Rabba vs. Rav Yosef, part two (article summary)
This post is a summary of part two of Rabba vs. Rav Yosef, and the exploration of whether it really is a legal decisive principle. Because it is part two, and the subject matter is complicated, it really pays to first read part one. So if you haven’t, or if it has been too long since part one, why not first reread it?
OK, with that done, let us move on to part two. It is now available on the web here: HTML, flipdocs, paid Substack. Or, here is an image:
A quick summary.
In the prior article, I covered a statement in Gittin 74b, that hilcheta keRabba. The idea was that since it was juxtaposed with hilcheta beha — in this — kiFloni, whereas by Rabba, it did not say beha, the Talmud was invoking an implicit, otherwise known rule. Such was Tosafot’s widely adopted suggestion. I attacked that idea in two ways. First (as Tosafot themselves note elsewhere), there are manuscripts which have the word beha even by the Rabba clause. Second, with unnecessarily support from one manuscript, I pointed out that Gittin 74b was most likely about Rava, not Rabba. My proof was that, throughout the Talmud, it is always Rabba preceding Rav Yosef in their argument or even their agreement. This because Rabba presided over Pumbedita first, for twenty two years then Rav Yosef. Yet here, Rav Yosef’s position is listed first. This would make sense if it is Rava, who is of the next generation, so that the gemara is in chronological order.
Now, on to this article. That Gittin 74b rule was never standalone. It was used by Tosafot to prop up an different rule, appearing in Bava Batra. Namely, that in three cases — field, matter, and half — the halacha is like Rav Yosef.
This could be interpreted as a statement limited to Bava Batra. What are the odds that all three cases where Rav Yosef wins appears in a single masechet (or third of the larger masechet Nezikin)?
But Tosafot counter that, because of the general assumption of ruling like Rabba found in Gittin 74b.
I counter Tosafot by reminding the reader about points made in the prior article - beha in some manuscripts, plus it’s likely about Rava, not Rabba.
Additionally, instead of reasoning that michlal lav ata shome’a hen, deducing the positive from the negative, which many Sages maintain — e.g. that which I don’t eat from you is not like a korban — this is michlal hen ata shome’a lav. That is, the statement was that the halacha is like Rav Yosef in X, Y, and Z; not that the halacha is only like him in X, Y, and Z. I suggested a similar thing for ruling like Abaye in ya’al kegam.
And no mention was made of his opponent, Rabba. Indeed, one of the X, Y, Z cases involves arguing against students, Abaye and Rabbi Zeira II.
Since we are analyzing Rabbeinu Tam’s arguments, we may as well explore other points he made.
Namely, in Kiddushin, why bother listing the case where Rabba wins, if there is a general rule like him?
And why not say “the halacha is like Rabba”, as in the next two vehilchetas in the chain [though not like the immediately preceding one, that aina mekudeshet]? Rabbeinu Tam answers that we don’t exactly hold like Rabba fully, just in the case of silk fabric and the like, which have a fixed value.
My alternative answer to (a) is: maybe there is no such general rule. But if there is, the reason for listing it is agav urcha, by the way while we are mentioning others. There are four vehilchetas in a row, targeting 9a, 7b, 8a, 8a-b, in that order. 9a is the sugya we just finished. And then, the Talmudic Narrator jumps back to the earlier halachic disputes covered in the gemara up to this point, and covers them in textual order, all the way back to 7b and from there on.
My alternative answer to (b) is: Now that we jumped all the way back to 7b, who can remember the dispute? Also, even earlier, Rabba argues with Abaye (though not necessarily halachically), so just saying Rabba wins doesn’t provide enough information for the listener to know. We need to disambiguate.
We explore the three cases of field, matter, and half, so that we know what we are talking about, and so that we can look for features or clues such as the internal arguments in the sugya. Is it clear in each who won, so that this general rule might be a summary of the gemara’s conclusions?
We are omitting a Bava Batra case where Rav Yosef wins, half-way, against Rabba. In money, Rav Yosef wins; in land, Rabba wins. A named Amora, Rav Idi bar Avin, mentions this, on daf 32a. Rishonim discuss if this is a definitive vehilcheta. But vehilcheta is used. Isn’t this an exception to the rule?
I didn’t think of this at the time, but could this be the half case, instead of the one against Rav Yosef’s students?
Finally, here’s another counter to the general rule. In Berachot 12b, it is Rav Yosef vs. Rabba, and we conclude that the halacha is like Rabba. Shouldn’t Tosafot grapple with why the gemara needs to declare this vehilcheta, if there is a general rule, just like in Kiddushin
I answer that, once again, just as in Gittin 74b, Rav Yosef is listed first, suggesting this is actually third-generation Rav Yosef against fourth-generation Rava. And Rava wins. And there is manuscript support for it being Rava.