Rava bar Ahina?
Continuing the other day’s post on Sotah 39b, one or two other thoughts. People need to wait for the sefer Torah to leave before leaving shul themselves. What is the basis?
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי: הָא — דְּאִיכָּא פִּיתְחָא אַחֲרִינָא. הָא — דְּלֵיכָּא פִּיתְחָא אַחֲרִינָא. אָמַר רָבָא, בַּר אֲהִינָא אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי: ״אַחֲרֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם תֵּלֵכוּ״.
The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree about the halakha. Rather, they were discussing different situations. This statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is referring to a case where there is another exit. When the Torah scroll is being taken out of one exit, people may leave through the other exit. However, that statement of Shmuel is referring to a case where there is no other exit, and therefore the congregation must wait until the Torah is carried out. Rava said: The Sage bar Ahina explained to me that this halakha is derived from the verse: “After the Lord your God you shall walk” (Deuteronomy 13:5), meaning that one must walk after the Torah scroll and not in front of it.
This follows Rashi’s explanation that bar Ahina is the name of a chacham:
בר אהינא אסברה לי - חכם ששמו בר אהינא אסברה לי הבינני טעמו של דבר:
Vatican 110 has amar Rava, bar Ahina… Munich 95 has amar Rav Huna, bar Ahina…
Were it not for the words אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי, I might have omitted the comma and said that some Sage named Rava bar Ahina said this.
Looking across Shas, we encounter Bar Ahina, but always quoted by Rava. Thus, Kiddishin 51a:
אִיתְּמַר קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה אַבָּיֵי אָמַר הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין רָבָא אָמַר לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין אָמַר רָבָא בַּר אֲהִינָא אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין הַמְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין
§ It was stated that amora’im had a dispute: With regard to betrothal that is not given to consummation, Abaye says it is betrothal, since the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse does not affect the betrothal itself. Rava says: It is not betrothal. Rava says: The Sage bar Ahina explained to me that this halakha is derived from the verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), as it indicates that betrothal that is given to permitted consummation is betrothal, whereas betrothal that is not given to consummation is not betrothal.
We have Abaye then Rava, and Rava explains what bar Ahina explained to him. That primary sugya is also quoted earlier in Kiddushin 9b:
וּלְרָבָא דְּאָמַר בַּר אֲהִינָא אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין הַמְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rava, who said: Bar Ahina explained this to me by citing a proof from the following verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which teaches that betrothal that is given to consummation, i.e., betrothal when it is permitted for the man and woman to engage in intercourse, is a betrothal, but betrothal that is not given to consummation is not a valid betrothal, what is there to say? Since he uses this verse for a different purpose, from where does Rava derive that a woman can be betrothed through intercourse and that a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired in this manner?
(Munich 95 is possibly messed up here, having א' רבא רב הונא בר אהינא אסברא לי. But we can understand it as Rava saying: Rav Huna bar Ahina explained it to me.)
Meanwhile, Menachot 37b is confusing. It has:
אמר רב יוסף סדין בציצית איכא בינייהו
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to the four ritual fringes on a garment, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as the four of them constitute one mitzva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The four of them are four discrete mitzvot, and the absence of one does not prevent fulfillment of the rest. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of the first tanna and Rabbi Yishmael? Rav Yosef said: The difference between their opinions is with regard to a linen sheet with woolen ritual fringes that has fewer than four ritual fringes. The first tanna maintains that since one is not performing a mitzva, he may not wrap himself in the sheet, due to the prohibition of diverse kinds, i.e., the prohibition against wearing clothing made from a mixture of wool and linen threads. Conversely, Rabbi Yishmael permits one to wrap himself in it, as each ritual fringe is a separate mitzva, and the mitzva of ritual fringes overrides the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds.
רבא בר אהינא אמר טלית בעלת חמש איכא בינייהו
Rava bar Ahina said: The difference between their opinions is with regard to a cloak with five corners. It is derived that a cloak of this kind requires ritual fringes (see 43b), but it is unclear whether ritual fringes must be placed on each corner. If each fringe is a discrete mitzva, then the obligation applies to the fifth corner as well, but if it is one mitzva then it applies only to four of the corners of this garment.
which makes it sound like there is an Amora named Rava bar Ahina who argues with Rav Yosef as to the difference, not that Rav Yosef said something, while Rava argues and says that Bar Ahina explained the difference to him.
However, the manuscripts on Hachi Garsinan don’t have Rava bar Ahina here. They do have Rav Adda bar Ahava.
One final relevant variant on Sotah 39b.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּם אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: אֵין הַצִּבּוּר רַשָּׁאִין לָצֵאת, עַד שֶׁיִּנָּטֵל סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה וְיָנֻיחַ בִּמְקוֹמוֹ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא.
And Rabbi Tanḥum says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The congregation is not permitted to leave the synagogue after the Torah reading until the Torah scroll has been taken and prepared to be returned to its place, as the Torah scroll used to be stored near the synagogue.
And Shmuel said: They may not leave until the Torah scroll is actually taken out of the synagogue, out of respect for the Torah scroll.
Forget the English translation for a moment. With this version, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi might be more stringent. The Torah scroll must be removed from the shul and returned to its place, before the people can leave. It must reach its destination. And Shmuel maintains that it simply needs to leave — that would be a more lenient position.
However, it would be difficult to make this accord with the next segment in the sugya.
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי: הָא — דְּאִיכָּא פִּיתְחָא אַחֲרִינָא. הָא — דְּלֵיכָּא פִּיתְחָא אַחֲרִינָא. אָמַר רָבָא, בַּר אֲהִינָא אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי: ״אַחֲרֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם תֵּלֵכוּ״.
The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree about the halakha. Rather, they were discussing different situations. This statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is referring to a case where there is another exit. When the Torah scroll is being taken out of one exit, people may leave through the other exit. However, that statement of Shmuel is referring to a case where there is no other exit, and therefore the congregation must wait until the Torah is carried out. Rava said: The Sage bar Ahina explained to me that this halakha is derived from the verse: “After the Lord your God you shall walk” (Deuteronomy 13:5), meaning that one must walk after the Torah scroll and not in front of it.
Vilna and Venice printings have וְיָנֻיחַ בִּמְקוֹמוֹ. So to this fragment, CUL: T-S AS 88.23:
However, other manuscripts remove that phrase, meaning that the sefer Torah need merely be taken up:
Thus, Vatican 110: