Relinquishing Honor (full unlocked article)
In yesterday’s daf, Kiddushin 32, we discussed a father, teacher, king, and nasi relinquishing honor. A while back, for Ketubot, I wrote an article, which I will repost here.
It has already been available for a while on the Jewish Link website (HTML, flipdocs), but Substack has its benefits in terms of formatting, plus it ease of lookup. So here it follows, for Ketubot 17a / Kiddushin 32b:
On Ketubot 17a, a brayta discusses traffic situations, and right-of-way. A funeral procession yields to (or, reroutes before) a wedding procession, and both funeral and wedding procession yield to a king of Israel. The brayta continues that King Agrippa I (of the Herodian dynasty, 10 CE - 44 CE) yielded to a wedding procession, for which the Sages praised him. The Talmudic Narrator wonders at this. Rav Ashi had elsewhere (Kiddushin 32b) declared that even those who say a Nasi can effectively relinquish his honor maintain that a king cannot effectively do so. As prooftext (דְּאָמַר מָר), it cites an exposition from Devarim 17, “you shall surely place a king over you”, that his awe should be upon you. Why should the Sages then praise King Agrippa? The Talmudic Narrator explains that the incident occurred at a crossroads. (Rashi explains that it would appear that he wished to take the path to which he turned.) It wasn’t obvious to onlookers that he had yielded, so the king’s honor wasn’t impinged.
Yet, King Agrippa is consistent. A Mishnah in Sotah (41a) describes how, though the law is that a king receives the Torah scroll while standing and then reads from it while sitting, King Agrippa read from it while standing, for which the Sages praised him. The Talmudic Narrator (41b) asks from Rav Ashi’s statement that a king cannot effectively relinquish his honor, and the accompanying exposition, then answers that, for a mitzvah, it is different.
A Mishnah in Sanhedrin (18a) records a dispute. The first Tanna says that a king may not perform chalitza (because it doesn’t accord with his honor), while Rabbi Yehuda allows him to do so. Again, the Talmudic Narrator (19b) brings up Rav Ashi’s assertion and the exposition, then answers that, for a mitzvah, it is different. Tosafot in Ketubot, Sotah, and Sanhedrin explain why different reasons are provided - isn’t it a mitzvah to honor the bride? Regardless, these exceptions somewhat weaken the assertion that everyone agrees a king may not effectively forgive his honor. These rather seem like solid prooftexts against Rav Ashi, if not for the Talmudic Narrator explaining them away. Does Rav Ashi indeed maintain this, seemingly against three Tannaitic sources?
Rav Ashi in Context
The original context for Rav Ashi’s statement is Kiddushin 32. Rav Yitzchak bar Sheila (fifth-generation Amora) quoted (fourth-generation) Rav Mattana II who quoted Rav Chisda (third-generation, Sura academy) that a father can effectively forgive his honor, but a rav cannot. In contrast, Rav Yosef, a third-generation Amora of Pumbedita academy, says that a rav can effectively forgo his honor, proving it via exposition of a verse in Shemot about Hashem leading the Israelites. Rava (fourth-generation, Pumbedita, and Rav Yosef’s student) objects. Regarding Hashem, the world is His and the Torah is His, so He can forgo His honor. The honor accorded a rav is that of the Torah, and is the Torah his? Upon reflection, Rava retracted, interpreting the possessive pronoun “and in his Torah - וּבְתוֹרָתוֹ - he mediates day and night” (Tehillim 1:2) as referring to the Torah scholar rather than Hashem. Thus, Rava agrees with Rav Yosef.
The gemara questions whether this is so, for Rava served drinks to guests at his son’s wedding feast. His students Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua stood before him, while Rav Mari and Rav Pinchas, sons of Rav Chisda, didn’t. Rava grew angry at them. “Are these (latter) Sages and these (former) not Sages?” he said. A similar incident occurred with Rav Pappa at his own son’s wedding, where served drinks at his son’s wedding, and when a rabbi didn’t stand before him, Rav Pappa grew angry. The gemara answers that while the rav can forgo his honor, they still have to have some reverence. Rashi explains this as a slight move indicating they wish to rise before him - the half-rise my classmate in Rav Schachter’s shiur referred to as “the tuchus salute”. Alternatively, perhaps this isn’t a compromise position. Rava (and Rav Pappa) forewent his honor in terms of the act of serving, and felt that he wasn’t causing others to sin by their accepting the drinks - thus maintaining like Rav Yosef. Still, with their own actions, students should arise before their teacher. This is then the consistent Pumbeditan position.
Then, Rav Ashi (fifth generation Amora, Rav Pappa’s student, located in Sura and thus grappling with both Suran and Pumbeditan positions) says that even those who say a rav can effectively forgo his honor, a Nasi cannot. The gemara objects from a brayta, where Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Tzadok were reclining at the wedding of Rabban Gamliel’s son. Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi, wished to serve them drinks. Rabbi Eliezer demurred while Rabbi Yehoshua accepted. Rabbi Yehoshua justified his actions based on the verse describing Avraham attending the angels, whom he thought to be Arab travelers. So too, they could be served by someone greater than themselves. Rabbi Tzadok gave stronger proof, noting that Hashem makes the wind blow, brings rain, causing the earth to sprout, thus setting the table before every creature, so certainly the esteemed Rabban Gamliel could serve them drinks. This proves that at least some say a Nasi can effectively forgo his honor. In light of this, the Talmudic Narrator says אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר - if it was stated, what was stated was as follows, and then changes Rav Ashi’s statement to be: that even those who say a Nasi may forgo, a king may not forgo. And then brings the Devarim prooftext.
Difficulties
This reimagining of Rav Ashi’s statement is by Kiddushin’s Talmudic Narrator. That Narrator isn’t Rav Ashi himself, who would know how to quote himself correctly in the first place. The other sugyot (Ketubot, Sota, Sanhedrin) are derivative of Rav Ashi’s emended statement in Kiddushin, so are from that stratum or later.
Rav Ashi’s emended statement seems difficult. His original statement easily refers to מַאן דְּאָמַר הָרַב שֶׁמָּחַל עַל כְּבוֹדוֹ כְּבוֹדוֹ מָחוּל, for Rav Yosef employed this language (and Rava / Rav Pappa may follow). Further, “even though those who allow X won’t allow Y” echoes the stepping-stone language of Rav Chisda. It all builds on an existing conversation. In the emended language / position where the Nasi can forgo, Rav Ashi would need to refer to the Tannaim (Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok) of the cited brayta.
Further, Rav Ashi lacks a real prooftext. Though several sugyot (including the source, Kiddushin) seemingly present this as a Rav Ashi quote (by continuing with שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר), Ketubot accurately separates the prooftext as דְּאָמַר מָר. This exposition occurs in full (verse plus שֶׁתְּהֵא אֵימָתוֹ עָלֶיךָ) in a Mishnah in Sanhedrin (22b) to establish acts prohibited because of the king’s honor (e.g. riding his horse), though not establishing that he cannot forgo them. Also, in dispute between Amoraim and between Tannaima about whether a king can really act harshly (taking people’s sons and daughters to serve him) or whether (as per Rav and Rabbi Yehuda) these Biblical rules were merely written to scare the Israelites. The Talmudic Narrator’s has extended (or reinterpreted) it to eliminate the option for the king to forgo.
Also, why should we emend Rav Ashi’s statement because of one brayta (Rabban Gamliel’s son’s wedding), but not emend it back in the face of three Tannaitic sources (bridal party, Torah reading, chalitza? At least, the original version should be recalled!
Salvaging the Original
I think it’s possible to salvage Rav Ashi’s original statement. Firstly, while we may imagine a continuum of [father, rav, Nasi, king], with king as most stringent, this isn’t necessarily so. A Nasi (e.g. of Hillel’s descendants) isn’t just a watered-down king of the Davidic line recognized as a political figure by the Roman government. A Nasi is also head of the Sanhedrin, and thus a rav representing halachic power. A Nasi has both rav and king aspects, while separately the rav and king don’t possess the other’s aspect. A Nasi therefore may be more stringent than a king. If so, King Agrippa acted within bounds, and no harmonization is required.
Secondly, Rabbi Tzadok’s exposition, that Hashem sets the table for every creature, so certainly Rabban Gamliel could serve them drinks might be understood differently than Hashem forgoing His honor. Rather, providing beneficently is a Godly virtue (and an Abrahamic virtue), and itself honors the host as a provider. Refusing hospitality in Mediterranean culture could be considered a personal insult. Further, this is Rabban Gamliel’s (and Rava’s) / Rav Pappa’s own son’s wedding, so the honors extended are not for the Sages sake, but to enhance the ambiance of his son’s wedding. (See Meiri on Ketubot 4a, about postponing the father’s burial for the son’s wedding, שאין זה אלא כמלינו לכבודו שלא יתבזה בנו בחתנתו.) Finally, Rava’s students honored him and his son by accepting the drinks, but some dishonored him by misinterpreting this as his forgoing his honor, and so didn’t arise.