An interesting definition of “Shitta”, on Bava Metzia 68b. The gemara on 68a read:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וַהֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וַהֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
Rav Naḥman said: With regard to these joint ventures involving animals, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda; and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
Then, regarding a document in the hands of Rav Illish’s sons, Rava, who was Rav Nachman’s student, said something. One of the Rav Kahana (perhaps IV of Pum Nahara, who was also Rava’s student) said this before Rav Zevid of Nehardea, who challenged this based on Rav Nachman. (Recall that Rav Nachman also presided over Nehardea academy.)
To this, Rav Kahana replies that halacha doesn’t mean halacha, but shita. That seems to mean that these three opinions, of Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel all align, or are motivated by a similar concern.
Thus:
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, וַאֲמַר לִי: דִּלְמָא רַב עִילִישׁ טוֹבֵל עִמּוֹ בְּצִיר הֲוָה. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו הִלְכְתָא אִיתְּמַר, אֶלָּא שִׁיטָה אִיתְּמַר.
Rav Kahana said: I said this halakha before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a and he said to me: Why is it certain that the document included all the details of the transaction? Perhaps Rav Ilish immersed his bread in brine together with the other party? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this would suffice to avoid the prohibition of interest, and Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Kahana said to Rav Zevid: It was not stated by Rav Naḥman that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but rather it was stated that a single opinion is common to three Sages: Rabbi Yehuda; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. This does not establish the halakha in accordance with their statements, but on the contrary, they all hold one common opinion that is not accepted as the halakha.
Note that the analysis doesn’t really say that the quoted text was wrong, despite saying that itmar means that one should say it. Rather, the intent is that “the intent is this”. After all, see how the gemara continues, justifying it:
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי – לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִיחְשַׁב וּלְמֵימַר הֲלָכָה הֲלָכָה? לֵימָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּמֵיקֵל מִכּוּלְּהוּ.
The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, as, if you do not say so, why did Rav Naḥman list them individually and say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so? Instead let Rav Naḥman say simply: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he is the most lenient of all of them, and their rulings can be derived from his. Since Rav Naḥman did not state this, it is reasonable to say that he was not issuing a ruling in accordance with their opinion, but simply clarifying that these three opinions are actually one.
Saying halacha halacha repeatedly either means that the repetitive structure shows that we are aligning shitot, or otherwise, that we should just say one of the laws is halacha. But the wording - halacha, halacha, halacha isn’t under dispute, that the word should have been shita throughout.
(1) Rav Nachman can say positions of these Sages are aligned without endorsing them, as is the case here. Does this then mean that all such declarations of aligned positions are not endorsement? Alternatively, does it mean that declarations of aligned positions are anti-endorsement, that we don’t rule like any of them?
For instance, when Abaye says this in Sanhedrin 64a:
אמר אביי רבי אלעזר בר' שמעון ור' חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אמרו דבר אחד רבי אלעזר בר' שמעון הא דאמרן רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס דתניא רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר מפני מה תפסה תורה לשון מולך כל שהמליכוהו עליהם אפי' צרור ואפי' קיסם
Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus said the same thing, i.e., they share the same halakhic opinion. The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is that which we said. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus shares the same opinion, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: For what reason does the Torah use the term Molekh? It is to indicate that if one passes his child through fire in the worship of any object that people enthroned [shehimlikhuhu] over them as their king, referring to it as Molekh, he is liable, even if it is merely a pebble, or even a toothpick. The baraita indicates that one who passes his child through fire in worship of an item that is not referred to as Molekh is not liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
Does assembly of multiple opinions actually form a rabbim, with whom we might rule with against a minority opinion? Or, as I’ve heard Rav Schachter say as a position of the Geonim, these are assembled to show that these are all minority opinions, and we don’t rule like them?
(2) Perhaps whether we rule like them is a separate question, and was not Rav Nachman’s concern. But then, how do we rule? Tosafot write:
אלא שיטה איתמר - אומר ר"ת דמכ"מ הלכה כרשב"ג דהא אמרינן (גיטין דף עה.) כל מקום ששנה רשב"ג במשנתינו הלכה כמותו
ואין נראה דהא רב ושמואל בעו או לקצוץ דינר או ריש עגלא לפטומא ור' שמעון בן גמליאל לא בעי אלא גללים וליכא למימר דהיינו דוקא בעגל עם אמו דלא נפיש טירחא דהא ר' יוסי בר' יהודה אמר לעיל (בבא מציעא דף סח:) אפילו בבהמות גדולות דסגי בנסיובי ותותרי דסבר לה כאבוה
וגם רבינו חננאל פירש דכל כי האי גוונא שנאמר שיטה לית הלכתא כחד מינייהו אלא כרבי שמעון דאמר (שם) נותן לו שכרו משלם:
Thus, Rabbenu Tam would rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (who isn’t the most lenient of the three enumerated positions, but still within the alignment). Because there is a principle, stated in Gittin 75a, that we generally rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel where he appears in our Mishna. I am a bit confused by this, because Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel didn’t appear in our Mishnah; it was a brayta introduced by תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן.
The Tosafists writing disagrees with Rabbenu Tam, because of later Amoraic discussion (of Rav and Shmuel) that doesn’t work within Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Finally, they cite Rabbenu Chananel who says that any such situation of shitta, the halacha is not like any of them. Rather, it is like Rabbi Shimon.