Abaye's Mishnaic Interpretive Principle -- יַגִּ֣יד עָלָ֣יו רֵע֑וֹ

We’ve moved on to Horayot, but how about one parting analysis?

At the very end of Avodah Zarah, 75a, we read how Abaye deals with a difficulty between Mishnayot — by invoking a principle — and how Rava shuts him down. Thus:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? מְרִיקָה וּשְׁטִיפָה בְּצוֹנֵן, הַגְעָלָה בְּחַמִּין! אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ — תְּנָא הָכָא לִיבּוּן, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְהַגְעָלָה; תְּנָא הָתָם הַגְעָלָה, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְלִיבּוּן.

Abaye said to him: Are rinsing and scouring comparable to purging? Scouring and rinsing are done in cold water, whereas purging is done in hot water. Therefore, this is not a valid interpretation of the term purging. Rather, Abaye said that the Mishna employs the style of: Its counterpart reveals about it (see Job 36:33), as follows: The Mishna taught here that the spit and the grill require heating until white-hot, and the same is true of purging, which is also required. The Mishna taught there that purging the spit and the grill is necessary, and the same is true of heating until white-hot.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי הָכִי, לִתְנִינְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ בַּחֲדָא, וְלִיתְנֵי חֲדָא בְּאִידַּךְ אַחֲרִיתִי, וְלֵימָא: ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ״!

Rava said to him: If so, let the Mishna teach all of these requirements in one of the places, and let it teach only one of them in the other, and then let us say that the Mishna employs the style of: Its counterpart reveals about it. The principle that one mishna supplements the other can apply when all of the information is stated in one of the two places, but not when each has only part of it.

In Artscroll footnote 16, Square Brackets Guy (which someone told me is one of the editors rather than the translators or elucidators) rightly points out that this is Abaye’s regular principle of interpretation of Mishnayot.

To expand, we see Abaye also invoke this in Bava Batra 19a, regarding insulating with rocks vs. sand, again with Rava’s objection:

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ״; תְּנָא הָכָא סְלָעִים – וְהוּא הַדִּין לְחוֹל, תְּנָא הָתָם חוֹל – וְהוּא הַדִּין לִסְלָעִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ״, לִיתְנִינְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ בַּחֲדָא, וְלִיתְנֵי חֲדָא מִנַּיְיהוּ בְּאִידַּךְ – וְהוּא הַדִּין לְאִידַּךְ!

Rather, Abaye said that the tanna follows the biblical aphorism in the verse that states: “Its neighbor tells about him” (Job 36:33), i.e., one example is mentioned and the same applies to the other case. He taught the halakha in the case of rocks here and the same is true of sand; he taught the halakha in the case of sand there and the same is true of rocks. Rava said to Abaye: If this is correct, that “its neighbor tells about him,” let him teach the halakha of all of these examples in one case, and let him teach the halakha of just one in the other case, and it can be said that the same is true with regard to the others.

So too in Bava Metzia 31a:

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ״; תְּנָא רוֹעָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ דְּלָא הָוְיָא אֲבֵידָה, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְרוֹעָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים. תְּנָא רָצָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים דְּהָוְיָא אֲבֵידָה, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְרָצָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ.

Abaye said that the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it (see Job 36:33), and the mishna distinguishes between grazing and running. The tanna taught a case of grazing on the path, where the animal is not considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is grazing among the vineyards. And the tanna taught a case of running through the vineyards, where the animal is considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is running on the path.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵעוֹ״ – לִיתְנֵי קִילְּתָא, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן חֲמִירְתָּא. לִיתְנֵי רָצָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ דְּהָוְיָא אֲבֵידָה, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן רָצָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים. וְלִתְנֵי רוֹעָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים, דְּלָא הָוְיָא אֲבֵידָה, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן רוֹעָה בַּדֶּרֶךְ.

Rava said to him: If the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it, let him teach the lenient case and all the more so it would apply to the stringent case. The Gemara elaborates: Let the tanna teach that when the animal is running on the path it is lost property and all the more so it is lost property when it is running through the vineyards. And let the tanna teach that when the animal is grazing among the vineyards it is not lost property, and all the more so it is not lost property when it is grazing on the path.

And finally, in Yevamot 31b,

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵיעוֹ״. תְּנָא בְּקִידּוּשִׁין, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְגֵירוּשִׁין. תְּנָא בְּגֵירוּשִׁין, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְקִידּוּשִׁין.

Rather, Rabba’s understanding of the mishna must be rejected, and Abaye said: The mishna should be understood according to that which is written: “His fellow speaks of him” (Job 36:33). This principle teaches that a related case can be inferred from the single case cited. The mishna teaches the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to betrothal, and the same is true with regard to divorce if it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce fell closer to him or closer to her. Similarly, the mishna teaches the case of bills that were written in a questionable manner with regard to divorce, and the same is true with regard to betrothal.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי ״יַגִּיד עָלָיו רֵיעוֹ״, מַאי ״זֶהוּ״ דְּקָתָנֵי?

Rava said to him: If you understand that the legal ruling in all of these cases is the same, and the mishna was written in the style of: His fellow speaks of him, then what is the meaning of the term: This is, that the mishna teaches? The mishna in fact emphasizes that this is a betrothal whose status is uncertain and this is a divorce whose status is uncertain, which indicates this case alone and no other.

In each case, Abaye presents this analysis, Rava (or perhaps we can say it is the Talmudic Narrator on Rava’s behalf) offers the objection, which is follows by Rava’s own resolution.

I don’t think that Rava’s rebuttal to Abaye is that strong. Sure, you could have a list with repeated elements in place A and place B, and then merge the list. But is does not have to work like that. It could be that in place A and place B, there is no intersection. We might even say that Abaye persists: despite hearing the Rava objection once (and twice, and three times…), he repeats the same analysis elsewhere. Or, we might say that he never heard Rava’s objection, because this is the Talmudic Narrator backfilling the reason for Rava’s alternative analysis. And, even though we purportedly hold like Rava over Abaye except in ya’al kegam, this isn’t necessarily true (see my analysis elsewhere), and especially where they are among other disputants. This is just Abaye’s derech halimud.