Rav Pappa's Knowledge of Reish Lakish

In yesterday’s daf, Avodah Zarah 47a, there are two versions of Reish Lakish’s dilemma, בָּעֵי.

First is:

בָּעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לַדֶּקֶל, לוּלָבוֹ מַהוּ לְמִצְוָה?

§ Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a palm tree, what is the halakha with regard to its lulav? Is it permitted to use a lulav cut from it for the mitzva or not?

and the gemara elaborates.

Then there is Rav Dimi’s version, when he came to Bavel:

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: בַּאֲשֵׁירָה שֶׁבִּיטְּלָהּ קָמִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, יֵשׁ דִּחוּי אֵצֶל מִצְוֹת אוֹ אֵין דִּחוּי אֵצֶל מִצְוֹת?

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he presented a different understanding of Reish Lakish’s dilemma. He said: Reish Lakish raises the dilemma with regard to an ashera whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked. His dilemma is as follows: Is there disqualification with regard to mitzvot or is there no disqualification with regard to mitzvot? This lulav was once unfit for the mitzva, since it was worshipped while attached to the tree. Is it permanently disqualified, i.e., can it never be rendered fit? Or is the halakha that there is no permanent disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and consequently when the tree’s status as an object of idol worship was revoked, the lulav became fit for the mitzva?

Rav Dimi certainly preceded Rav Pappa by at least one generation.

The Talmudic Narrator tries to resolve based on an analysis performed by Rav Pappa. This begins with תִּפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדִּתְנַן and continues וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ, meaning that the Stamma in a later stratum is quoting a finished sugya from elsewhere, and within that other sugya, וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא regarding a statement of Rabba bar bar Chana quoting Rabbi Yochanan. So Rav Pappa does not react here, but elsewhere. That elsewhere is Chullin 87a, the primary sugya, where it is just amar Rav Pappa, and Rabba bar bar Chana quoting Rabbi Yochanan is about the Mishna there. Thus:

כסהו הרוח: אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא שחזר ונתגלה אבל לא חזר ונתגלה פטור מלכסות וכי חזר ונתגלה מאי הוי הא אידחי ליה אמר רב פפא זאת אומרת אין דיחוי אצל מצות

§ The mishna teaches that if the wind blew earth on the blood and covered it one is obligated to cover the blood. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught this halakha only if the blood was again uncovered. But if the blood was not again uncovered one is exempt from the obligation to cover it. The Gemara asks: And when the blood was again uncovered, what of it? Isn’t it already rejected from the mitzva of covering since it was covered by the wind? Rav Pappa said: That is to say that there is no permanent rejection with regard to mitzvot. Although the wind covered the blood, the mitzva to cover it was not rendered null; rather, the mitzva simply could not be performed. Consequently, once the blood is again uncovered, the mitzva to cover the blood remains in place.

Anyway, our local gemara says you cannot resolve from there. But this is because the gemara makes Reish Lakish’s dilemma a point within Rav Pappa, namely whether it equally applies to leniency and stringency.

(Another non-primary sugya where this occurs is Succah 33a, where it is Rabbi Yirmeya who raises a different dilemma seemingly predicated on whether יֵשׁ דִּחוּי אֵצֶל מִצְוֹת, אוֹ לֹא; the gemara again makes the vehavinan bah cross reference to the primary sugya in Chullin with Rav Pappa, and then explains that Rabbi Yirmeya operates within Rav Pappa, about leniency / stringency.)

Perhaps. Another possibility, without reimagining Reish Lakish / Rabbi Yirmeyah, is that he did not agree with this analysis of the Mishnah regarding kisuy hadam. Reish Lakish often disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan. Whereas Rabbi Yochanan held that there was no dichuy by mitzvot, and therefore explained the Mishnah’s halacha in one way, these other Amoraim were uncertain.

---

The gemara continues with the first of a series of Rav Pappa dilemmas, and interjects before he can get to the others:

בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לִבְהֵמָה, צַמְרָהּ מַהוּ לִתְכֵלֶת?

§ Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to an animal, what is the halakha with regard to its wool? May it be used for the sky-blue wool?

תְּכֵלֶת דְּמַאי? אִי תְּכֵלֶת לְכֹהֲנִים — הַיְינוּ בַּעְיָא דְּרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא, וְאִי תְּכֵלֶת לְצִיצִית — הַיְינוּ בַּעְיָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ!

The Gemara asks: The sky-blue wool in question is for which mitzva? If it is the sky-blue wool for the ritual garments worn by priests, then Rav Pappa’s dilemma is the same as the dilemma raised by Rami bar Ḥama earlier (46b) with regard to the use in the Temple of worshipped items that have since changed in form. And if the sky-blue wool in question is for the mitzva of ritual fringes, this is the same as the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish with regard to the use of a branch of a worshipped palm tree for performing the mitzva of lulav.

The gemara answers that this was not really what Rav Pappa was asking. Rather, it was the lead of a general pattern of questions:

אִין הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא הֲוָה לְמִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא בָעֵי לֵיהּ הָא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא מִילֵּי אַחְרָנְיָיתָא: צַמְרָהּ מַהוּ לִתְכֵלֶת? קַרְנֶיהָ מַהוּ לַחֲצוֹצְרוֹת? שׁוֹקֶיהָ מַהוּ לַחֲלִילִין? בְּנֵי מֵעֶיהָ מַהוּ לְפֹארוֹת?

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that Rav Pappa did not need to raise this dilemma, as it was previously addressed. And the reason that he raises this dilemma is due to other matters that he needed to clarify, concerning the use of parts of a worshipped animal in the Levites’ ritual song. With regard to its wool, what is the halakha concerning using it for sky-blue wool used in the performance of a mitzva? With regard to its horns, what is the halakha concerning their use for trumpets? With regard to the bones of its thighs, what is the halakha concerning their use for flutes? With regard to its innards, what is the halakha concerning their use for harp strings [leforot]?

This reminds me of a point I made, and an article I wrote about a year back, about Rami bar Chama as the Query Master setting the agenda for study in the academy.

The gemara in Bava Metzia wonders at Rami bar Chama’s seemingly straightforward questions, and therefore deliberately makes the initial query more complicated. I suggested that it was part of a series, and functioned to set up the assumptions from which other questions flowed. But that yes, it may have been obvious.

Regardless, here in Avodah Zarah, firstly, the gemara lands on such an analysis of a trivial query appearing at the start of a series of queries. So I can find support for my earlier analysis.

Secondly, to point out the gemara’s objection to Rav Pappa’s query, this is based on scholastic generations and that later generations know things from preceding generations. So Rav Pappa would know both Rami bar Chama’s query on 46a and Reish Lakish’s query about dichuy by mitzvot immediately above.

I would point out that this latter assertion, that he knew about Reish Lakish’s dillema, is a bit fuzzy. It is mostly true, but still — maybe Rav Pappa operated within the initial non-Rav Dimi version of Reish Lakish. Also, even though Reish Lakish posed the question about dichuy eitzel mitzvot, Rav Pappa did not immediately and personally resolve it here (even before saying it is a stringency.) Locally, he does not discuss this at all. Recall that Rav Pappa above was actually pulled from a separate sugya which was primary in Chullin. So, maybe this was somehow not within his frame of knowledge when he posed the question.