On Gittin 42a, we encounter the idea of the meimra. Essentially, a question is asked, with nary an איבעיא להו, and in response, a specific source is cited as a ta shema:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ,
Come and hear a proof with regard to this issue: When a Canaanite slave is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the owner of the ox pays a fixed penalty of thirty shekels to the slave’s owner. If a freeman is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the freeman’s value is paid to his heirs. If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master
וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. אַמַּאי? הָכִי נָמֵי לֵימָא: יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ – לְרַבּוֹ, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ – לְעַצְמוֹ!
and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. According to what was stated earlier, why is this the halakha? So too, in this case let us say: If the ox killed him on the day of his master, then the full penalty of thirty shekels is paid to his master, but if it killed him on his own day, then the full ransom is paid to the slave himself, i.e., his heirs.
The gemara attempts an answer, but it turns out that the distinction made is only acceptable according to Abaye, not to Rava. The gemara then attempts two answers via iy ba’it eima, the latter of the two which is that Rava doesn’t care about this type of statement, a meimra.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּשֶׁהִכָּהוּ אָדָם. וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵימְרָא הִיא, וּמֵימְרָא לְרָבָא לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that this is referring to a case where the slave was struck by a person, not an ox, so that the one who struck him must pay for the loss of livelihood. And if you wish, say instead: This halakha is merely a statement of an amora, and Rava is not bound to hold in accordance with a statement of an amora.
It is unclear what is meant by a meimera. It could be a Tannaitic statement that somehow was not encoded in a Mishnah, a brayta, or a Tosefta. See Artscroll, based on Rashi who says הך מימרא - בעלמא היא ואינה לא משנה ולא ברייתא. This is novel, because I would say that any transmitted statement that derives ultimately from a Tanniatic source would be called a brayta. Rav Steinsaltz renders it as an Amoraic statement, מאמר של אמוראים.
This is an interesting thing to examine. It was cited anonymously as a ta shema. Typically, when you encounter a ta shema, we assume that the source is indeed Tannaitic. Indeed, when reviewing someone’s digital humanities project, the person assumed that all ta shema’s and meitivei’s were anonymous and therefore should be considered Savoraic, even as they considered the very same statement elsewhere, when introduced with tanya or teno rabbanan to be Tannaitic! Yet, I pushed back, that is the pattern of the Talmud, they don’t always explicitly say that it is Tannaitic, but especially if you can spot it in a parallel text, the underlying assumption which makes it either an attack of a proof is that it is Tannaitic and therefore quite authoritative.
For this particular cited statement, I wanted to double check the assertion that it is a meimra. After all, it is the Talmudic Narrator stating it, not a named Amora, and this is one candidate suggestion out of two. I searched and did not find any parallel sugya which explicitly stated it was a brayta, just as another ta shema. Meanwhile, on occasion we do find תָּא שְׁמַע דְּתַנְיָא, so maybe that could indicate a lesser stature where דְּתַנְיָא does not appear.
I’ve been writing about ya’al kegam, so this was at the top of my mind. If Rava isn’t bothered by a meimra, why is the following, from Eilu Metziot a refutation?
ת"ש דא"ר יוחנן משום רבי ישמעאל בן יהוצדק מנין לאבידה ששטפה נהר שהיא מותרת דכתיב (דברים כב, ג) וכן תעשה לחמורו וכן תעשה לשמלתו וכן תעשה לכל אבידת אחיך אשר תאבד ממנו ומצאתה מי שאבודה הימנו ומצויה אצל כל אדם יצאתה זו שאבודה ממנו ואינה מצויה אצל כל אדם
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.
ואיסורא דומיא דהיתירא מה היתירא בין דאית בה סימן ובין דלית בה סימן שרא אף איסורא בין דאית בה סימן ובין דלית בה סימן אסורה תיובתא דרבא תיובתא
And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation.
והלכתא כוותיה דאביי ביע"ל קג"ם
And although in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha is typically ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rava, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye in the disputes represented by the mnemonic: Yod, ayin, lamed; kuf, gimmel, mem.
Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak, a last-generation Tanna, was Rabbi Yochanan’s teacher — see Rav Hyman about this, and Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak was presumably the same. Indeed, Rav Hyman corrects the girsa to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak. And this ta shema isn’t introduced with tanya. Why should this not be a meimra, especially since Rabbi Yochanan, an Amora, is citing it?
Also, there appear to be people named Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak, the second who is a transitional figure. Rav Hyman distinguishes them, but it might be possible to say that he was a transitional figure. If so, this might be a good candidate for something called a meimra.
We should then consider this as a possible contradiction to the Talmudic Narrator’s second suggestion. Or else, we may have a good response to the yud of ya’l kegam, and we should rule like Rava as we generally do, and against the Savoraic hilcheta statement!
We should look at the aforementioned parallel. The Talmudic Narrator is bold yet humble, and will innovate but basing itself on statements by Amoraim. Here, the proof was not in a brayta elsewhere, but in a תא שמע brought by a discussion of named Amoraim on the very next daf. Thus, Gittin 43a:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ, וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ קִידּוּשָׁיו לָאו קִידּוּשִׁין, יוֹרְשִׁין מְנָא לֵיהּ?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which is taught in a baraita: If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. And if you say that his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, and the half-slave half-freeman may not marry a woman, then from where does he have heirs? It must be that he may betroth and marry a woman, and as a result he can have heirs.
It may be this secondary sourcing, a ta shema pulled from another ta shema, that makes the current Talmudic Narrator think it is a mere meimra.
[It is interesting that the Koren English translation refers to that which is taught in a brayta. Rav Steinsaltz didn’t mention a brayta in his Hebrew commentary.]
Who responds to the ta shema? Rav Adda bar Ahava II, whose real name is Rav Adda bar Abba. He offers a radical reinterpretation of the brayta in which “killed” means rendered a traifa, but he is still around. And his “heirs” would then be himself.
Rava responds by rejecting the radical reinterpretation, because that isn’t supported by the source’s language, plus you can incorporate Reish Lakish’s statement.
אָמַר רָבָא, שְׁתֵּי תְּשׁוּבוֹת בַּדָּבָר: חֲדָא – דְּ״יוֹרְשָׁיו״ קָתָנֵי; וְעוֹד – כּוֹפֶר הוּא, וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כּוֹפֶר אֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רָאוּי לִיטּוֹל, וְאֵין לוֹ.
Rava said that there are two refutations of your statement: One is that it teaches: His heirs, and it is not reasonable to say that this is referring to the victim himself. And furthermore, it is referring to ransom here, and Reish Lakish says: Ransom is paid only after the death of the victim but not while he is still alive, even if he is a tereifa. Rather, Rava says: When the baraita states that half of the ransom is given to his heirs, it means that it is fitting for heirs to take the ransom, but he does not actually have heirs.
My question in this is why Rava needs to reinterpret this as “fitting”, if according to the second suggestion it is a mere meimra. We could of course say that this just works out according to the first of the Stamma’s suggestions.