About a week back, I summarized by Jewish Link article promoting teaching grammar and linguistics, deeply for Hebrew and broadly across multiple languages, in order to understand the actual mechanics of the derashot Chazal. I also argued for actually looking at the verses inside a Chumash, to that we could see them in context, see what the peshat of the verses may be, and what exactly Chazal are doing with them.
In the comment section of that post, I had a lengthy discussion with Ezra Brand (see also his blogpost) with this comment as my last clarifying comment (which you need to expand to read in full).
The other day, we saw a nice derasha which might illustrate my idea, regarding actually examining the pasuk in context and regarding not realizing the depth of the interpretation. We encounter it at the top of Kiddushin 50a:
״יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ. יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצֹנוֹ״.
With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words “he shall offer it” teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: “According to his will.”
הָא כֵּיצַד? – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.
How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering.
Artscroll has a similar explanation, based on Rashi’s commentary, that it is superfluous:
יקריב אותו - קרא יתירא הוא דהא כתיב ברישא דקרא זכר תמים יקריבנו:
This then seems very much like a derasha based on a superfluous phrase, something very common. And then, a contrast with the implication of that superfluous phrase with some other phrase — we might not realize that it appears in the selfsame verse. Therefore, we arrive at a compromise position within this tug of war.
We should of course look at the verse in context. And Koren did it well by citing it in English. Rav Steinsaltz just cited provided a citation in his commentary, not the full verse.
"יקריב אותו" (ויקרא א, ג) המוזכר בנודר קרבן — ייתור הפסוק מלמד שכופין אותו לקיים את נדרו ולהקריב את הקרבן. יכול בעל כרחו לגמרי, כגון שנוטלים מרכושו שלא לרצונו — תלמוד לומר "לרצנו" (שם).
And in Artscroll, we at least have Torah Or Hashalem on the side. Here this suffices because it is contained within a single verse. It isn’t always so helpful, when we require a paragraph for context.
That full verse, in Biblical Hebrew and translation, is this:
אִם־עֹלָ֤ה קׇרְבָּנוֹ֙ מִן־הַבָּקָ֔ר זָכָ֥ר תָּמִ֖ים יַקְרִיבֶ֑נּוּ אֶל־פֶּ֜תַח אֹ֤הֶל מוֹעֵד֙ יַקְרִ֣יב אֹת֔וֹ לִרְצֹנ֖וֹ לִפְנֵ֥י יְהֹוָֽה׃
If an offering-up is his near-offering, from the herd,
male, wholly-sound, let him bring it near;
to the entrance of the Tent of Appointment let him bring it near,
as acceptance for him, before the presence of Hashem.
So we see the yakrivennu earlier in the verse, thus making the yakriv oto superfluous as Rashi writes.
OK, what can we observe about this verse and derasha further, looking at context and at dikduk?
We are dealing with the hiphil, the causative. That is yakriv as opposed to yikrav. Yes, this is the term typically used for offering a korban. But this at least supports the idea of causing / coercion.
If we interpret it as causing the person, it wouldn’t necessarily be (as in the Koren English commentary above) that we take the korban from the man and offer it on his behalf against his will. Rather, we might say that oto is being taken in this derasha to refer to the man, not the korban.
While Artscroll translates lirtzono as willingly or voluntarily, speaking about the owner’s ratzon, we might otherwise understand it as referring to acceptance before Hashem, on a peshat level. So even the second part of the contrast would be a derasha, an additional level of interpretation over the plain meaning.
It is in the same verse, in juxtaposed statements.
I suspect what is happening here is not that it was first superfluous, then they made the derasha, and then they saw the contrast.
Rather, first they saw the potential for contrast. Because the two parts of the verse might be seen as Biblical parallelism:
אֶל־פֶּ֜תַח אֹ֤הֶל מוֹעֵד֙ יַקְרִ֣יב אֹת֔וֹ
לִרְצֹנ֖וֹ לִפְנֵ֥י יְהֹוָֽה
That is:
To the entrace of the Ohel Moed == Before Hashem
They shall force him to come (or bring it) =/= according to his will
This will work if we reinterpret both yakriv and lirtzono. Since Chazal are always searching for not just the plain and overt meaning of the verse, but instead look for omnisignificance, they try to ferret out all the possible meanings. And this particular set of meanings / reinterpretations works wonderfully to express a deep concept, that sometimes what someone overtly says not match his or her deep-seated desires. And that a person really wants to perform mitzvot, but might require some persuasion or even coercion. This seems to be both homiletical and legal in application.
If this is indeed what is going on, I don’t think most people would stop to think about it, to examine what the full pasuk is saying, what the peshat vs. derash is stating, or when rules of dikduk are being applied in the reinterpretation.
Fascinating theory about derashos. I think I found an example recently, Sotah 27a
״אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׂטֶה אִשָּׁה תַּחַת אִישָׁהּ״, לְהַקִּישׁ אִישׁ לְאִשָּׁה וְאִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם הוּא סוֹמֵא לֹא הָיָה מַשְׁקָהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנֶעְלַם מֵעֵינֵי אִישָׁהּ״, כָּךְ הִיא, אִם הָיְתָה סוֹמָא — לֹא הָיְתָה שׁוֹתָה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחִיגֶּרֶת וְגִידֶּמֶת לֹא הָיְתָה שׁוֹתָה, דִּכְתִיב: ....
Perhaps the Gemara is understanding תחת in the sense of "exchange", in which case it would make sense that the man and woman should be approximately "equal".