Abaye Elsewhere
Looking globally to understand him locally
In Nedarim 54a, the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Akiva argue about whether a vow targeting classes of items (e.g. yarak = vegetables, or elsewhere, basar = meat) operates in a strict ontology. The Tanna Kamma maintains it does, so gourds are outside the class. Rabbi Akiva holds that items which are class-adjacent can also be encompassed within the class. Natural language, and the intent which accompanies the speech of a vow, is messy. So, if an agent sent to purchase yarak would come back to consult, that they only had gourds in the market, but wouldn’t go back to consult if there were only legumes (or even bread or meat), this is evidence that it is yarak-proximate.
(This formulation and conceptualization is my own. You might find it forced with some words of commentaries or parts of the Talmudic text, but I stand by it.)
Abaye weighs in on this, limiting Rabbi Akiva’s position (which may be important, given that Ran says we rule like Rabbi Akiva):
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת, שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.
Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to lashes that the one who vowed is not flogged if he ate gourds, as the issue of whether or not he violated his vow is not entirely clear.
In other words, this is a mere stringency, so the vower should be careful. But Rabbi Akiva won’t impose it on the vower to the extent that a violation would entail lashes.
Interesting. I wouldn’t necessarily have expected this. It makes some sense, given that the agent himself is uncertain about its status and so goes back to ask. But it is strange given how I’m seeing this as basic dispute on how to conceptualize classes.
Also, Abaye’s words seem a bit familiar. That is because he already said them on the first Mishnah.
That Mishnah on 2a (again, blatantly deviating at least from the initial understanding of the gemara, but perhaps not from how hat certain Amoraim such as Shmuel understood it) was talking about kinuy nedarim, nicknames for nedarim. So ״מוּדְּרַנִי מִמָּךְ״ has at its root the word neder (with the nun assimilated in the daled - thus the dagesh in the daled). That is the actual neder. ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״, ״מְרוּחֲקַנִי מִמָּךְ״, these don’t use the actual root of neder, but get at the gist of it with other language. Similarly, ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ is the literal description of what he is vowing against, that which I will eat from you. ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ which uses taste as a substitute for eating is a nickname, getting at the gist. Then, ״מְנוּדֶּה אֲנִי לָךְ״, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הָיָה חוֹכֵךְ בָּזֶה לְהַחְמִיר. For that language of menudeh, which sounds like and shared letters with neder, but could convey something else, Rabbi Akiva was uncertain and was stringent about that.
Regarding Rabbi Akiva there, Abaye comments on Nedarim 7a:
מְנוּדֶּה אֲנִי לָךְ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. דְּאִם כֵּן, נִיתְנֵי ״רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מַחְמִיר״.
We have an explanation, and an explicit diyuk, careful analysis in the language of the Mishnah leading to it.
We have no such diyuk locally to Nedarim 54a. Either Abaye has a tradition, or he understands Rabbi Akiva more generally willing to impose stringencies in all instances in nedarim, on a Rabbinic but not Biblical level.
The alternative is that this Abaye statement was transferred from 7a, given that Abaye comments a bit below regarding the topic, in responding to Rav Chisda. What should we assume, generally and in particular cases, when the same statement from an Amora appears in different contexts? Did he say it in both, or did the Talmudic Narrator transfer it?
There is a famous saying contrasting knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge is knowing that tomatoes are a fruit. Wisdom is knowing that, despite that, you shouldn’t put tomatoes into a fruit salad.
This comes to mind when Ulla comments on the Mishnah which has the dispute about gourds.
הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַיָּרָק כּוּ׳. וְהָא מִן יָרָק נְדַר! אָמַר עוּלָּא: בְּאוֹמֵר ״יַרְקֵי קְדֵרָה עָלַי״,
We learned in the mishna: For one who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him, it is permitted to eat gourds, and Rabbi Akiva prohibits him from eating gourds. The Gemara questions Rabbi Akiva’s ruling: But how can his vow include gourds, which are fruits and not vegetables; didn’t he vow to refrain from eating vegetables? Ulla said: The mishna is referring to one who said: Vegetables cooked in a pot are forbidden to me. Gourds are included in the category of vegetables cooked in a pot.
Alongside the way the gemara frames it (especially in the continuation), we could imagine it as follows. I had suggested above that it is a matter of subscribing to a strict, hierarchical ontology on the one hand, or having a fuzzier sense of boundaries on the other. Where items which share many characteristics from different classes can be encompassed into one group or another.
For Ulla, perhaps the idea is that one can construct multiple ontologies to describe the world. (See the Ran, about three botanical food groups, the first being yarak, the second being legumes and grains, and the third being fruit of the ground, with gourds being in the third group.) There is the botanical ontology, in which gourds are not yarak, and the culinary ontology, in which they are. I’m reminded of those who equate the daga which swallowed Yonah with a whale but then fault the Biblical classification of whale as fish rather than mammal (where it may be more swimming creature). Or who think the atalef is a bat, but fault the Biblical classification of bat as bird (when it may be more flying creature).
Continuing to another statement of Abaye, in analyzing a brayta in which a Tanna Kamma, discussing vowing against meat, encompasses bird meat but not fish meat. Abaye says that “this” (perhaps vowing, perhaps purchasing via agent with consecrated) is on a day the person had a bloodletting. (This is typically understood as severely restricting the described case in the brayta. The alternative could be that since on bloodletting day one wouldn’t eat fish meat to invigorate oneself, it somehow isn’t encompassed in the class of meat.)
This has a parallel sugya in Meilah 20. (This since, as our gemara discussed it, if one sends an agent to purchase meat with consecrated coins, only if the agent followed the sender’s instructions precisely is the sender liable; otherwise the agent is liable, and an example is meat, and whether bird meat is included.) If we compare the two sugyot, here in Nedarim it is Abaye who says it while there it is Rav Pappa. We have to determine which is primary and which is secondary. I lean towards Nedarim, with Abaye, being original. Regardless, there is also slightly more material in Nedarim, in terms of the number of disproofs of Abaye’s first answer regarding bloodletting, or whether there is any rejoinder to his second answer, about his eyes hurting him.
When it comes to disproving Abaye, there is Shmuel’s statement that fowl meat after a bloodletting causes one’s heart to flutter.
דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דִּמְסוֹכַר וְאָכֵיל בִּישְׂרָא דְצִפְּרָא — פָּרַח לִבֵּיהּ כְּצִפְּרָא
as Shmuel said: With regard to one who lets blood and eats the meat of a bird, his heart rate accelerates and flies like a bird. Clearly, bird meat too is deleterious for his health.
This might be ambiguous, but it does sound bad. Abaye might not have heard this statement of Shmuel. But we should expect him to hear a brayta, and one brayta (here, the only one quoted in Meilah) states:
וְתַנְיָא: הִקִּיז דָּם — לֹא יֹאכַל לֹא חָלָב, וְלֹא גְּבִינָה, וְלֹא בֵּיצִים, וְלֹא שַׁחֲלַיִים, וְלֹא עוֹפוֹת, וְלֹא בָּשָׂר מָלִיחַ!
And it is taught in another baraita: If one let blood, he may eat neither milk, nor cheese, nor eggs, nor cress, nor birds, nor salted meat.
The gemara here, not Abaye, respond to the brayta challenge, stating:
The Gemara answers: Meat of birds is different, as it is possible to eat it safely after bloodletting by means of thoroughly boiling it.
Despite this answer (or perhaps not knowing it), Abaye shift to an eye-pain answer. But would Abaye not know a brayta? This is admittedly possible, as it is no Mishnah.
Even so, I think the answer is that Abaye did know the brayta. But he perhaps had a different version. Look to Avodah Zara 29:
ת"ר המקיז דם לא יאכל חגב"ש לא חלב ולא גבינה ולא בצלים ולא שחלים אם אכל
אמר אביי נייתי רביעתא דחלא ורביעתא דחמרא ונערבבינהו בהדי הדדי ונישתי וכי מפנה לא מפנה אלא למזרחה של עיר משום דקשה ריחא
§ The Gemara presents a series of health-related statements. The Sages taught: One who lets blood may not eat the following foods, corresponding to the acronym ḥet, gimmel, beit, shin. That is, he may consume neither milk [ḥalav], nor cheese [gevina], nor onions [betzalim], nor cress [sheḥalim].
If he ate one of these, Abaye said: He should bring a quarter-log of vinegar and a quarter-log of wine and mix them together and drink the mixture. And when he defecates, he should defecate only toward the east of the city, because the odor of the excrement after that treatment is offensive. Since the wind does not usually blow from the east, it is less likely to spread the stench.
Thus, it seems that Abaye is aware of such a brayta. But that brayta ends at cress, and decidedly does not continue with birds and salted meat. He might not consider those foods dangerous. Less likely, that he has a recommended treatment would obviate the need for avoiding fowl.