Rabba and Darshinan Taama diKra
On today’s daf (Sotah 44a), an interesting statement, seemingly by Rabba. In trying to explain the Mishnah’s position that a kohen doesn’t return from war because he newly married if the woman is forbidden, such as a gerusha, and reconciling it with Rabbi Yossi HaGelili that he returns for even commission of minor sins:
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, כִּדְרַבָּה. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיִּבְעוֹל, מָה טַעַם: ״לֹא יִקָּח״ מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא יְחַלֵּל״ — מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה עַד שֶׁיִּבְעוֹל.
The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, such a man does not return, in accordance with the opinion of Rabba. As Rabba said: A man is never liable for a forbidden marriage until he engages in sexual intercourse with his wife. With regard to the forbidden marriages of a High Priest, the Torah states: “A widow, or a divorcée, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these he shall not take…And he shall not profane his seed among his people” (Leviticus 21:14–15). What is the reason that “he shall not take” one of these women as a wife? It is due to: “He shall not profane his seed” by engaging in sexual intercourse. Due to that reason, he is not flogged until he engages in sexual intercourse with a woman who is forbidden to him. Therefore, even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, one who merely betroths a forbidden wife might not return home from the ranks.
First how this ties into something I discussed yesterday, about how the gemara will take great pains not to fabricate an Amoraic statement, if the Amora didn’t say it in a particular context.
So here on Sotah 44a, it is not Amar Rabba, that Rabba said this thing to reconcile Rabbi Yossi HaGelili with the Mishnah. Rather, the Talmudic Narrator says כִּדְרַבָּה. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה, we can harness the same approach that Rabba said elsewhere. For Rabba took this approach about when one is liable for a forbidden marriage — only at the point of intercourse. It makes it less likely that they will then deliberately do the opposite, and have Rav Pappa say “therefore let us do both” in several different contexts, where he only said it once. Rather, the Stammaitic style is to say, “let us say both like Rav Pappa, for Rav Pappa said…” And similarly for Rabbi Yirmeyah, who we still need to discuss in a separate post.
Before proceeding, let us correct the speaker. It is not third-generation Rabba who said it, but fourth-generation Rava. The printed texts have Rabba, but the manuscripts, Munich 95 and Vatican 110 have Rava.
This is a somewhat strange case, because I could not find the original context of Rava’s statement.
Perhaps I am interpreting it incorrectly, but Rava’s statement feels a bit radical, and in line with Rabbi Shimon’s position of darshinan taama dikra. Rabbi Shimon, like other Tannaim, will contemplate the motivation behind mitzvot, but he takes it further such that (in carefully controlled contexts) if the reason doesn’t hold, the mitzvah itself won’t hold. See e.g. Sanhedrin 21a and Gittin 49b. For instance, in Sanhedrin:
דתניא אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה שנאמר (דברים כד, יז) לא תחבול בגד אלמנה דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר עשירה ממשכנין אותה ענייה אין ממשכנין אותה ואתה חייב להחזיר לה ואתה משיאה שם רע בשכנותיה
As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 10:3): In the case of a widow, whether she is poor or whether she is wealthy, one may not take collateral from her for a loan, as it is stated: “You may not take the garment of a widow for a pledge” (Deuteronomy 24:17); this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of a wealthy widow, one may take collateral from her. But in the case of a poor widow, one may not take collateral from her, because you are obligated to return it to her, and you will give her a bad name among her neighbors.
Is this what Rava is saying? That the reason of the verse to not marry is that you will come to have intercourse, which will lead to mixed dancing? And therefore violating just the bare Biblical gezeira of not marrying doesn’t count as a violation? OK, maybe that is not exactly the same as Rabbi Shimon, who only wouldn’t count it as a violation if the actual target prohibition wouldn’t be violated. But it seems along the same lines.
Or maybe not.
The closest I could find in my search for Rava was this position by his colleague Abaye in Bechorot 56b:
וכהן הבא עליה אינו לוקה משום (ויקרא כא, טו) לא יחלל זרעו דלא יחלל זרעו אמר רחמנא והאי לאו זרעיה הוא:
Abaye further stated: And a priest who engages in intercourse with her is not flogged due to the prohibition of: “And he shall not profane his seed among his people, for I am the Lord who sanctifies him.” The Gemara explains: The reason is that the Merciful One states that he should not profane his seed, i.e., his children, and any children born from this gentile prostitute are not considered to be his seed, as the children of a gentile mother are gentiles.
Abaye’s idea is that the prohibitions are linked, so he doesn’t violate lo yikach with his intercourse if he doesn’t end up fathering children that could be considered his, thus, lo yechalel. The parallel for Rava is that he does not violate lo yikach with his marriage (to a divorcee) until he ends up engaging in intercourse, the lo yechalel. They may argue with one another, but they operate in similar manner. This is not necessarily the same as a Rabbi Shimon position. (Or if it is, the case may be different if the reason is explicitly written in the verse via this linkage, rather than intuited.)
While we are on the topic of returning for even minor sins, a cute idea. Rabbi Yossi HaGelili had said: ״וְרַךְ הַלֵּבָב״, זֶה הַמִּתְיָירֵא מֵעֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ. And the gemara says this means even Rabbinic sins (as opposed to Rabbi Yossi, who held only Biblical sins).
Thus:
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: שָׂח בֵּין תְּפִילָּה לִתְפִילָּה — עֲבֵירָה הִיא בְּיָדוֹ, וְחוֹזֵר עָלֶיהָ מֵעוֹרְכֵי הַמִּלְחָמָה. כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: If one spoke between donning the phylactery of the arm and the phylactery of the head, he has a sin on his hands, and due to that sin he returns from the ranks of soldiers waging war. In accordance with whose opinion does this man return? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who maintains that one returns even due to a minor transgression.
We can say that it is specifically speaking after donning the tefillin shel yad, because it is an aveira shebeyado.
Back in 2006 on parshablog, I discussed a position attributed to a Yerushalmi that one who speaks between Yishtabach and Yotzer Or has violated, and would return from the battle. I took issue with this idea because:
I couldn’t find that Yerushalmi despite having learned through it
Yishtabach and Baruch SheAmar seem to be post-Talmudic innovations (as Rif says, something enacted by Rabbevata), as blessings surrounding Pesukei deZimra.
And even pesukei de-zimra was optional during Talmudic times.
And why should there even be any problem? Yishtabach closes the prior segment. Why say that in this entirely permitted time, one cannot speak?
And even between perakim in pesukei dezimra, on can speak for various purposes.
So it seems strange for there to be a problem with such a hefsek, even on a rabbinic level (like Rabbi Yossi HaGelili).
My suggestion was that this was a misread, and the basis was really שָׂח בֵּין תְּפִילָּה לִתְפִילָּה, that he spoke between tefillin shel yad and shel rosh. “Tefillah” can also be interpreted as prayer, so someone misunderstood this as speaking between the first prayer (psukei dezimra with its blessings) and the second prayer (shema with its blessings).