Arrival and Appeasement

Gittin 30a

In Gittin 30a, a discussion of whether there is ones when it comes to gittin:

הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין – לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. אֲתָא וּפַסְקֵיהּ מַבָּרָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: ״חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי״, ״חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי״. אֲמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא שְׁמֵיהּ מַתְיָא.

§ The Gemara relates another incident, involving a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not arrive from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came at the end of the thirtieth day, but he was prevented from crossing the river by the fact that the ferry was located on the other side of the river, so he did not cross the river within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. Shmuel said: That is not considered to be an arrival, even though it is clear that he intended to arrive, so the bill of divorce is valid.

Rashi explains:

לא שמיה מתיא - דלא מטי עד הכא ואין טענת אונס בתנאי גיטין למימר אניסנא א"נ יש אונס בגיטין הא אוקימנא בשמעתא קמייתא דכתובות דהאי אונסא דשכיח הוא ואיבעי ליה לאתנויי:

There are two aspects for why it doesn’t work:

1. דלא מטי עד הכא — he did not actually arrive at the destination, thus hadn’t fulfilled the condition

2. ואין טענת אונס בתנאי גיטין — saying that some outside unanticipated force prevented him from accomplishing doesn’t work for gittin

Note that Shmuel only says the first aspect, and even the Talmudic Narrator doesn’t make the second aspect explicit, at least not initially. It brings in ones begittin only in discussion of the next segment, the difference between the two versions of Rav Yosef. It still may indeed be the underlying assumption in this segment.

However, based on the next segment, about appeasement — which we’ll discuss next — perhaps Shmuel deals with a linguistic query. Namely, the verb אֲתָא, as expressed in אָתֵינָא — does that indicate the act of travel towards a destination, or does it indicate actual arrival at the destination? (I’m reminded of וַיֵּצֵ֥א יַעֲקֹ֖ב מִבְּאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע וַיֵּ֖לֶךְ חָרָֽנָה׃ followed by וַיִּפְגַּ֨ע בַּמָּק֜וֹם וַיָּ֤לֶן שָׁם֙ which occurred before arrival in Charan. Rashi following midrash, speaks of reversing direction and attaining “Kwisatz Haderach”, but simple peshat may be that vayelech charana means that he traveled towards Charan, and that the root HLK carries that connotation.)

In the description of what the get-giver did, it says אֲתָא וּפַסְקֵיהּ מַבָּרָא. So the word אֲתָא is there. But Shmuel says that the condition is fulfilled, based on the definition of the term, only by accomplishing the act, by arrival. Thus לָא שְׁמֵיהּ מַתְיָא means it is not called coming if he has not arrived.

The same linguistic question, of attempt vs. accomplishment, seems to be at play in the Rav Yosef case.

הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא [מְ]פַיֵּיסְנָא לַהּ עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין – לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. אֲזַל פַּיְּיסַהּ, וְלָא אִיפַּיַּיסָא. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִי יְהַב לַהּ תַּרְקַבָּא דְּדִינָרֵי וְלָא אִיפַּיַּיסָא?!

The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who said to agents with whom he had deposited a bill of divorce: If I do not appease my wife within thirty days, let this be a bill of divorce. He went to appease her, but she was not appeased. Rav Yosef said: Did he give her a large vessel [tarkeva] full of dinars but she was not appeased? Although his inability to appease her was a result of his lack of financial means, since he did not properly fulfill his condition to appease her, the bill of divorce is valid.

Though this is followed with an ikkah deamrei, a variant version encoded in the gemara text itself, where Rav Yosef says he did fulfill his condition. Rav Yosef said:מִידֵּי תַּרְקַבָּא דְּדִינָרֵי בָּעֵי לְמִיתַּב לַהּ?! הָא פַּיְּיסַהּ, וְלָא אִיפַּיַּיסָא.

The question is whether, linguistically speaking, piyus is engaging in the act of appeasing, or in the accomplishment of appeasement. Even in the first version, Rav Yosef does not seem to indicate that it is only in accomplishment. Rather, the point is that he did not go far enough in appeasing her, for indeed, appeasement was possible. He only made a half-hearted effort. In the second version, it is the attempt which is called piyus, rather than the actual accomplishment of having placed his wife in the state of being appeased.

The Talmudic Narrator does not take it this way. Thus:

הָא – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין, הָא – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין.

The Gemara explains the difference between the first and second versions of Rav Yosef’s statement: This second version, in which the bill of divorce does not take effect, is according to the one who says: Circumstances beyond one’s control have legal standing with regard to bills of divorce. Therefore, the bill of divorce is not valid, as the husband did all he could to appease her. This first version, in which the bill of divorce is valid, is according to the one who says: Circumstances beyond one’s control have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce.

The distinction between versions is rather whether there is ones begittin. That a condition will be deemed fulfilled or not fulfilled based on circumstances outside his control.

If so, is it that we give him an out? Or is it that the condition was on his intent. Does he want the get to take effect? He’ll decide, based on his future actions. He was toleh bedaat atzmo. And so, mere attempt to arrive at the destination (despite the river stopping him), or mere attempt to appease her, reveals his wish that the get not take effect.

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Rashi, on the Rav Yosef case, says that the man said that the get would take effect from now predicated on his not appeasing her in the interim.

ליהוי גיטא - מעכשיו אמסור לה גט על תנאי זה אי לא אפייס לה:

The phrase ליהוי גיטא also occurs in the Shmuel case, but Rashi does not comment with the word מעכשיו, and someone in the daf yomi shiur asked why. I’d guess that Rashi would agree that it is a מעכשיו for both.

If so, I wonder why this is not — or indeed, whether it is, not a mere conditional, but rather a case of breira. This is a good general question, what distinguishes breira from a typical tnai. I might say that for breira, it is application to some target but the target is to be decided later. For instance, which of his two wives will be the target of the get, which of his two eruvin will be koneh shevita, which particular liquid in the wine flask will be designated as terumah. But then, in the give-and-take in gemaras, there seem to be cases of full conditionals on single items, such as whether this one get should take effect now, based on his dying later; or whether this kiddushin should take hold if her father agrees. So maybe we can question the extension of the term breira to those other cases, or maybe we just don’t understand breira.

Maybe we could say that, at this point when the get or kiddushin should take effect, there is not enough information to know if this marriage or divorce would be a good idea, so he does not have gemirat daat. But, if he will die later from the present illness, then the divorce will spare his wife from chalitza, so he would want it. If her father agrees, then it will be a happy marriage, so he would want it, and would have the full gemirat daat later.

At any rate, let us posit that these cases — crossing a river, appeasing her — is a case of breira. If he tries to appease her later, or if he indeed manages to appease her, then there were no irreconcilable differences, so the divorce wasn’t a good idea. Otherwise, it would be a good idea, and he wants it to take hold from now. If he decides to come back, if not for the river intervening, then it reveals his later gemirat daat that it should not take effect, but if he decides not to come back, then he’s decided that he does want it, and it should take effect from now. So maybe we would say that this is breira, maybe not.

Then consider the post from the other day:

Towards the end, I arrayed the two sides of the dispute against one another. Rav Hoshaya, Abaye, and Rav Mesharshiya consider that there is a valid distinction between breira in which he is תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ — based on his later decision, and one where he is תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים — based on the decisions of another person, or even something not under anyone’s decision-making process, such as whether he would eventually die from the present illness. Rav Yehuda and Rava took the opposite position, that these were the same. And I suggested that one could be termed retroactive determination (bechira, selection, borer, perhaps now we can say selection among two choices) and the other would be retroactive clarification (huvrar hadavar lemafrei’a),.

And, I noted there, Tosafot on Gittin 26a placed Rav Yosef in the first group:

בין לרבי יהודה בין לר"ש לא שנא וכו' - ורב יוסף דמסיק בפ' בכל מערבין (עירובין דף לז:) דלר"ש לית ליה ברירה גבי הריני מערב לשבתות של כל השנה כולה רציתי אלך רציתי לא אלך דמסיק רב יוסף איפוך ולר"ש רצה מבעוד יום עירובו עירוב כו' רב יוסף יחלק בין בתולה בדעת עצמו לתולה בדעת אחרים:

This Tosafot is deserving of its own post, and expansion.

But if so, it is the same Rav Yosef here who either accepts or rejects unsuccessful piyus. And the Talmudic Narrator (as explained above) took this as an argument over whether yesh ones or ain ones in gittin.

I would simply observe that if this is indeed breira, and this hinges on successful appeasement, then it is literally תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים. Meanwhile, if it merely hinges on the attempt to appease (either any level or an honest and full attempt), then it is literally תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ.

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The Talmudic Narrator explained the two versions of the Rav Yosef story based on whether one maintains — I suppose across the board — that there is or is not ones begittin.

Rashi helpfully points us to the beginning of Ketubot and to Rava. Though it is a matter of whether our Rava is on 2b, or not 2b. In Ketubot 2b:

אָמַר רָבָא: וּלְעִנְיַן גִּיטִּין אֵינוֹ כֵּן. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רָבָא אֵין אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין.

Rava said: And although delays caused by circumstances beyond his control exempt the groom from providing support to his betrothed at the time originally designated for the wedding, with regard to bills of divorce that is not so. Apparently, Rava maintains that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce. If one stipulated that the bill of divorce will take effect only with the fulfillment of a condition, even if that condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the bill of divorce takes effect.

מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא הָא? אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ״, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — אֵינוֹ גֵּט. מֵת הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ גֵּט הָא, חָלָה — הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.

The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle? If we say it is from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b) with regard to one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, if I do not return from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, the document is not a bill of divorce. Therefore, if she has no children from her deceased husband, the halakhot of levirate marriage would apply to her. The Gemara infers: If he died, that is when it is not a bill of divorce, since a divorce cannot take effect posthumously. By inference, in cases involving other circumstances beyond his control, e.g., if he fell ill, and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce and it takes effect. Apparently, if the reason for his failure to arrive is a circumstance beyond his control, the divorce takes effect.

But that that was one version of Rava’s statement. There is a lishna kamma and a lishna batra. In the second version, on Ketubot 3a, we have:

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רָבָא, וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן גִּיטִּין. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רָבָא יֵשׁ אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין.

Some say, to the contrary, that Rava said: Just as with regard to postponement of a wedding due to circumstances beyond his control, the groom is not obligated to provide sustenance for his betrothed, the same is true with regard to the matter of bills of divorce. The Gemara concludes that apparently Rava maintains: Unavoidable circumstances have legal standing with regard to bills of divorce.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ״, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — אֵינוֹ גֵּט. מֵת הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ גֵּט, הָא חָלָה — הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט!

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Gittin 76b): With regard to one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, the document is not a bill of divorce. The Gemara infers: If he died, that is when it is not a bill of divorce, since a divorce cannot take effect posthumously. However, in cases involving other circumstances beyond his control, e.g., if he fell ill and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce and it does take effect.

Recall also that Rava took a position regarding breira, that there is no distinction between תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ and תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, but all Tannaim equate the two (and indeed say yeish breira). If there is no distinction, then it is a matter of fulfilling or not fulfilling the condition, not a matter or whether we can apply his later intent to the earlier action.

And if so, then if he is across the river, and has not fulfilled, his intent to have returns matters not a whit. He hasn’t accomplished. And if he does not succeed in appeasing her, his intent to appease her matters not a whit. It isn’t a matter of his later daat and intent. It is the bare condition on objective reality, which either is there or is not.

Anywhere, this post contained a lot of speculation and meandering through ideas. Hopefully, there is something of value somewhere in it.