Attributed Statements; Plus, Who was Rav Mari?
In the daf for Shabbos, namely Avodah Zarah 66b:
הַאי בַּת תִּיהָא, גּוֹי בִּדְיִשְׂרָאֵל — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּדְגוֹי — אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אָסוּר, רָבָא אָמַר: מוּתָּר. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אָסוּר, רֵיחָא מִילְּתָא הִיא. רָבָא אָמַר: מוּתָּר, רֵיחָא לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא.
§ With regard to this bunghole [bat tiha], the hole in a barrel through which one can smell the wine, if a gentile smells a Jew’s wine through it, the wine is permitted, but for a Jew to smell a gentile’s wine through it, Abaye says that it is prohibited, whereas Rava says that it is permitted. Abaye says that it is prohibited because he holds that a smell is a substantial matter, a significant form of pleasure, and it is not permitted to derive benefit from a gentile’s wine. Rava says it is permitted because he holds that a smell is nothing; it is insignificant.
אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דְּרֵיחָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא? דִּתְנַן: תַּנּוּר שֶׁהִסִּיקוֹ בְּכַמּוֹן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה וְאָפָה בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — הַפַּת מוּתֶּרֶת, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין טַעַם כַּמּוֹן אֶלָּא רֵיחָא כַּמּוֹן. וְאַבַּיֵּי? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמִיקְלָא אִיסּוּרֵיהּ.
Rava says: From where do I say that a smell is nothing? It is as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 10:4): With regard to an oven that one lit with cumin stalks of teruma and baked bread in it, the bread is permitted because it has not absorbed the flavor of the cumin stalks but only the smell of the cumin stalks. This indicates that smell alone does not render a food forbidden. And how does Abaye explain this? He answers that it is different there, as the forbidden substance was burned. The smell of the forbidden cumin stalks entered the bread after the cumin stalks themselves were consumed by the fire, and a smell that is not from an extant substance is not forbidden. By contrast, in a case where the smell is from an extant source, it is forbidden.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי: כְּתַנָּאֵי, הָרוֹדֶה פַּת חַמָּה וּנְתָנָהּ עַל פִּי חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מַתִּיר בְּשֶׁל חִיטִּין, וְאוֹסֵר בְּשֶׁל שְׂעוֹרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַשְּׂעוֹרִים שׁוֹאֲבוֹת. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: רֵיחָא מִילְּתָא הִיא, וּמָר סָבַר: רֵיחָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא?
Rav Mari said: This dispute between Abaye and Rava is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a mishna (Terumot 10:3): With regard to one who detached a hot loaf of bread from the oven and placed it on the opening of a barrel of wine of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, Rabbi Meir deems the bread forbidden to non-priests, as in his opinion the smell of the wine renders the bread forbidden to them, and Rabbi Yehuda deems it permitted. Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted in a case of wheat bread but deems it forbidden in a case of barley bread, because the barley draws out the fumes of the wine. Rav Mari explains: What, is it not with regard to this matter that the Sages in the mishna disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a smell is a substantial matter, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a smell is nothing?
לְרָבָא וַדַּאי תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, לְאַבָּיֵי מִי לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא?
The Gemara remarks: According to the opinion of Rava, the dispute between him and Abaye is certainly parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as he must concede that Rabbi Meir holds that a smell is a substantial matter. But according to the opinion of Abaye, shall we say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im?
אָמַר לָךְ אַבָּיֵי: לָאו מִי אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בְּפַת חַמָּה וְחָבִית פְּתוּחָה —
The Gemara answers: Abaye could say to you that Rabbi Yehuda also holds that a smell is a substantial matter. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel…
There are four types of attributive statements in this sugya as well as the preceding one on 66a.
The initial short dispute about a case, with Abaye amar A veRava amar B. They say assur vs. muttar.
The identification of the underling principle under dispute. Abaye amar A, because reicha mileta. And Rava amar B, because reicha lav mileta. We might wonder whether this expansion is stammaitic or part of their actual st
Justification based on sources. This is directly attributed to Rava, and uses first person. Amar Rava, mina amina lah. Rava said: how can I demonstrate (to you) that reicha is lav mileta? And here is a Tannaitic source.
(Skip over Rav Mari for a second, moving to…)Abaye’s purported response, which is amar lecha Abaye.
As I noted, the same pattern appears in the previous sugya on 66a, but with the Abaye and Rava roles reversed, disputing some other practical case and underlying principle.
Regarding (4), it is fairly clear that this is the Talmudic Narrator, the Stamma deGemara. Regarding (1), it is clear that these are direct quotes. We might be uncertain about what portion of (2) is actually Rava, and whether (3) is an imagined expansion attributed to Rava in the same way that (4) is an imagined expansion attributed to Abaye. It is something to think about while looking at many such sugyot.
The fact is, though, that a named Amora, Rav Mari, responds seemingly to point (2) by declaring this principle a matter of Tannaitic dispute. Unless we say that he really was addressing (1) — and you, reader, should try as an exercise to make that work — it seems that Rav Mari knew of the explicated principles at play. Depending on who Rav Mari was, that strongly suggests that the principle in (2) was also stated by Abaye and Rava.
So, who was Rav Mari? Rav Mari I was contemporary with third-generation Rav Yosef and traveled from Bavel to Israel, studying under Rabbi Yochanan. He’s not the one. Rather, Rav Mari II was a fifth-generation student of Rava. It makes sense that he is explaining the Abaye / Rava dispute.
In Toledot Tannaim vaAmoraim, Rav Aharon Hyman discusses sugyot showing his generation. To select the clearest one to demonstrate his identity as Rava’s student, though with a girsological issue, see Kiddushin 32b, which reads (and with illustration):
So Rav Mari is a student, alongside Rav Pinchas son of (breih) Rav Chisda. The girsological issue is a text with bnei, meaning that Rav Mari and Rav Pinchas are both sons of Rav Chisda. Regardless, elsewhere we see interactions with fifth-generation Rav Zevid and with Rav Pappa as colleagues, and elsewhere as a teacher of sixth-generation Rav Ashi.
Here is the text from Rav Hyman:
