Juggling Variant Texts in Halachah

Alack! We have not yet left Avodah Zara 7, since there are two more points to cover. One is a Tosafot which discusses how to deal with ikka de’amrei, that is, Talmudic variants included within the Talmudic text itself.

Thus, on 7a, regarding Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, there’s a braya that includes this gem, with third-generation Amora Rav Yosef endorsing his position:

הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם, אֶחָד מְטַמֵּא וְאֶחָד מְטַהֵר, אֶחָד אוֹסֵר וְאֶחָד מַתִּיר, אִם הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶם גָּדוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ בְּחָכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן — הַלֵּךְ אַחֲרָיו, וְאִם לָאו — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הַמַּחְמִיר. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשֶׁל תּוֹרָה הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הַמַּחְמִיר, בְּשֶׁל סוֹפְרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הַמֵּיקֵל. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה.

In a situation where there were two Sages sitting together and one deems an item impure and the other one deems it pure, or if one deems it prohibited and the other one deems it permitted, the questioner should proceed as follows: If one of the Sages was superior to the other in wisdom and in number, one should follow his ruling, and if not, he should follow the one who rules stringently. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: If the uncertainty exists with regard to a Torah law, follow the one who rules stringently; if it exists with regard to a rabbinic law, follow the one who rules leniently. Rav Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

This is a case where there are two legitimate, flesh-and-blood human being arguing with one another. The Rabbanan give one way of deciding: if there is a reason (greater wisdom, number) to prefer one, then prefer; otherwise, since it is a dispute, rule stringently to cover your bases.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha disagrees. Rather, across the board, Biblical goes stringently and Rabbinic goes leniently. And Rav Yosef, the Amora, endorses Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha.

Now, ikka deAmrei is not the same as human rabbis who each give their own sevara. Rather, it is more like variant accounts of exactly what was said or what was argued.

(Rav Herschel Schachter has made such distinctions, in terms of applying a specific subcategory of eilu ve’eilu divrei Elokim chaim, where if I recall correctly, one who is muchzak in money can invoke the possible rejected opinion. But he says that that is only for humans, who expressed their sevara. Different quotations of what a Tanna or Amora said don’t count in the same way.)

So, even if we apply Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha generally, what do we do about ikka de’amrei variants? Tosafot write (with slight modifications to the Sefaria community translation):

בשל תורה הלך אחר המחמיר - רש"י היה פוסק בכל איכא דאמרי שבתלמוד בשל תורה הלך אחר המחמיר בשל סופרים הלך אחר האחרון וריב"א פי' דכל איכא דאמרי לגבי לשון ראשון כטפל לעיקר והלכה כלישנא קמא ור"ת פירש בדאורייתא לחומרא בדרבנן לקולא כרבי יהושע בן קרחה דהכא ורבינו שמשון היה מפרש דבכל מקום שיש להתברר כחד מינייהו משיטת התלמוד בתריה אזלינן:

In matters of Torah law, follow the stricter opinion

1. Rashi generally ruled that whenever "there are those who say" appears in the Gemara (presenting an alternate reading), if it concerns Torah law, one follows the stricter reading. If it’s a matter of Rabbinic law, one follows the latter reading.

2. Riva explained that these alternate readings are negligible compared to the first given / primary text, and the halakha follows the first version.

3. Rabbeinu Tam argues that in Torah law, one rules stringently, whereas in Rabbinic law, leniently, as with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah here.

4. Rabbeinu Shimshon explained that wherever one version could be discerned from the Talmud's shitta, one follows that approach.

See more of my discussion about which principle to apply, when and where, in this earlier Person and the Page article: