Consistency in Rav Nachman, Rav Chisda, and Rabbi Yochanan (article summary)
Here is a summary of a recent Jewish Link article (paid Substack, Jewish Link website, flipdocs).
It is a long and complex article and the hyperlinks are in the paywalled version. Still, here is an attempt at summary. The summary might be about as long as a the article, since while it’s a summary, I’m not as concerned about word count. Also, it only makes sense together with study of the sugyot inside…
Generally, we want Amoraim to be consistent with their own opinions as expressed elsewhere. Here, the Talmudic Narrator works to answer questions, but perhaps introduces Amora-internal contradictions, or particulars of cases required in one sugya but absent in another. Tosafot have a global view and note the contradictions. They work to harmonize while not arguing with the Stamma, but I am not convinced it works out / this is the way to go. On to the specifics!
A general principle of zachin le’adam shelo befanav, to his benefit. But not chavin, to his detriment.
In Bava Metzia 10a, two laws or principles which may intersect.
A: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵרוֹ, either works or doesn’t work.
B: הַתּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים, either works or doesn’t work.
About A, Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda both say it does not work.
About A, Rabbi Yochanan says it does work.
The Talmudic Narrator says that the reason Rav Nachman / Rav Chisda says A doesn’t work it because they say B doesn’t work. (We might infer that Rabbi Yochanan says B does work, but that isn’t explicit.)
Rava challenges his teacher Rav Nachman about A. (He doesn’t necessarily know about the Stamma’s equation. This might also help resolve the Rashi / Tosafot dispute about whether in this case, the issue is that he didn’t appoint him as an agent, and how that fits into being chav la’acheirim.) Rav Nachman responds.Earlier on 8a, Rami bar Chama tried to prove A does work. Rava attacks the proof. Note that Rami and Rava were Rav Chisda’s sons-in-law, but Rav Chisda doesn’t come up. Tosafot note the inconsistency, for on 8a, Rava attacks the proof that A works and on 10a, Rava tries to argue that A works. Maybe Rava’s jusrt playing devil’s advocate generally? Tosafot say that the conversation with Rav Nachman happened earlier, and Rava must have accepted Rav Nachman’s rejoinders.
The Talmudic Narrator said that for Rav Nachman / Rav Chisda, B doesn’t work (as a means of explaining their A position). Does this check out when we compare with other sugyot? Also, for Rabbi Yochanan, here he says B does work? Is this true when we compare with other sugyot?
Story in Ketubot 84b about a boat which someone was going to acquire on behalf of a creditor, where he wasn’t a creditor. Thus, B. And Rav Pappa says it doesn’t work, because Rabbi Yochanan says it doesn’t work. This is an apparent contradiction within Rabbi Yochanan.
Except it isn’t, because while the Stamma says for Rav Chisda / Rav Nachman than ¬B → ¬A and we say ¬B, that doesn’t mean that for Rabbi Yochanan, if he holds A, it is because he holds B and B → A. (See Tosafot in several places about this. Instead, we can tap into Rava’s position about מִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ.)We can also grapple with whether Rav Chisda is consistent, because in Gittin 11b, he says B is a matter of dispute between two Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. (Rav Pappa offers a distinction there consistent with his teacher Rava.) Assuming he would side with the majority, Rav Chisda would emerge as consistent in B.
In Beitza 39a, there is a dispute about drawing water from a public cistern on behalf of someone else, and whose techum the water then follows. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet argue about this, with Rav Nachman saying that it’s the recipient’s boundary. Rava attacks Rav Nachman based on assuming that he holds the cistern is jointly owned. The answer would be based on breira, but the Talmudic Narrator rejects this because of a resulting Rav Nachman breira inconsistency. Rather, it is that Rav Nachman holds that A (acquiring for one’s friend) works.
As Rashi and Tosafot point out, this is a Rav Nachman inconsistency in A.Rashi resolves this with an emendation of the text, so that it is הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵרוֹ, but continues with just kana as opposed to kana chaveiro. And then we contort our understanding. Some manuscripts follow this, but many do not, such as this one.
Further, it seems rather unlikely to me that within Rav Nachman himself, they would employ a seemingly identical statement with one word different, in a misleading manner. Rather, the Stamma probably just deliberately invoked the dispute involving Rav Nachman, but forgot (!) which position Rav Nachman took in that other dispute.
Other Rishonim resolve this in other ways. Rashbam: delve into underlying reason, and here there is no chav la’acheirim since there’s plenty of water. This seems unlikely and misleading.
Rabbeinu Tam doesn’t like emending, so keep kana chaveiro. But we can invoke and apply Rava’s distinction. But it is also quite complicated.
Rabbeinu Chananel simply says that Rav Nachman must have reversed himself. Ramban is bothered by why the gemara never explicitly mentioned this reversal.
But again, I’d suggest the deliberate invocation of the dispute, while incorrectly recalling which position Rav Nachman took (or maybe that Rav Nachman, and not just Rav Chisda) took the opposite position in A.