Should a Rabbi have Personal Chumrot?

A certain passage struck me as I read it on Shabbat. It had to do with drinking gentile beer, where there was no Tannaitic prohibition but perhaps a prohibition which arose in Amoraic times. Avodah Zarah 31b:

אָמַר רַב: הַאי שִׁיכְרָא דַּאֲרַמָּאָה שְׁרֵי, וְחִיָּיא בְּרִי לָא נִישְׁתֵּי מִינֵּיהּ. מָה נַפְשָׁךְ? אִי שְׁרֵי — לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא שְׁרֵי, אִי אֲסִיר — לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֲסִיר!

Rav says: This Aramean beer is permitted, but my son Ḥiyya does not drink from it. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at this matter, Rav’s statement is difficult: If the beer is permitted, then it is permitted to everyone, and there is no reason for his son to refrain from drinking it. And if it is prohibited, it is prohibited to everyone, and why would Rav say it is permitted?

אֶלָּא, רַב סָבַר מִשּׁוּם גִּילּוּיָא, וְאָזֵיל מְרוֹרָא דִּכְשׁוּתָא וְקָלֵי לֵיהּ זִיהֲרֵיהּ, וְדִלְקֵי מַלְקֵי לֵיהּ טְפֵי, וְחִיָּיא בְּרִי הוֹאִיל וּלְקֵי לָא נִישְׁתֵּי מִינֵּיהּ.

The Gemara explains: Rather, Rav holds that the prohibition is due to exposure, but the bitterness of the hops in the beer goes and impairs the snake’s venom, so that it is safe for an average person to drink. But a person of weak constitution is weakened further by the impaired venom, and Rav was saying: In the case of my son Ḥiyya, since he is weak, he does not drink from it.

A similar idea can be found in Chullin 112a, regarding a loaf upon which one cut unsalted roasted meat:

אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל ככר שחתך עליה בשר אסור לאכלה והני מילי דאסמיק והני מילי דאבריה והני מילי דאסמכיה אבל קלישתא לית לן בה

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel says: It is prohibited to eat a loaf of bread upon which one cut unsalted roasted meat, since the blood expelled from the roasted meat is absorbed in the loaf. The Gemara adds: And this statement applies only if the meat is ruddy from the blood it contains. And furthermore, this statement applies only if so much blood was absorbed in the loaf that it passed through from one side of the loaf to the other and was visible from both sides. And furthermore, this statement applies only if the liquid emitted by the roasted meat is viscous. But if it is runny, we have no problem with it, i.e., the loaf is permitted.

שמואל שדי ליה לכלביה רב הונא יהיב ליה לשמעיה מה נפשך אי שרי לכולי עלמא שרי אי אסור לכולי עלמא אסור שאני רב הונא דאנינא דעתיה רבא אכיל ליה וקרי ליה חמר בשר

The Gemara relates: Shmuel would throw to his dog such a loaf of bread that he held was prohibited. Rav Huna would not eat the loaf himself but would rather give it to his attendant. The Gemara objects: Whichever way you look at it, Rav Huna’s behavior is problematic: If the loaf is permitted, it is permitted for everyone, including Rav Huna himself. And if it is prohibited, then it is prohibited for everyone, and he should not give it to his attendant. The Gemara explains: In fact, the loaf is permitted for consumption, and Rav Huna is different, as he is of delicate constitution and did not want to eat the loaf himself. The Gemara further relates: Rava would eat a loaf of this type, and he would call the red liquid meat wine.

The Talmudic Narrator’s point is the same in both cases: How could a Sage declare a leniency for the community while maintaining a stringency for himself or for his family? And the answer is the same in both cases: Indeed, one should not be inconsistent in this manner. Rather, it is a matter of health and personal constitution.

We could theoretically set aside the Talmudic Narrator and say that these Amoraim were willing to impose an extra chumra upon themselves, because of legitimate underlying halachic concerns that nevertheless are not enough to really impose a prohibition. They would not want to burden the community with the chumra but are willing to apply it to themselves. That is, they disagree with the Talmudic Narrator’s assumption in posing the question.

Yet, I viscerally agree with the Stamma here, about the inappropriateness or the cognitive dissonance relating to not abiding by a leniency one applies to the community.

As an example of this, in one of the communities in which I’ve lived, one of the local rabbanim organizes the sale of chametz for his congregants. This also includes arranging for various stores to sell their chametz. Even so, he and his family will not eat chametz that has been sold — even this chametz he has sold — as a chumra associated with chametz she’avar alav haPesach.

Now, maybe this is because I’m a big believer in the good of selling chametz on Pesach. Regardless this feels off, and a bit wrong. If you really think that it is wrong and does not work, then how can you engineer a situation in which you cause thousands of Jews to violate — either in owning chametz, which is Biblical, or consuming chametz she’avar alav haPesach, which is Rabbinic?