Rav Huna bar Chinena (article summary)

Someone told me that this article was more boring than my typical fare. This sounds plausible. I don’t try to radically reinterpret any gemaras based on biographical knowledge. Instead, there is an Amora who is mentioned, and I try to fill in his background, so that we recognize him when we encounter him, just as we recognize Abaye or Rava. Though there is one insight, I’ll add at the bottom of this post. Also, it is possible that a blog-type format, with sections of quoted text, would have been a better format for this one.

You can read the article here: HTML, flipdocs, paid Substack.

There are a few aspects of Rav Huna bar Chinena I discuss.

He was fourth-generation, thus a contemporary of Rava. Two stories, rather than just mere arguments, have him taking a halachic position against Rava. In one, Avoda Zara 40a, it is about fish, though the specifics are debated by Rishonim.

ההוא ארבא דצחנתא דאתי לסיכרא נפק רב הונא בר חיננא וחזא ביה קלפי ושרייה א"ל רבא ומי איכא דשרי כה"ג באתרא דשכיחי קלפי נפק שיפורי דרבא ואסר שיפורי דרב הונא בר חיננא ושרי

The Gemara relates that there was a certain ship carrying tzaḥanta which came to the city of Sikhra. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana went out and saw that the fish had scales on them and permitted them, as any fish with scales is kosher. Rava said to him: But is there anyone who permits tzaḥanta in a case like this, when it is from a land where fish with scales are common and it is very possible that the scales are from kosher fish that had been in the boat previously? Shofarot went out from the court of Rava to herald a declaration promulgating his ruling, and he thereby prohibited all the fish on that boat. And shofarot went out from the court of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana, and he thereby permitted the fish.

The other is about wine touched by a gentile thrown into a much larger container of wine, in Avoda Zara 57b.

ההוא עובדא דהוה במחוזא אתא עובד כוכבים עייל לחנותא דישראל אמר להו אית לכו חמרא לזבוני אמרו ליה לא הוה יתיב חמרא בדוולא שדי ביה ידיה שיכשך ביה אמר להו האי לאו חמרא הוא שקליה האיך בריתחיה שדייה לדנא

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain incident in Meḥoza in which a gentile came and entered the store of a Jew. The gentile said to the owners: Do you have any wine to sell? They said to him: No. There was wine sitting in a bucket. The gentile put his hand in it and stirred the wine around. The gentile said to them: This, is it not wine? The other person, i.e., the storeowner, took the bucket and, in his anger, threw its contents into a barrel of wine.

שרייה רבא לזבוני לעובדי כוכבים איפליג עליה רב הונא בר חיננא ורב הונא בריה דרב נחמן נפקי שיפורי דרבא ושרו ונפקי שיפורי דרב הונא בר חיננא ור"ה בר ר"נ ואסרי

This incident raised a dilemma with regard to the status of the wine in the barrel. Rava permitted the owner to sell the wine to gentiles, as he held that it is permitted to derive benefit from the wine. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana and Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, disagreed with him. Blasts of shofarot went out from the court of Rava promulgating his ruling, and they permitted the sale. And blasts of shofarot went out from the court of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana and Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, promulgating their ruling, and they prohibited the sale.

In this particular case, the argument / competing courts don’t end there. Rav Huna bar Rav Nachman, one of the pair arguing with Rava, tries to resolve this. The story continues at the top of 58a:

איקלע רב הונא בריה דר"נ למחוזא א"ל רבא לרב אליקים שמעיה טרוק טרוק גלי דלא ניתו אינשי דניטריד

Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, happened to come to Meḥoza. Rava said to his attendant, Rav Elyakim: Close, close the gates, so that people who might disturb us should not come, and we may focus on clarifying the matter.

על לגביה א"ל כי האי גוונא מאי א"ל אסור אפילו בהנאה והא מר הוא דאמר שיכשך אין עושה יין נסך אימר דאמרי אנא לבר מדמיה דההוא חמרא דמי דההוא חמרא מי אמרי

Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, entered into Rava’s presence. Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, said to Rava: What is the halakha in a case like this where a gentile stirred the wine without intending to offer it as an idolatrous libation? Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman: It is prohibited even to derive benefit from it. Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, asked him: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said: If a gentile stirs the wine, he does not thereby render it wine used for a libation, as Rava permitted the sale of the wine in the barrel to gentiles? Rava answered: Say that I said that it is permitted to sell the wine that was in the barrel and benefit from all the proceeds except for the monetary value of that prohibited wine that was poured into the barrel of wine. Did I say that it is permitted to derive benefit from the monetary value of that prohibited wine?

We need to figure out why Rava commanded to close the gates. Was it indeed to keep Rav Huna bar Rav Nachman out?! He was afraid to dispute, or to perhaps admit that he was wrong? This seems so out of character to Rava, who elsewhere is exceptionally intellectually honest, willing to engage in debate, and willing to admit mistakes. Soo Tosafot who question this. Alternative explanations have Rava command to shut the door, so that he can have a private audience with his disputant, to hash it out in the DMs instead of on his public feed. Textual variants brought by Tosafot have it as Rava’s rebbe, Rav Nachman, who comes to Mechoza. So Rava comes to his rebbe to have him clarify the matter.

At any rate, Rav Aharon Hyman points to these two stories, one in Sichra and one in Mechoza, and another gemara showing the proximity of these two towns, to say that Rava presided over his court in Mechoza and Rav Huna bar Chinena over his court in Sichra. Perhaps.

Finally, we see in a few places that Rava and Rav Huna bar Chinena take contrary positions about what their primary teacher, Rav Nachman said. This might be a good way of resolving a problem that we are going to encounter in about ten days, on Kiddushin 42a-b, bringing in a gemara in Ketubot 100:

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחְלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶם – בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִים לָהֶם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִים לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה, וְאִם הִגְדִּילוּ – יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: אִם הִגְדִּילוּ אֵינָם יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת, דְּאִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה?

§ With regard to the halakhot of stewardship, Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If orphans came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward for them, and they select for them, i.e., for each of the orphans, a fine portion. And when they have grown up, the orphans can protest the division and demand redistribution of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: When they have grown up, they cannot protest, as if so, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? In other words, to strengthen the authority of the court, it is required that its decisions not be questioned later on.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן ״אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה״? וְהָתְנַן: שׁוּם הַדַּיָּינִים שֶׁפִּיחֲתוּ שְׁתוּת אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ שְׁתוּת – מִכְרָן בָּטֵל. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מִכְרָן קַיָּים. (וְאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל): אִם כֵּן – מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה! וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.

The Gemara asks: And is Rav Naḥman of the opinion that there is a consideration of: If so, what advantage does the court have over an ordinary person? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 99b): The halakha with regard to the appraisal by the judges of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it is as follows: Where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, if the sale is void, then what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? And Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. This indicates that Rav Naḥman does not accept the consideration of: What advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person?

לָא קַשְׁיָא:

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.

הָא – דִּטְעוֹ, הָא – דְּלָא טְעוֹ. אִי דְּלָא טְעוֹ, מַאי יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת? יְכוֹלִים לְמַחוֹת בְּרוּחוֹת.

In this case, where Rav Naḥman ruled that their transaction is void, in accordance with the Rabbis, the court erred by one-sixth. But in that case, where Rav Naḥman ruled that the orphans cannot protest when they grow up, they did not err by one-sixth. The Gemara asks: If Rav Naḥman’s ruling that the orphans cannot protest is referring to a case where they did not err by one-sixth, why did Shmuel say that they can later protest; what is the nature of their protest? The Gemara answers: They can protest with regard to the locations. One of the orphans can contend that he prefers property in a different location than he was given.

You need to look at the foreign gemara inside to see if it works out, but maybe an easier approach is that the first tradition here about Shmuel and Rav Nachman himself was via Rava, while the tradition from Rav Huna bar Chinena differs. I suggest that an examination of that foreign sugya, Ketubot 100a, indeed bears out that this is a dispute, of Rava quoting Rav Nachman and Rav Shmuel bar Bisna quoting Rav Nachman, about the power of beit din and its agent for for orphans. See there.