Isha / Usha; Eishet / Sheishet
A post from last year about the significance of Nachamu.
Still playing a bit of catch-up.
A quick thought or three from a sugya from last week. On Bava Batra 50a:
כִּי אִיתְּמַר דְּאַמֵּימַר – הֵיכָא דְּזַבֵּין אִיהוּ וּמִית, אַתְיָא אִיהִי וּמַפְּקָא; אִי נָמֵי זַבִּנָה אִיהִי וּמִתָה, אָתֵא אִיהוּ וּמַפֵּיק בְּתַקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן – וְכִדְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ, הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג, וּמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת;
The Gemara answers: When the statement of Ameimar was stated, it was to say that neither the husband nor the wife can sell the property unilaterally. Where he sold the property and then died, she can come and remove it from the buyer. Alternatively, in a case where she sold it and then died, he can come and remove it, due to a rabbinic ordinance, and in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: When the Sanhedrin convened in Usha, they instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the buyers.
אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּזַבִּינוּ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ לְעָלְמָא, אִי נָמֵי זַבִּנָה אִיהִי לְדִידֵיהּ – זְבִינַהּ זְבִינֵי.
But where the two of them sold it to someone, or if she sold it to her husband, the sale is valid. The inference that the Gemara drew from the mishna, that if the husband produces evidence that his wife sold usufruct property to him then he is regarded as the owner, is relevant when she sells her usufruct property to him.
In some manuscripts, the text is much shorter. It just states וְכִדְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא without elaborating. This functions almost like a hyperlink, or a way of calling his shita to mind to an understanding audience. In this way, there are fewer words to memorize and recite orally.
Thus, in the Pisaro printing:
and the Vatican 115b manuscript:
it is this shortened version. While it is certainly possible for a scribe to accidentally omit something, there’s also a general principle of textual criticism, lectio brevior potior, the shorter reading is stronger. Nothing is really lost here with the shorter text. I’m not suggesting the meaning differs at all.
This quote from Rabbi Yossi beRabbi Chanina actually appears in several places, as one might intuit from the “like X said, for X said” pattern. We can examine each of them, but IIRC not all of them specifically mention Usha.
What’s interesting is that they are speaking about a decree in Usha - אושא - regarding a wife — אשה. There is textual and sound similarity. And in some cases, each is even written in abbreviated form, e.g. Munich 95:
This finally brings us to the Escorial manuscript, which is fun:
It leaves out him saying explicitly that באושא התקינו, that they decreed it in Usha. However, two factors play into this change:
The Usha / Isha similarity. Thus, haplography - skipping from the first to the second, the scribe thinking he’d already written it.
End of the written line. The scribe already neglected to write the end of the name, Chanina. Memory errors can abound when we reach a line feed / carriage return, or the equivalent for scribes.
In fairly close proximity to Isha / Usha, we get another nice one. On Bava Batra 50b,
וְלֹא לָאִישׁ חֲזָקָה בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ. וְהָאָמַר רַב: אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ צְרִיכָה לְמַחוֹת! בְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא בְּאַחֵר – וְהָאָמַר רַב: אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין בְּנִכְסֵי אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ. אֶלָּא לָאו בְּבַעַל?
§ The mishna teaches that a man does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to his wife’s property. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav say that a married woman must protest? The Gemara clarifies: With regard to whom must she protest? If we say: With regard to another, i.e., one who is not her husband who has taken possession of her property, that is problematic: But doesn’t Rav say that one cannot establish the presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a married woman, as she can claim that she did not lodge a protest because she expected her husband to do so? Rather, Rav’s intention must be that she must lodge a protest with regard to the husband. This indicates that absent her protest, it is possible for a husband to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to her property, in contrast to the ruling of the mishna.
Thus, Rav followed by the word Eishet. We know of a Rav Sheshet, not a Rav Eshet! This confounded the scribes of Escorial and Vatican 115b, who wrote Rav Sheshet:
though Vatican 115b’s scribe corrected himself.
Once again, we see that carriage return / line feed as the opportune place for a memory and hearing mistake.
On the other hand, Escorial’s scribe didn’t catch it, and while the error occurs on the top line of the page, it isn’t at a line boundary.
