Cirrhosis of the liver
Thoughts on the Zeh HaKlal, the operative principle
On Nazir 21b, a brayta (found in Tosefta Nazir 3:3) gave me a jolt. It read:
וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״יָדִי נְזִירָה״ וְ״רַגְלִי נְזִירָה״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, ״רֹאשִׁי נְזִירָה״, ״כְּבֵדִי נְזִירָה״ — הֲרֵי זֶה נָזִיר. זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה נָזִיר.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this. If one said: My hand is a nazirite, and similarly, if he said: My foot is a nazirite, he has not said anything of consequence. However, if he said: My head is a nazirite, or: My liver is a nazirite, he is a nazirite. This is the principle: If one accepted naziriteship by means of an entity upon which life depends, i.e., a limb or a body part that he cannot survive without, he is a nazirite. Conversely, if he mentioned part of the body that is not essential for life, he is not a nazirite. In this case, as he referred to his hair, which is certainly not a vital part of him, he should not be a nazirite.
Now, the simple (and correct) interpretation of this is straightforward. Colloquially speaking, loss of a single limb, arm or leg, is not fatal, and so here, as the would-be-nazir employs metonymy — “in which a concept is referred to by the name of something closely associated with that thing or concept” — and more particularly synecdoche — “in which a term for a part of something is used to refer to the whole” — it will only work if the part is a literally vital part. (And the fact that cutting off above a specific portion of the leg is fatal is irrelevant, as such diyukim don’t figure into typical speech.) So hand / foot won’t make him a nazir, but head / liver will make him a nazir.
Nowadays, we know the function of the liver, in that it processes alcohol and removes it from the blood (at about one ounce per hour). And the head is affected by drunkenness. Or alternatively, the head is impacted by the hair-growth.
So, if I thought that they had the same understanding of the liver’s function back then, I could have produced an interpretation of the operative principle here, that he is מתפיס in his liver, or his head / hair, so that it works well with the (contextual) ״פִּי כְּפִיו וּשְׂעָרִי כִּשְׂעָרוֹ״ הֲרֵי נָזִיר as being מתפיס in specific aspects, as per Rav Yehuda’s explanation.
Of course, that won’t work. Not just because, as far as I could see in Aristotle and Galen, they didn’t understand the liver’s function in that way. But because of the zeh hakelal. That is, זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה נָזִיר.
In terms of translating zeh haklal in Tannaitic sources, I’ve seen it rendered as “this is the general rule”. And the gemara will often then ask what the general rule comes to include, זֶה הַכְּלָל לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? Because why make a general rule if the only cases are those enumerated. I’d rather render it as “this is the underlying operating principle”. Understanding that principle could indeed occasionally cause you to apply the same principle to new cases, but also to NOT assume a different operating principle so that you won’t accidentally apply it to the wrong cases. We don’t want to be מדמה מילתא למילתא incorrectly. Also, as a pure matter of talmud Torah, we want to understand the why and not the what.
We could wonder whether the zeh haklal is from the same stratum as the rest of the statement in the Mishnah. Did the same Tanna (e.g. Rabbi Meir) declare the halacha as well as the underlying logic? Or, did same later Tanna (e.g. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi) explain the reasoning. I fuzzily recall (so quite possibly am misremembering) a case where the zeh haklal doesn’t match the underlying statement, due to source splicing. A similar question can be (has been?) posed for the vaChachamim Omerim, “but the Sages say”. Is this a record of dispute contemporary to the individual opinion-holder, the daat yachid. Or is this a later stratum, in which the author expands on it being a presumptive daat yachid, to spell out what the putative daat rabbim would be?
Looking at parallel sugyot is always useful. The parallel is to Mishnah Arachin 5:3, as well as Arachin 20a. The Mishnah:
עֵרֶךְ יָדִי וְעֵרֶךְ רַגְלִי עָלָי, לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. עֵרֶךְ רֹאשִׁי וְעֵרֶךְ כְּבֵדִי עָלָי, נוֹתֵן עֵרֶךְ כֻּלּוֹ. זֶה הַכְּלָל, דָּבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְלוּיָה בוֹ, נוֹתֵן עֵרֶךְ כֻּלּוֹ:
One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, or: The valuation of my leg, has not said anything, as there are valuations in the Torah only for a complete person. But if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. This is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent, i.e., without which one will die, gives the valuation of his entire self.
The gemara explains what the zeh haklal is to include, namely even the leg cut off above a certain point.
ה הכלל דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו כו': לאתויי מן הארכובה ולמעלה:
The mishna further teaches that this is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent and without which one will die gives the valuation of his entire self. The Gemara explains that the phrase: This is the principle, serves to include one who vowed to donate the valuation of his leg from the knee and above. Since one would die if his leg were severed above the knee, this is considered an item upon which the soul is dependent, and therefore he gives the valuation of his entire self.
which if so, would also apply by a nazir (contra what I had suggested above to set this up).
There is also an explicit derasha by Arachin to tie the entire person to the vital organ.
ערך ראשי וערך כבידי נותן ערך כולו: מ"ט נפשות קאמר רחמנא:
§ The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers that the Merciful One states: “A valuation of living people” (Leviticus 27:2), which indicates that in the case of one who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent and without which one will die, he must give the valuation of his entire self.
Though that is also the answer they give for half a nazir. See inside.
I don’t know of any parallel derasha for nefesh regarding nazir. There is a pasuk, וְעָשָׂ֣ה הַכֹּהֵ֗ן אֶחָ֤ד לְחַטָּאת֙ וְאֶחָ֣ד לְעֹלָ֔ה וְכִפֶּ֣ר עָלָ֔יו מֵֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר חָטָ֖א עַל־הַנָּ֑פֶשׁ וְקִדַּ֥שׁ אֶת־רֹאשׁ֖וֹ בַּיּ֥וֹם הַהֽוּא, where sinning regarding the nefesh means that he became impure to a corpse. But it is also taken as sinning against his own soul for improperly taking on stringencies and afflicting his nefesh.
Regardless, from the parallel to a non-nazir, it is clear what the underlying operative principle is.