Husband or Father?
For Nedarim 72b
On Nedarim 72b, the Mishnah declares that Torah scholars make sure that their daughters enter marriage free from vows:
מַתְנִי׳ דֶּרֶךְ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, עַד שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה בִּתּוֹ יוֹצְאָה מֵאֶצְלוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין. וְכֵן הַבַּעַל, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנְסִי לִרְשׁוּתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין. שֶׁמִּשֶּׁתִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר.
MISHNA: The practice of Torah scholars is to ensure that a woman about to be married should not be encumbered by any vows. A father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This was necessary because once she enters his jurisdiction he cannot nullify the vows she made before that.
Presumably the seifa of the Mishnah refers to also husbands who are Talmidei Chachamim. In the gemara, this Mishnah is used by Rava to answer a query posed by his fellow student of Rav Chisda, Rami bar Chama.
בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: בַּעַל, מַהוּ שֶׁיָּפֵר בְּלֹא שְׁמִיעָה? ״וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ״ דַּוְקָא הוּא, אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא הוּא?
Rami bar Ḥama asks: Concerning a husband, what is the halakha with regard to his nullifying a vow without hearing it? In other words, can a husband state a general nullification of his wife’s vows without being aware of any particular vow? When the verse states: “And her husband hears it, on the day that he hears it, and holds his peace at her, then her vows shall be ratified” (Numbers 30:8), is that referring specifically to a situation where he actually heard of a vow, and only then he can nullify it? Or is it not specifically referring to such a situation, and the mention of hearing is merely because the ordinary situation is that the husband nullifies a vow once he hears it?
אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: דֶּרֶךְ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, עַד שֶׁלֹּא יָצָאת בִּתּוֹ מֵאֶצְלוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין, וְהָא לָא שְׁמַע!
Rava said: Come and hear the mishna: The practice of Torah scholars is that a father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. Rava points out: But the father did not hear her vows, so it must be that one can nullify vows without knowledge that they were actually made.
Note that Rami bar Chama asked about בַּעַל, the pasuk cited is Bemidbar 30:8, her husband hears. Yet Rava cited the reisha, about the father. (Once the Talmudic Narrator pushes away Rava’s proof, it, or perhaps Rava, does continue with the seifa about the husband.)
This incongruence about father vs. husband as prooftext sparks an interesting variant about the cited pasuk. Printed texts, Vilna and Venice, have “father”, as above. So does the Munich 95 manuscript:
However, Vatican 110-111 has her father hearing it.
This would be a reference to an earlier pasuk, Bemidbar 30:5:
וְשָׁמַ֨ע אָבִ֜יהָ אֶת־נִדְרָ֗הּ וֶֽאֱסָרָהּ֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר אָֽסְרָ֣ה עַל־נַפְשָׁ֔הּ וְהֶחֱרִ֥ישׁ לָ֖הּ אָבִ֑יהָ וְקָ֙מוּ֙ כׇּל־נְדָרֶ֔יהָ וְכׇל־אִסָּ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־אָסְרָ֥ה עַל־נַפְשָׁ֖הּ יָקֽוּם׃
and her father learns of her vow or her self-imposed obligation and offers no objection, all her vows shall stand and every self-imposed obligation shall stand.
I think that the latter option, father, is an obvious scribal error. While both are indeed pesukim, Rami bar Chama’s question framed about the husband should quote a verse about the husband. What likely happened is that Rava’s answer, citing our Mishnah which began with the Torah scholar father, dragged along the citation of the verse. From Rava’s perspective, the question of father vs. husband is irrelevant, since the query is just whether the word ושמע implies a requirement to hear.
Another interesting textual variant is raised by Ran. Our printed texts have this, for the second attempted proof, from the seifa of the Mishnah, about the Torah scholar husband nullifying the vows upon entrance to the marriage:
תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא: וְכֵן הַבַּעַל, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״לְכִי שָׁמַעְנָא״.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from the latter clause of the mishna: And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This implies that he can nullify vows without hearing them. The Gemara responds: Here too, it means that he says to her: When I hear the particular vow, then it will be nullified.
The Ran writes of different girsaot:
ת"ש וכן הבעל וכו' הא נמי לכי שמע והא קמ''ל דאורחא דצורבא מרבנן להדורי - כך היא הגירסא במקצת ספרים ולהאי גירסא הוה ליה פירוקא כי ההיא דלעיל ואיכא נסחי דגרסי הכי לכי שמענא דסבירא להו דנהי דכי היכי דאב לאחר שמיעה לא מצי מיפר הכי נמי בעל לאחר שמיעה לא מצי מיפר שאין הבעל מיפר בקודמין אפי' הכי נהי דגבי אב לא מצינן לתרוצי דאמר לכי שמענא גבי בעל מתרצינן הכי דאמר לה קודם שמיעה לכי שמענא תחול הך הפרה דבשלמא אב לא מצי עביד הכי משום דבנשואין נפקא ליה מרשותיה לגמרי אבל בעל אדרבה בנשואין עיילא ליה לרשותיה ומאי טעמא אמרינן דאין הבעל מיפר בקודמין משום דאסתלק ליה אב אבל הכא כיון דאב הפר חלקו קודם שנשאת ובעל נמי צרפה להפרה דידיה בהדי הפרה דבעל קודם שנשאת נהי דכי חיילא לה הפרה דבעל אסתלק ליה אב אפילו הכי מיפר ואפשר נמי דלכי שמע משעה שהפר לה הוא דחיילא הפרה דיליה ואיכא צרופא מעליא דאב בהדי בעל זה נראה לי לפרש לפי גרסא זו:
Thus, he writes that in a few manuscripts, the girsa is: “here too, it is when he hears, and it is coming to teach that it a Torah scholars practice to seek after such matters.” That matches precisely what the Talmudic Narrator had in pushing off Rava’s proof from the reisha. The alternative girsa is ״לְכִי שָׁמַעְנָא״, “when I hear”. He explains the difference between them, where according to the latter, they hold that just like the father after he hears cannot annul, so to the husband cannot annul after he heard, because these were prior vows. Read the Ran inside.
There are only two manuscripts in Hachi Garsinan for this, Munich 95 and Vatican 110. Munich 95 is hard to read, in general, and especially for long spans, but here it is, with Rami bar Chama’s inquiry underlined, as well as the proof from the seifa:
Here is the column by column summary, with the difference in red:
So it has both לכי שמע, when he hears, plus the explanation about Torah scholars. Vatican 110 similarly has the extra explanation, but omits לכי שמע. To continue from where the previous clip (above) of Vatican 110 left off, now at the top of the next column:
I don’t know that a specific legal theory was running through the scribe’s mind. This isn’t precisely dittography in the sense of accidental copying, but especially for Munich 95, the assumption might be that this is a systematic refutation from both reisha and seifa and so the response should be identical.