Derivations and Asmachtot
(1) On Bava Metzia 61b, there’s a dispute between Rabbi Eleazar ben Pedat and Rabbi Yochanan as to whether one can sue in court and get the return of Biblical ribbit.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: רִבִּית קְצוּצָה יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין, אֲבַק רִבִּית אֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ רִבִּית קְצוּצָה נָמֵי אֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין.
Rabbi Elazar says: Fixed interest can be removed from the lender’s possession by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. By contrast, in cases of a hint of interest, prohibited by rabbinic law, the money paid cannot be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even fixed interest cannot be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges.
It is interesting that Rabbi Eleazar is mentioned first. He might well consider himself to be Rabbi Yochanan’s contemporary, but Rabbi Yochanan considers such to be insulting — he is the teacher.
Amoraim weigh in to support first Rabbi Yochanan, and then one Amora to support Rabbi Eleazar. Thus:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״בַּנֶּשֶׁךְ נָתַן וְתַרְבִּית לָקַח וָחָי לֹא יִחְיֶה אֵת כׇּל הַתֹּעֵבוֹת הָאֵלֶּה עָשָׂה״ – לְמִיתָה נִיתַּן וְלֹא לְהִישָּׁבוֹן. רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֶל תִּקַּח מֵאִתּוֹ נֶשֶׁךְ וְתַרְבִּית וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ״ – לְמוֹרָא נִיתַּן וְלֹא לְהִשָּׁבוֹן.
Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It is as the verse states: “He has given forth with neshekh and he took tarbit, shall he live? He shall not live. He performed all these abominations, he shall be executed; his blood shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:13). It can be inferred that one who takes interest is subject to death at the hand of Heaven but not to repayment, as the court cannot compel him to repay the interest. Citing a different proof, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that the verse states: “You shall not take from him neshekh or tarbit; you shall fear your God and your brother shall live with you.” (Leviticus 25:36). It can be inferred that one who does so is subject to shirking the fear of Heaven, but not to repayment.
I may be preempting Rava, who makes Rabbi Yitzchak’s proof clearer, but I’d suggest that the derasha from Yechezkel is from the end of the verse, not quoted — מ֣וֹת יוּמָ֔ת דָּמָ֖יו בּ֥וֹ יִֽהְיֶֽה׃. When we understand damav not as “his blood” but “his money”, then we effectively are saying that there is mita but there is not an obligation to repay the damim.
Regarding Rav Ada bar Ahava, this could be #1, who is Rav’s student and Rav Huna’s contemporary, or it could be #2, who is really Rav Ada bar Abba, who is Rava’s student. Since Rava follows next, I’d prefer it be #1, so that we are approximately progressing chronologically. But maybe not…
In terms of the verse in Vayikra, we could again be creative, and rather than saying it hinges on וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ, it hinges on אֶל תִּקַּח מֵאִתּוֹ נֶשֶׁךְ, reversing the actors. Once he, the lender, has the neshech, don’t take it away from him.
Are these legitimate derashot? Or, are they mere Scriptural support, asmachta? After all, Tosafot have been going on for several recent derashot that they are asmachta. I’d say: that Amoraim offer it, rather than Tannaim, doesn’t help resolve it. While Tannaim fairly uniquely will innovate derashot, they will do so and as a result innovate a halacha. Here, the halacha already exists, and the Amoraim work to find the derasha.
Still, a derasha from Sefer Yechezkel, as opposed to the Torah, to establish a Torah law might indicate that it is an asmachta. If so, even if others are interpreting Vayikra, they are operating in the same headspace.
Rava gives a final support to Rabbi Yochanan, from the end of the verse. Then, his fifth-generation student offers a support to Rabbi Eleazar:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? דְּאָמַר קְרָא:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that interest prohibited by Torah law can be reclaimed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges? It is as the verse concerning the prohibition against taking interest states:
״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״. אַהְדַּר לֵיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּנֵיחֵי.
“And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), from which it is derived: Return the interest to him so that he may live.
I’d say this may be in reaction to the earlier statement based on the beginning of Vayikra. That was darshened by Rav Adda bar Ahava, or bar Abba. Now I’d include to it being #2, Rava’s student, so that these two are in conversation.
So, one takes the head of the verse and the other takes the tail of the verse, and each finds their cited portion more compelling.
The Talmudic Narrator wants everything systematically understood, so it asks what Rabbi Yochanan would do with this verse וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ. It answers with a well-known derasha of Rabbi Akiva, about drinking the one flask of water to save your own life:
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ וּבְיַד אֶחָד מֵהֶן קִיתוֹן שֶׁל מַיִם, אִם שׁוֹתִין שְׁנֵיהֶם – מֵתִים. וְאִם שׁוֹתֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן – מַגִּיעַ לַיִּשּׁוּב. דָּרַשׁ בֶּן פְּטוֹרָא: מוּטָב שֶׁיִּשְׁתּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְיָמוּתוּ, וְאַל יִרְאֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶם בְּמִיתָתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִימֵּד: ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״, חַיֶּיךָ קוֹדְמִים לְחַיֵּי חֲבֵירֶךָ.
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.
There is an obvious problem which jumps out from what the Stamma has just done. After all, we rule like Rabbi Akiva in this. And, at the same time, if we keep reading the gemara and see what the gemara itself concludes, and how various Amoraim conduct themselves in practice, we rule like Rabbi Eleazar, that ribbit ketzutza can be returned by taking someone to court. Yet, according to what was laid out, we should only be able to select one, because these come from the same verse. The Rosh grapples with this and says it’s fine, because the derasha is actually from the last word, עִמָּךְ. I would have liked the Stamma to mention it, if so.
Another possibility is that the whole thing was an asmachta, so there is no need to grapple, or explain how Rabbi Yochanan must interpret the verse.
(2) Earlier, on 61a, a brayta listed a gezeira shaveh:
נֶאֱמַר נֶשֶׁךְ בַּלֹּוֶה וְנֶאֱמַר נֶשֶׁךְ בַּמַּלְוֶה. מָה נֶשֶׁךְ הָאָמוּר בַּלֹּוֶה – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין בְּכֶסֶף בֵּין בְּאוֹכֶל בֵּין בְּנֶשֶׁךְ בֵּין בְּרִבִּית, אַף נֶשֶׁךְ הָאָמוּר בַּמַּלְוֶה – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין בְּכֶסֶף בֵּין בְּאוֹכֶל בֵּין בְּנֶשֶׁךְ בֵּין בְּרִבִּית. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל דָּבָר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״נֶשֶׁךְ כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁךְ״.
The baraita answers: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is stated with regard to a lender. Just as concerning neshekh that is stated with regard to a borrower, you did not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit, so too, concerning neshekh stated with regard to a lender, do not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit. The baraita concludes: From where is it derived to include in the prohibition interest of any sort? The verse states: “Neshekh of anything that is lent with interest.”
We can wonder what a gezeira shaveh is, and why we say that we cannot innovate a gezeira shaveh. Perhaps these are real, authentic derashot, but it is just so hard to get it right. And that is why we have rules like the hyperlink of word / phrase being open on one side, or on both sides. Or perhaps these are real, authentic derashot but they correspond to specific ones given to Moshe, as a halacha leMoshe miSinai. Or, perhaps these are fictional derashot, and are mere mnemonics for halachot known elsewhere e.g. halacha leMoshe miSinai, or from some explicit derivation which has been forgotten, so we shouldn’t use a gezeira shaveh from scratch to innovate a brand-new halacha.
Anyway, Ravina says that the gezeira sheveh is unnecessary.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: לָא נֶשֶׁךְ בְּאוֹכֶל וְלָא רִבִּית בְּכֶסֶף צְרִיכִי קְרָא, דְּאִי כְּתִיב ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וְאׇכְלְךָ בְּמַרְבִּית״ – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ. הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיב ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית לֹא תִתֵּן אׇכְלֶךָ״, קְרִי בֵּיהּ הָכִי: ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית״, ״וּבְנָשְׁךָ וּבְמַרְבִּית לֹא תִתֵּן אׇכְלֶךָ״.
Ravina said: An explicit verse is not required, neither to derive neshekh of food nor to derive ribit of money. As, if it were written: You shall not give him your money with neshekh and your food with marbit, juxtaposing neshekh with money alone and marbit with food alone, it would be as you say, that there is a need for the derivation of the baraita. But now that it is written: “You shall not give him your money with neshekh and with marbit you shall not give him your food,” interposing both neshekh and marbit between money and food, read into the verse this interpretation: Your money you shall not give him for neshekh and for marbit; and for neshekh and for marbit you shall not give your food.
This is a type of derasha associated with Issi ben Yehuda, who speaks of five verses that can be ambiguously parsed. Here, Ravina takes בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית and applies it to the previous phrase about money, and בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית and applies it to the next phrase about food.
The Talmudic Narrator doesn’t like this, because the brayta pretty explicitly set it up as a gezeira shaveh!
וְהָא תַּנָּא ״נֶאֱמַר״ ״נֶאֱמַר״ קָאָמַר!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t the tanna of the baraita saying that neshekh of food and tarbit of money are derived by means of a verbal analogy: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is also stated with regard to a lender? How can Ravina, an amora, state that the verbal analogy is not needed?
Depending on how one views a gezeira shaveh, we can be more or less bothered by it. I feel like assuming this was Ravina #2, so that the question and answer are Savoraic or later. And there are two possible answers. The first is what we have in our printed gemaras, and several manuscripts:
הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִילּוּ לֹא נֶאֱמַר קְרָא, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה. עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר קְרָא, גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לָא צְרִיךְ. אֶלָּא גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לְמָה לִי? לְ״נֶשֶׁךְ כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁךְ״, דְּלָא כְּתִב בְּמַלְוֶה.
The Gemara answers: This is what Ravina is saying: Had the verse not stated the terms neshekh and tarbit interposed between money and food, I would have said that the halakha that both terms apply to both money and food would be derived by means of a verbal analogy. Now, as the verse is stated in that manner, a verbal analogy is not necessary. The Gemara asks: Rather, why do I need this verbal analogy? The Gemara explains: I need the verbal analogy to teach that “neshekh of anything that is lent for interest” (Deuteronomy 23:20), which is written with regard to a borrower but not written with regard to a lender, applies to a lender as well.
I don’t need the gezeira shaveh for this. Instead, I’ll use it for that which isn’t money or food, rather כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁךְ. This answer bothers me, since that isn’t how the brayta applies it. Ravina is thereby accepting the existence of the gezeira shaveh, but applying it to a different case.
Alternatively, we find a different answer in Florence 8-9, Hamburg 165, Escorial, Vatican 117, and the JTS: ENA 2087/3–5 fragment. A sample:
Something you can get from a gezeira shaveh, the Scriptures will nevertheless bother and write. This is an adaptation of the principle seen elsewhere about something derived from a kal vachomer.