Rava as a Youngster

In yesterday’s post, I discussed Rava and the position that he took. First, that he explicitly took, on Sanhedrin 61b.

אִיתְּמַר: הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מֵאַהֲבָה וּמִיִּרְאָה, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רָבָא אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

§ It was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of one who worships idols due to his love of another who requested that he bow before the statue, or due to fear of someone coercing him to do so, but not due to faith in that idol, what is the halakha? Abaye says: He is liable. Rava says: He is exempt.

and then, the position that he might have taken. We aren’t sure, because it might be that the gemara is merely attributing it to him within the Rava framework — how Rava would have answered. According to the Vilna printing, it was Rava amar lecha la…, which is the formula for a position the Stamma puts in an Amora’s mouth. Other printings / manuscripts omit lecha. But this might be haplography (skipping the similar word based on context), and the Stamma can sometimes attribute something to an Amora who has already spoken in the give-and-take, without using this explicit formula. This second position, now connected to the first, is:

וְרָבָא אָמַר לָךְ: לָא, בְּאוֹמֵר מוּתָּר.

And Rava could have said to you in response: No, the baraita is not referring to this case, but to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted.

and in the gemara that continues (with Rabbi Zakkai) that position appears twice more for Rava within the Stamma’s analysis.

In one of those follow-up occurrences, the gemara raises a contrast between this point and something else we know about Rava. Sanhedrin 62a:

אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר ״מוּתָּר״. תִּפְשׁוֹט דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הֶעְלֵם זֶה וָזֶה בְּיָדוֹ, מַהוּ?

Rather, according to Rava, unawareness with regard to idol worship can be explained as referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. If so, one can resolve the dilemma that Rava raised before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if one who violated Shabbat has a lapse of awareness of both this, i.e., that it was Shabbat, and that, i.e., that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat?

תִּיפְשׁוֹט, דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, וְתִפְשׁוֹט.

Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved. If the phrase “and performs from one of them” is interpreted as referring to a case where one engages in idol worship thinking that it is permitted to do so, one can resolve that the transgressor is obligated to bring only one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship, according to this interpretation of the verse. The fact that Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved therefore serves as a challenge to this interpretation. The Gemara refutes this challenge: This is not difficult; indeed, resolve the dilemma from here.

The point of this question is that, if Rava says what he purportedly says in the way that he says it, it resolves a certain dilemma that he raised to his primary teacher, Rav Nachman. But then, he knows the answer himself, so why should he ask?

The gemara then answers that it is not a big deal. You’re right, resolve the dilemma from here.

Ultimately, it’s a moot point, because the gemara retracts in terms of interpreting the verses in this way, in the very next statement.

Looking meanwhile at the primary sugya where Rava raised this question, Shabbat 70b, I see that Rava poses this dilemma and Rav Nachman gives an answer. The answer is aligned with what they are trying to say Rava should conclude locally, that he’s only liable to one korban. But Rava rejects that this is a conclusive answer, and wonders why we would not say the opposite.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הֶעְלֵם זֶה וָזֶה בְּיָדוֹ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם שַׁבָּת בְּיָדוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אַדְּרַבָּה, הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם מְלָאכוֹת בְּיָדוֹ וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: חָזֵינַן, אִי מִשּׁוּם שַׁבָּת קָא פָרֵישׁ — הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם שַׁבָּת בְּיָדוֹ וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, וְאִי מִשּׁוּם מְלָאכָה קָפָרֵישׁ — הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם מְלָאכוֹת בְּיָדוֹ וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: כְּלוּם פֵּרֵישׁ מִשַּׁבָּת אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם מְלָאכוֹת, כְּלוּם פֵּרֵישׁ מִמְּלָאכוֹת אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם שַׁבָּת — אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if a person had a lapse of awareness of both this, Shabbat, and that, a particular labor? He said to him: He had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat and is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Rava said to him: On the contrary, he had a lapse of awareness with regard to prohibited labors, and he should be liable for each and every labor that he performed. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists from performing the labor when he is told what day it is, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable for only one. And if it is due to awareness of the prohibited labor that he desists, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to the labors and he is liable for each and every one. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? When one desists from labor when he is told that it is Shabbat, it is because he understands that the labor he is performing is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, when one desists from his labor when he is told that the labor is prohibited, it is because he understands that the day is Shabbat. Rather, there is no difference between the cases, and in both he is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat.

The gemara in Shabbat does not invoke the gemara here in Sanhedrin to resolve it.

I would note that these are two separate eras in Rava’s life. Rav Nachman (bar Yaakov) of Nehardea was Rava’s teacher, and so Rava is relatively young.

When Abaye and Rava were arguing, Rava was somewhat older, and had moved to Pumbedita. It would not be surprising for something for Rava to challenge something in his youth and then, as he matured and studied more, his positions shifted or solidified. As the gemara itself notes, yes, deduce the correct solution from this.