic Sages present in Sura told Rav Huna, “Don’t listen to him, for this is what Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: If one ate this hanging limb, he is not flogged.”

As a brief digression, let us identify Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta, and consider why the patronymic goes that far back. In Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, Rav Aharon Hyman notes that it is likely that the “Marta” here is Rav’s father’s brother. In Sanhedrin 5a, Aivo (who was Rav’s father), Chana, Sheila, Marta, and Rabbi Chiyya were all sons of Abba bar Acha Karsela from Kafrei. Then, Shmuel bar Marta was Rav’s first cousin, and Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta was Rav’s first cousin once removed. Rav Hyman notes that he is a talmid muvhak of Rav and is always quoting him.

Thus, we have a competition between two second-generation Amoraim, both primary students of Rav, as to Rav’s position. This unnamed third-generation Amora was saying not to listen to third-generation Rav Yosef. Alternatively, he was saying not to listen to second-generation Rav Yehuda, because of the conflicting tradition.

The story continues. Rav Huna said to Rav Yosef, “Upon whose ruling shall we rely?” Rav Yosef turned his face away – Rashi explains this was in anger – and said to him, “What’s the difficulty? That which I say refers to a case of death by other means, where the limb is considered to have fallen off prior, while he (the unnamed Amora, or Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta) was dealing with a case where it had been shechted, where it is not so considered.” Thus, both traditions of Rav’s position were accurate.

Rav Yosef Insulted

We can understand why Rav Yosef took umbrage at the unnamed Suran Amora’s remark. He was extremely punctilious about traditions and attributions. He was famously “Sinai,” knowledgeable in many braytot, while his colleague Rabba (bar Nachmani) was the Uprooter of Mountains with his argumentation. In Chullin 18b, Rabbi Zeira, having ascended from Bavel to the Land of Israel, adopted their local halacha of eating a certain kind of meat. The scholars there asked him, “Aren’t you from the place of Rav and Shmuel (who ruled it forbidden)?” He replied, “Who said this halacha (in Rav and Shmuel’s name)? It was Yosef bar Chiyya (that is, Rav Yosef). Yosef bar Chiyya learns from anyone!” That is, according to Rashi, Rabbi Zeira claimed that Rav Yosef would repeat statements from any of Rav’s students, even those who were not careful. According to Tosafot, Rav Yosef did not hear this from the mouths of Rav and Shmuel, but from elsewhere, and it is a mere stringency.

Rav Yosef heard this and was angry. He said, “Do I learn from everyone? I learn from Rav Yehuda, who is so precise in his statements that he even mentions doubts about attributions.” The example given is Rav Yehuda quoting Rav Yirmeyah bar Abba, who quotes either in the name of Rav or in the name of Shmuel that a tribunal of three regular individuals permits shechting a bechor outside the Mikdash when there is no expert Sage to consult.

Thus, Rav Yosef was careful about whom he cited and in determining the authenticity of statements. His teacher, Rav Yehuda, was also careful in giving proper attribution to statements and would not simply attach a position to a Sage who did not say it. I am not sure whether Rav Yosef was upset in the Rav Huna incident on his own behalf or on behalf of Rav Yehuda.

When Rav Yosef distinguished the cases of dangling limbs, was he thinking on his feet and extemporaneously devising a defensive harmonization – this by shechita and that by mita? Or was he clarifying his earlier statement and quotation?

I believe that this was clarification, because the distinction is not arbitrary. If we examine the complete statement of Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef (quoting Rabbi Yochanan) endorsed by Rav Yosef above, we see that the first half pertains to mita and the second to shechita. It is quite plausible that a bare statement could have pertained to either.

Once, Rav Safra told Abaye that a scholar (tzurba meirabbanan) named Rav Avira had arrived from the Land of Israel with an interesting first-hand report. A case had come before Rabbi involving a needle found protruding from the thickness of a cow’s second stomach (the reticulum) and Rabbi had pronounced it a tereifa. This novel ruling contradicted standard halachic assumptions in Bavel. Therefore, Abaye, presumably at this time quite prominent as the head of Pumbedita academy in this fourth Amoraic generation, summoned Rav Avira to appear before him, so that he could hear the report firsthand and interrogate Rav Avira as to the particulars.

Rav Avira didn’t answer the summons, so Abaye decided to visit him. Rav Avira was standing on the roof and Abaye called for him (“Master”) to descend, but Rav Avira demurred. (It seems that he was reluctant to be interrogated.) Abaye therefore ascended to the roof and asked him for details. Rav Avira said, “I’m the director of assemblies in the study hall. I was standing above Rabbi Rabba, with Rav Huna of Tzippori and Rabbi Yossi of Media sitting in front of him. A needle came before Rabbi which was found in the thickness of the reticulum, protruding from one side. Rabbi turned it over and found a drop of blood on the outside, and deemed the animal a tereifa. He (Rabbi) argued that if there was no wound on the outside, where did the drop of blood come from?” Abaye was annoyed, because this was no novel ruling – it accords with what is stated expressly in the Mishnah. See Chullin 51a.

Generational Difficulties

There is a seeming generational difficulty in this story. Rabbi is commonly understood to be Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is a sixth-generation Tanna and who died in 217 CE. After him comes the transitional generation between Tannaim and Amoraim, then first, second, and third generation Amoraim. Rav Safra spanned the third and fourth scholastic generations, and traveled between the Land of Israel and Bavel. Abaye was fourth-generation, was born around 278 CE and died around 338 CE. Abaye was not a newborn in this incident. He assumed leadership in the last fourteen years of his life. Even with approximate dates, 338 - 14 - 217 = 107. Meanwhile, Rav Avira is described as a tzurba meirabbanan, which usually refers to a young Torah scholar, and his demeanor is perhaps that of a bashful youth. How could he tell us stories about Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi?

Before we resolve that question, let us establish the identity of this Rav Avira. He is presumably Rav Avira I, a third- and fourth-generation Amora like Rav Safra. We know from elsewhere that he was third-generation Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi’s student (Pesachim 119b). There is also a Rav Avira II, who is a fifth-generation Amora, a student of fourth-generation Rava and a colleague of fifth-generation Ravina I. It would be nifty if it is Rav Avira II, as it would explain the tzurba meirabbanan description relative to Abaye. Based on our partial information regarding associations with the Land of Israel, Rav Avira I seems the likelier match.

Next, at least once in the story, the person ruling on the needle-pierced reticulum was “Rabbi Rabba”. Other places, in the Vilna printing, we have Rabbi spelled in full. In manuscripts it seems to be a resh with a diacritic stroke. These could be authentic plain Rabbi. Alternatively, רבי is orthographically similar to רבה, so a scribe could easily omit the second word, erroneously considering it an erroneous duplicate. This process might be described as haplography.

Who is Rabbi Rabba? Rashi explains this as referring to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. He presumably bases this partly on Chullin 54a. There, Reish Lakish asks, “who is this Rav and who is this Rav? I have never heard of him.” Rabbi Yochanan replies, “Don’t you remember that student who served Rabbi Rabba and Rabbi Chiyya? But by Gosh! All those years that student served in the academy, I also served (but only) while standing. And who was greater? He was greater in everything.” Reish Lakish replied, “Indeed, that man is remembered for good, for they say the following halacha in his name…” Rav famously served and studied under Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as well as his uncle, Rabbi Chiyya. Rabbi Rabba thus refers to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Also, Rabbi by itself refers to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and “Rabba” or “Rubba” as a suffix is an honorific meaning “the Great” and refers to prominent figures in approximately the late Tannaic (as here) or early transitional era. Rav’s uncle is sometimes called Rabbi Chiyya Rabba / Rubba.

There is an interesting parallel in the people employing the phrase Rabbi Rabba. Both Rav Avira and Reish Lakish stood in service, while others in the story were serving and learning while seated. Also, Rabbi Yochanan was much younger than the others who studied under Rabbi. He was orphaned and brought into Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house, and was 15 years old when Rabbi died. If Rav Avira was also a young tzurba meirabbanan, alongside his role as director of assemblies, it could also explain his standing above Rabbi Rabba. Regardless, as above, the generational gap between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rav Avira seems too large.

Four Alternatives

We can resolve the generational gap by transforming Rabbi Rabba into a later Sage. He likely is not an otherwise unknown figure, but there are four more plausible candidates. These are Yehuda Nesia I, Yehuda Nesia II, Yehuda Nesia III, and Rabbi Yochanan.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had a son, Rabban Gamliel beRabbi, whom he appointed as Nasi, and another son, Rabbi Shimon beRabbi, as Chacham. Rabban Gamliel beRabbi’s son was Rabbi Yehuda Nesia I, an early first-generation Amora. He also was a Nasi of the Sanhedrin in Tzippori, and learned from his father and Rabbi Chiyya. Many early Amoraim, such as Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, were his students. Rav Hyman writes that Reish Lakish was his talmid muvhak (Nazir 20b). He is called “Rabboteinu” in Niddah 66a. In fact, in Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:6, we learn that Rabbi and his court permitted gentile oil. Rashi, based on parallel braytot, explains that this is a reference to Rabbi Yehuda Nesia rather than Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Thus, he appears in a Mishnah under this name or title! This brings us closer to Abaye’s era but is probably still too far.

His son was Rabban Gamliel IV, because the Nasi’s family liked reusing names. Rabban Gamliel IV did not assume the Nasi position. (It was taken over by others after Yehuda Nesia I’s death.) However, after Rabban Gamliel IV’s own death, his son, third-generation Rabbi Yehuda Nesia II assumed the role of Nasi. He was criticized by Rabbi Yannai for his lack of scholarship compared to his grandfather and great-grandfather. His teachers include second-generation Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

His son was Rabban Gamliel V, whose son was Rabbi Yehuda Nesia III. Rav Hyman finds reference to him in Yerushalmi Megillah 3:2, where (third-generation) Rabbi Yirmeyah sends him a message, and thus when Rabbi Yirmeyah was cast out of the beit midrash, an event occurred when Rabbi Yirmeyah was already a gadol hador . This would establish Yehuda Nesia III as a fourth-generation Amora. Assuming that Rabbi, or Rabbi Rabba, could apply equally to any Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi1, spoken in Hebrew or Aramaic, these two Yehuda Nesias are also candidates, drawing closer to Abaye’s generation.

Finally, as Rabbi Avraham Zacuto in Sefer Yuchsin suggests, there is second-generation Rabbi Yochanan. In Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, Rav Hyman explains that when Rashi said Rabbi Rabba was Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he undoubtedly meant Rabbi Yehuda Nesia – perhaps we need to emend our Rashi text. He quotes Sefer Yuchsin and elaborates that, while Rabbi Yochanan was not Rav Avira’s primary and direct teacher, they coexisted. Thus, Rav Avira I could refer to Rabbi Yochanan as Rabbi Rabba. Note that this would stretch the application of Rabbi, or Rabbi Rabba, outside the office of Nasi, by interpreting “Rabbi” relationally.

Surveying these options, I would actually land on Yehuda Nesia III. After all, he coexists with Abaye, and a tzurba meirabbanan – a young Torah scholar – would be fifth-generation Rav Avira II, the eventual student of Rava. The identification holds best on generational grounds, but it rests on a single assumption nothing else corroborates: that Rav Avira II had a tie to the Land of Israel — a fact this sugya would itself be establishing.

Why Rabbi Yehuda and not Rav Yehuda? After all, Rechava is the the father of two prominent fourth-generation Amoraim of Pumbedita: Avimi and Eifa. That means that he is third-generation, and his rebbe muvhak is Rav Yehuda, who established Pumbedita academy. Surely that is who his is citing! Also, see my discussion of the word mishum. If citing a Tanna, we should use mishum instead of amar.

I would give the obvious answer that this is a scribal error, and some sofer along the way wrote Rabbi instead of Rav, or even that it was first contracted from Rav to R’ and then wrongly expanded from R’ to Rabbi. This is a known phenomenon. However, that is not the route Tosafot take. Rather:

That is, Tosafot say that this amar Rechava amar Rabbi Yehuda refers to the plain Rav Yehuda (bar Yechezkel, the second-generation Amora), and because Rav Yehuda was Rachava’s rabbo muvhak, primary teacher, he referred to him as “Rabbi”.

They note an approach others take, that Rechava was unsure whether he had heard from Rabbi Yehuda the Tanna (presumably indirectly) or from Rav Yehuda the Amora. And that that is what leads to the common expression “he delved and learned Torah-reports (shmayta) from the mouth of his teacher, like Rechava of Pumbedita, for Rechava quoted R’ Yehuda that הַר הַבַּיִת סְטָיו כָּפוּל הָיָה…” Tosafot reject this because there is a different expression applied to others (Rav Yehuda) that even a safek in who said it he is gores, like Rav Yehuda, perhaps in the name of Rav and perhaps in the name of Shmuel. Also, they should have not only quoted הַר הַבַּיִת סְטָיו כָּפוּל הָיָה but also our sugya. Rather, that expression just means that he uses his teacher’s language.

I could understand that alternative approach (of doubt) more if he quoted R’ Yehuda, rather than Rabbi Yehuda. But of course, they were not saying “Resh Chupchik Yehuda” in speech, so that is not plausible. I suppose the suggestion is that the title “Rabbi” is ambiguous enough, since some Amoraim (say, of the Land of Israel, those who received semicha there) received it. Regardless, Tosafot reject it.

Going back to my suggestion, that we should cross out the yud of Rabbi and that an errant scribe is at fault, here are the printings and manuscripts.

Vilna printing has the full Rabbi Yehuda. Soncino and Venice printings have R’ Yehuda, which is ambiguous.

Hamburg have Rav Yehuda, either bare or later when cited by Rechava.
Munich has Rava quoting the ambiguous R’ Yehuda. The later one is irrelevant perhaps because throughout we have Rav Yehuda in this sugya saying things (though this is a related thing about the torin shel rechava — maybe see more later).

Finally, the various Vatican manuscripts, and one fragment, have R’ Yehuda throughout, which tells us nothing.

Why don’t Tosafot just emend the text? A few thoughts, arguing in the other direction.

1. Which of the baalei Tosafot are we dealing with. Rabbeinu Tam was famously against textual emendation, and he wrote a Sefer HaYashar to champion many difficult readings in the gemara, to show why the difficult reading was correct and original. In this respect, he was deeply opposed to Rivam and Rashbam who were quite quick on the draw to proposed emendations.

2. This is not the only place where this occurs, Rechava quoting Rabbi Yehuda. In his entry on Rechava, Rav Aharon Hyman writes:
   ומצינו רחבה אמר רבי יהודה כברכות יח. לג:, שבת סג., פסחים יג:, ביצה יא., יומא עב., מנחות לג:, לט:, חולין סב., ובשבת מ: מפרש דברי רב יהודה.
   
   At least I thought so. This is an OCR error where the original Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim has Rechava quoting Rav Yehuda. Still, drilling down into some of these instance, we see Rabbi Yehuda being quoting in that version of the text.

Separately, this is an instance of an eponymic attribution, that Rechava eventually talks about the birds of Rechava. These are not his own birds, but birds of a specific type.

It might be a case of birds of a feather flocking together. Or rather, Rechava wants to talk about birds of Rechava which is why he jumps at the chance of relating this Rav Yehuda statement. Or, it might be random chance. Alternatively, maybe it really was never him saying it — see the two statements, with plain Rav Yehuda speaking — and this was not pseudepigraphic attribution (the redactors making up the name), but rather a scribe getting confused by the later appearance of Rechava in the statement, and duplicated the word amar.

Finally, that there are two statements, and the latter is attributed to plain Rav Yehuda, and explaining that these are the very doves of Rechava from earlier might make someone think that the speakers must be different. That would be Rav Yehuda analyzing or referring to a statement of Rabbi Yehuda (as quoted by Rechava), which in turn accounts for the change of Rav Yehuda to Rabbi Yehuda in the first statement.

In last week’s column, I discussed which Rav Kahana owned chickens. That is, [A] a cat chased a chicken or hen of Rav Kahana’s house, had a door slammed in its face, and it struck the door with its paw. Later, five drops of blood or venom were found on the door. This was taken as evidence that a cat is venomous even if there is no one around to save its prey (Chullin 52b). There are five Amoraim named Rav Kahana with no patronymic who appear in the gemara, and we wondered which Rav Kahana this was. Admittedly, there are low stakes to this particular chicken-ownership question. However, we more generally want to construct biographies of the Amoraim, and to construct consistent legal positions held by individual Amoraim. For any statement or sugya, we need to disambiguate the Rav Kahana (or the Ravina, or Rabbi Zeira, or Rav Asi) involved and only then assemble our biographic or legal portfolio.

Again, last week, I quoted Rav Aharon Hyman who, in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, gives background on each Rav Kahana. Rav Hyman distinguished between two fairly early Amoraim. Rav Kahana I was a kohen, a first-generation Amora who was a student-colleague (talmid chaver) of Rav. Meanwhile, Rav Kahana II was a non-kohen, a second-generation Amora who was Rav’s student. He divided Rav Kahana in twain based on contradictions from various sugyot, but I suggested ways to resolve those contradictions. Finally, I pointed out that, immediately after the (second telling of the) cat chasing the hen of בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא, the gemara records [B] a conversation between Rav Kahana and Rav regarding clawing cats and weasels. If that Amora was Rav Kahana I or II, then Rav Kahana of the preceding segment could convincingly be the same person.

However, sugya [C] immediately follows. Rav Ashi (a sixth-generation Amora) posed an inquiry: regarding other non-kosher birds aside from a netz / hawk, do they have “clawing” which would render an animal they clawed a tereifa? Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: When we were in בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא, that is, the academy of Rav Kahana, he said that other birds do have clawing.

Sugya [D], which immediately follows, has Rav Kahana quote Rav Shimi bar Ashi1 (a fifth-generation Amora who was a ben bayit of fourth-generation Abaye) that a fox does have “clawing”. Rav Dimi, a third- and fourth-generation Amora, carrying a tradition from the Land of Israel, takes the opposite position.

Some of the later instances of Rav Kahana, such as in [D], could not be Rav Kahana I or II, since a first- or second-generation Amora wouldn’t quote a fifth-generation Amora. Let us explore the remaining three Rav Kahanas.

Rav Kahana III

In Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, Rav Aharon Hyman writes that Rav Kahana III was a fourth-generation Amora who was a primary student (talmid muvhak) of third-generation Rabba (bar Nachmani). In Sanhedrin 41b, he and Rav Safra were studying the tractate of Sanhedrin in בי רבה, Rabba’s academy (which was located in Pumbedita) when Rami bar Chama encountered them and asked them what was being studied in Rabba’s academy.

One issue I occasionally have with Rav Hyman’s analyses is that they are based on the printed text, and several manuscripts – Yad HaRav Herzog, Karlsruhe Reuchlin 2 – have the academy of Rava instead. Munich 95 has בי רבה but with the heh then corrected to an aleph, though Florence 8-9 has בי רבה. Rav Safra is a fourth-generation Amora, which would make a fourth-generation Rav Kahana plausible. However, I wonder whether this is really a reference to Rav Safra IV, who is Rava’s student. Rav Hyman also points to Shevuot 36b, where Rav Kahana encounters several students studying Shevuot in Rabba’s academy. Here, the weight of manuscripts (including Munich 95, Vatican 140) leans towards Rabba, with Florence 8-9 having bei Rav, meaning the academy.

He visited third-generation Rav Yosef in Nedarim 22b, where Rav Yosef encouraged him to taste something, but Rav Kahana refused. He visited the Land of Israel and was ordained there. Passages in Yerushalmi establish Rabbi Kahana as a Babylonian and a kohen, which means that he must be a different Rav Kahana than the one who was exiled and studied under Rabbi Yochanan.

Rav Kahana IV

Next is fifth-generation Rav Kahana IV, who is Rava’s student. We see that he often cites Rava, for instance in Bava Kamma 41b. His colleagues, with whom he interacts, include fifth-generation Rav Bibi bar Abaye and Rav Pappa. In many places, we see this Rav Kahana was the leader of Pum Nahara. For one instance of many, in Bava Batra 22a, wool-sellers came to Pum Nahara but the townsfolk stopped them from selling, imposing a local monopoly. That case came before Rav Kahana. In Chullin 95b, Rav Chanan of Nehardea arrived at Rav Kahana’s home in Pum Nahara on erev Yom Kippur. Ravens dropped livers and kidneys, and Rav Kahana told Rav Chanan that he could eat them.

Rav Kahana of Pum Nahara was sixth-generation Rav Ashi’s teacher. Rav Ashi often relates what Rav Kahana said or what they would do “when we were in Bei Rav Kahana”, that is, Rav Kahana’s academy. See Berachot 39a, 42a; Ketubot 69a, Bava Kamma 95b, 114a; Chullin 97b, Bava Batra 22b. Important for us, Rav Hyman includes Chullin 53b, where Rav Ashi said: When we were in Rav Kahana’s academy, they brought before us a lung that would keep its structural integrity when set down but when picked up would disintegrate, and we deemed the animal a tereifa based on the statement of (fifth-generation) Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua.

Many interactions further demonstrate this student relationship, in which Rav Ashi says “I related this report before Rav Kahana”, in Bava Metzia 92a, Chullin 11b, and several other sugyot. Rav Ashi reacts to Rav Kahana in Shabbat 137a, Pesachim 72b, Beitza 50a, and so on, saying that an explanation is difficult. Rav Hyman reads these as a student interacting with a teacher. I am not sure if objection demonstrates a student relationship more than a colleague relationship, and might place these as Rav Kahana V, assuming he exists.

Further, in certain interactions (Succah 7a, Yevamot 106b, Megillah 7b, Shabbat 136a), Rav Ashi calls this Rav Kahana “Mar”, meaning master. I think Rav Hyman understands “Mar” as indicating that Rav Ashi is the student. All these instances are objections to a position or practice that Rav Kahana displayed, where Rav Ashi asks, “didn’t the Master learn that which Rava said”. Still, I agree it works best if this is a student gently correcting his teacher, especially if Rav Kahana is also primarily Rava’s student2. Rav Hyman also notes that Rav Kahana IV held his student Rav Ashi in great respect, and referred to Rav Ashi as Mar. Specifically, in Yevamot 101b, Rav Ashi visited Rav Kahana’s academy. Rav Kahana asked him, “Does Mar want to complete the quorum of five for chalitza?” Rav Hyman discounts the possibility that this is Rav Kahana V, because of the power imbalance, with Rav Ashi being much more prominent.

Rav Kahana V

Finally, sixth-generation Rav Kahana V was Rav Ashi’s colleague. He was a student of Rav Pappa (Shabbat 89a), Rav Pappi and Rav Zevid (Sotah 45a), and Rav Shimi bar Ashi (Chullin 11b), all fifth-generation Amoraim. For instance, in Shabbat 89a, a Sage said to him, why don’t you frequent the academy of Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua (in Naresh), who delve into aggada3? It seems that Rav Kahana followed this advice, because we see interactions with Rav Pappa (Ketubot 86a, Gittin 89a).

Rav Sherira Gaon, in his Epistle, wrote that this Rav Kahana presided over Pumbedita academy after Rafram in approximately 394 - 413 CE. Despite this, Rav Ashi’s academy in Sura was the greater one, with all subjugated under him. This was because, in Sura, they were redacting the Talmud and all the Sages of the generation gathered there for lectures regarding how to apply halacha practically.

Assigning Rav Kahanas

My deliberately tentative suggestion, in last week’s column, was that Rav Kahana I or II owned the chicken in segment [A]. I would now suggest that it was Rav Kahana IV, of Pum Nahara. The cat was in בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא. Even though both Rav Steinsaltz and ArtScroll render this as Rav Kahana’s house, in every other occurrence across the Talmud, בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא is Rav Kahana’s academy in Pum Nahara, which Rav Ashi attended (as discussed above).

Segment [B] has him speak to Rav, so it has to be Rav Kahana I or II, as discussed last week4. Segment [C] has Rav Hillel relate to Rav Ashi what they did in בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא, so that is again Rav Kahana IV. Segment [D] has him quote Rav Shimi bar Ashi, so Rav Hyman says this is Rav Kahana V.

It seems quite strange to switch between so many Rav Kahanas in a single sugya5. Perhaps the Talmudic Redactors, arranging the sugya, believed that context would make it easy to disambiguate. Further, the Rav Kahanas appear in approximately chronological order. Alternatively, the arrangement is topical, and the arranger did not care about, or perhaps know about, conflating Rav Kahanas. Still, knowing which Rav Kahana said what seems like it might be important for establishing consistent legal positions.

Rav Kahana is a confusing figure, because there are so many of him. That is, Kahana is Aramaic for Kohen, and several Amoraim across several generations bore the name. One of these Rav Kahanas apparently kept chickens or hens. Chullin 52b relates that there was a הָהִיא תַּרְנְגוֹלְתָּא a certain hen, in Rav Kahana’s house. (Tarnegolta is a hen, but other manuscripts have ההוא תרנוגלא, chicken, with a masculine pronoun and masculine noun; other manuscripts have the ambiguous תרנגול׳ paired with either ההוא or ההיא, with the abbreviated form probably serving as a transformative bridge to changing the bird’s gender.) This domesticated bird was pursued by a cat. The door was shut in the cat’s face, and it struck the door with its paws. Afterwards, five drops of blood (interpreted as venom) were found on the door. (Cats have five toes on each front paw and four on each back paw, with a claw on each toe). This story is used to prove various scientific facts about the anatomy and behavior of cats, which has halachic import. But, which Rav Kahana is it?

Rav Kahana I

Rav Aharon Hyman, in Toledot Tannaim veAmoraim, identified five separate Amoraim named plain Rav Kahana, and constructed a biography for each. This was an exercise in educated guesswork. He needed to decide how many such Rav Kahanas existed. There is a limit to how long an Amora lives, but an Amora could potentially span and interact with around three generations. Still, based on interactions with other Amoraim, we could rule out certain possibilities. For an extreme example, if a Rav Kahana is a student of second-generation Rav Huna, it would be surprising for him to behave as a student to sixth-generation Rav Ashi. Once he decided how many Rav Kahanas existed, he needed to examine each sugya and decide which of the plain Rav Kahanas was referenced, again based on sometimes ambiguous clues of interactions with other Amoraim. Using this source material, he could construct a biography of each Kahana. Meanwhile, other Talmudic biographers could interpret the material differently and arrive at different sugya assignments and biographies.

Regarding Rav Kahana I, Rav Hyman relates (my rough translation) that when Rav descended to Bavel in 218 CE, came to Nehardea and afterwards established his famous yeshiva in Sura, all the gedolei hador flocked to him, and some were so great that they were like student-colleagues. He points to Rav Sherira Gaon’s Epistle which lists Rav Kahana Kamma and Rav Asi (of Hutzal) as Rav colleagues. He reinforces this by pointing to Sanhedrin 36b, that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi needed the traditions of Rav but did not need his reasoning. It therefore seems that, for Rav Hyman, any instance alongside Rav Asi is Rav Kahana I. Chullin 52a has Rav Kahana and Rav Asi ask Rav about the legal status of an animal if two ribs attached to a single vertebra were dislocated, with the vertebra itself remaining intact, so this would be Rav Kahana I.

Berachot 62a relates a colorful story of Rav Kahana hiding under Rav’s bed. In that story, Rav demonstrates passion and desire; also Rav Kahana refers to Rav as “Abba.” For Rav Hyman, this designation shows how dear Rav was to him. However, this ties into a broader dispute as to whether “Abba” was a designation or Rav’s actual name. In Pesachim 113a, Rav first speaks to Rav Asi, then stresses the importance of even demeaning work to Rav Kahana, “Skin a carcass in the market and take payment, but do not say ‘I am a kohen’ (kahana ana), or ‘I am a great man (gavra rabba), and this matter disgusts me.’” For Rav Hyman, this demonstrates that Rav Kahana I was a kohen.

Rav Kahana II

According to Rav Hyman, Rav Kahana II was a student of Rav and distinct from Rav Kahana I. Specifically, in Shabbat 152a, Kohelet 12:5 is midrashically interpreted to refer to sexual desire that ceased. Rav sighed when Rav Kahana read this verse before him, which Rav Kahana took as indication that Rav’s desire (for women) had ceased. Rav Hyman thus assumed that this student cannot be the same as the aforementioned student-colleague. To my mind, an alternative could be that the Berachot incident occurred prior to the Shabbat incident.

Chullin 132 relates that Rav Kahana partook of kohanic gifts only because of his wife, who was the daughter of a kohen. The same was true for fifth-generation Rav Pappa, and the same for sixth-generation Rav Yeimar1. Thus, this Rav Kahana was a mere Israelite, not a kohen. In Pesachim 49a, Rav Pappa said, “Had I not married a kohen’s daughter, I would not have become wealthy.” Rav Kahana said, “Had I not married a kohen’s daughter, I would not have been exiled.” (The implication was that he was an Israelite so this was improper.)

Rashi connects this story to Bava Kamma 117a. A man was going to reveal another’s straw to Greek authorities who would seize it. Rav told the man not to do so but the man was rude and defiant. Rav Kahana was sitting in Rav’s presence and broke the man’s neck. Rav advised Rav Kahana to flee to the Land of Israel and study under Rabbi Yochanan, and he did so. Tosafot (in Pesachim, Chullin, and Kiddushin) are troubled by the contradiction, for the exiled Rav Kahana under Rav’s instruction is an Israelite, while we also know that Rav Kahana was a kohen from Kiddushin 8a, where Rav Kahana accepted a turban as the pidyon haben payment which goes to a kohen, deeming it worth five sela. Tosafot in Kiddushin suggest that he could have accepted it by virtue of his wife, but across all three sugyot suggest that there were two Rav Kahanas, with the Israelite who was exiled being Rav’s student, Rav Kahana II. Rav Hyman accepts this distinction. This Rav Kahana later returned to Bavel after the time of Rav and Shmuel, and sat together with other students of Rav, before Rav Huna.

I believe we can resolve Rav Hyman’s contradictions without splitting an Amora in twain. First, in Pesachim 113a, when Rav said to Rav Kahana that one should not say כָּהֲנָא אֲנָא וְגַבְרָא רַבָּא אֲנָא, he may have been engaging in wordplay on Rav Kahana’s name, rather than a kohanic identity. Second, even if that Rav Kahana was a kohen, the exiled Israelite Amora married to a kohen’s daughter in Pesachim 49a and Chullin 132a was another exiled Rav Kahana. This may seem farfetched, but consider that the Amoraic era was unfortunately turbulent. Let us add that, in both Chullin and Pesachim, this Rav Kahana is discussed as marrying a kohen’s daughter in the context of fifth-generation Rav Pappa. Sugyot generally proceed in chronological order of Amoraim’s scholastic generation, yet in Chullin, Rav Kahana precedes and, in Pesachim, Rav Pappa precedes. Third, Tosafot only discuss two Rav Kahanas, but consider that in Kiddushin, when Rav Kahana accepts the turban, it is sixth-generation Rav Ashi who reacts, restricting it to one such as Rav Kahana who is a great man (gavra rabba). One of the later Rav Kahanas was actually Rav Ashi’s teacher, so maybe only this later one was a kohen. (On the other hand, consider the matching of kohanic status and gavra rabba status with the earlier moral instruction from Rav.) The constraints needn’t force us to divide one early Rav Kahana as student-colleague into two figures.

Rav Kahana’s Cat Query

This article began with the story of the cat chasing Rav Kahana’s chicken. Could Rav Kahana I or Rav Kahana II, assuming he is distinct, be the proud chicken owner? It is plausible. After all, immediately following the second telling of the cat story on the daf, the Gemara (and thus the Talmud’s redactors) record a related yet cryptic exchange. To wit, Rav Kahana asked Rav: Does a cat render an animal a tereifa through clawing? Rav replied to him that even a weasel (which is smaller) renders an animal tereifa. (Rav Kahana:) Does a weasel render an animal a tereifa through clawing? (Rav:) Even a cat does not. (Rav Kahana:) Do a cat and a weasel render a tereifa through clawing? (Rav:) A cat does, but a weasel does not. The Talmudic Narrator resolves the apparent contradiction, explaining that each deals with a different case, one involving clawing a bird. The juxtaposition of two Rav Kahana sub-sugyot, on related topics, makes me think we are dealing with the same person.

However, another Rav Kahana appears in the sugya who is associated with sixth-generation Rav Ashi. Indeed, he is mentioned in the sub-sugya immediately after the Rav / Rav Kahana / cat / weasel discussion. In our next column, we’ll consider the biographies of the remaining three plain Rav Kahanas, and whether one of these could be the chicken-owner.