Issi come, Issi go

(1) In today’s daf (Bava Metzia 83a), we have a derasha from Issi ben Yehuda.

וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם מִדְרוֹן נָמֵי – הֲתִינַח הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא רְאָיָה, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא רְאָיָה – נַיְתֵי רְאָיָה וְנִפְּטַר. דְּתַנְיָא, אִיסִי בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵין רֹאֶה שְׁבֻעַת ה׳ תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם״, הָא יֵשׁ רוֹאֶה – יָבִיא רְאָיָה וְיִפָּטֵר.

And even on an inclined plane, this works out well where there is no evidence, i.e., in a case without witnesses. But where there is evidence, let him bring evidence and be exempt. Why then is he forced to take an oath? As it is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says, with regard to the verse: “And it died or was hurt or driven away without an eyewitness, an oath of the Lord shall be between them” (Exodus 22:9–10), that one can infer from here that if there is an eyewitness, let him bring evidence and be exempt.

This derasha works by reparsing the verse, and taking the preceding phrase אֵין רֹאֶה and reading it together with the next phrase, that only then שְׁבֻעַת ה׳ תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם. This is indeed characteristic of Issi ben Yehuda, who has the famous “five verses which lack disambiguation”.

I wrote an analysis on parshablog of Issi ben Yehuda’s five, and Rav Chisda’s one, a while back on parshablog.

This current instance can also be obviously disambiguated by trup, because there is a pasuk break between the first and second phrase:

So we understand how Issi is always on the lookout for these ambiguities, that aren’t really ambiguities, but potential creative derashot.

(2) While discussing Issi, note that Rava rules in two separate instances and seems to have the same conversation with his son in both.

The first case:

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה קָא מְעַבַּר חָבִיתָא דְחַמְרָא בְּרִיסְתְּקָא דְמָחוֹזָא, וְתַבְרַהּ בְּזִיזָא דְמָחוֹזָא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רִיסְתְּקָא דְמָחוֹזָא שְׁכִיחִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי, זִיל, אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה וְאִיפְּטַר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ: כְּמַאן כְּאִיסִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין כְּאִיסִי, וּסְבִירָא לַן כְּווֹתֵיהּ.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who transported a barrel of wine in the market [beristeka] of Meḥoza and broke it on one of the protrusions of a wall in Meḥoza. The case came before Rava, who said to him: With regard to the market of Meḥoza, people are generally found there. Go and bring evidence in your favor and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef, Rava’s son, said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you issue this ruling? In accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda? Rava said to him: Yes, I ruled in accordance with the ruling of Isi, and we hold in accordance with his opinion.

and the second:

אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַרְבַּע מְאָה דַּנֵּי חַמְרָא תְּקִיפִי קָלָא אִית לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא, זִיל אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא כִּי מְזַבְּנַתְּ לְהוּ חַמְרָא מְעַלְּיָא הֲוָה, וְאִיפְּטַר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ: כְּמַאן כְּאִיסִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין כְּאִיסִי, וּסְבִירָא לַן כְּווֹתֵיהּ.

The case came before Rava, who said to the second man: If four hundred pitchers of wine had fermented, this matter would generate publicity, i.e., people would have heard of this occurrence. Consequently, go and bring proof that initially, when you purchased the pitchers, the wine was good, and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef, Rava’s son, said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you issue this ruling? According to that of Isi ben Yehuda? Rava said to him: Yes, I ruled in accordance with the ruling of Isi, and we hold in accordance with his opinion.

Those who argue (like Jacobs) that a whole lot of Talmudic quotes are pseudepigraphic point to such recurring statements. I don’t recall if this was one of them, but, for instance, Rav Pappa saying “therefore let us say both of them”; or Rabbi Yirmeya wondering about split cases. I’ve argued against this in the past, since it could just be that people act in consistent and predictable ways, so they may have the same reaction given nearly identical prompts. I know that I’ve done this myself, in my own conversations. Here, if Rava is training his son, the son might ask in two cases what the reasoning it, and checking that it is based on the Issi derasha.

(3) A lot portion of the daf was repetitious today, to the extent that the maggid shiur commented on it. I checked, and most manuscripts omitted the retreading of old ground. Note the gaps in all but Vilna and Hamburg. Soncino and Venice printings, not shown in this image, also have the text:

(4) To whom did Rabb Eleazar beRabbi Shimon apply the verse after the launderer was executed, on 83b?

לְבָתַר דְּנָח דַּעְתֵּיהּ, אֲזַל בָּתְרֵיהּ לְפָרוֹקֵיהּ וְלָא מָצֵי. קָרֵי עֲלֵיהּ: ״שֹׁמֵר פִּיו וּלְשׁוֹנוֹ שֹׁמֵר מִצָּרוֹת נַפְשׁוֹ״. זַקְפוּהּ. קָם תּוּתֵי זְקִיפָא וְקָא בָכֵי. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: רַבִּי, אַל יֵרַע בְּעֵינֶיךָ שֶׁהוּא וּבְנוֹ בָּעֲלוּ נַעֲרָה מְאוֹרָסָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.

After his mind settled, i.e., when his anger abated, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, regretted his hasty decision. He went after the laundryman in order to ransom him and save him from execution, but he was unable to do so. He read the verse about him: “Whoever keeps his mouth and his tongue, keeps his soul from troubles” (Proverbs 21:23), i.e., had the laundryman not issued his derogatory comment he would have been spared this fate. Ultimately, they hanged the laundryman. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, stood beneath the gallows and wept. Those who were present said to him: Our teacher, let it not be bad in your eyes that you caused his death, as this laundryman was a wholly wicked person; you should know that he and his son both engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman on Yom Kippur.

It seems like he is saying that it is the launderer, and that is what Rashi sees fit to say explicitly, קרי עליה - על הכובס: The keeping of mouth and tongue would be refraining from saying “vinegar son of wine”. The alternative was that he was self-critical of telling the deputies to arrest the man, given the rest of the story where he is alternately wracked by guilt or proclaiming himself guilt-free. At this point, he was not yet told of the fellow’s sinful behavior.

In the phrase קָרֵי עֲלֵיהּ, the word aleih is slightly ambiguous, but tends to favor the launderer as the target. I checked some manuscripts, and most on Hachi Garsinan have עֲלֵיהּ, while two — Escorial and Florence 8-9 — have קרי אנפשיה.

Meanwhile, he later applies a different positive verse to himself, and there all texts have קָרֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁהּ.

I’m not sure which variant of anafshei / aleih is original — whether it was first aleih, and whether it is influence from the later plus a scribal assumption that he is self-critical to move it to anafsheih; or whether it was initially structured as self-criticism and there is meant to be a parallel between the self-critical and self-congratulatory, but then adapted by a scribe to refer to the launderer. I favor aleih being original, since I see the adaptation easier toward anafsheih than towards aleih, so I would invoke lectio difficilior.