The Big Difference Between Pappa and Pappi
In today’s daf, Avoda Zara 40, there are a few relatively minor girsological variants in names, some of which can have a bigger impact than we might assume.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְטַבֵּל בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מֵרֵישׁ הֲוָה מְטַבֵּילְנָא בְּצִירָן, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁמַעְנָא לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְטַבֵּל בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר, בְּצִירָן נָמֵי לָא מְטַבֵּילְנָא.
The Gemara analyzes the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute applies to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies, everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Zeira said: Originally, I would dip foods in their brine, but once I heard that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute is only with regard to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable; I too no longer dip foods in their brine.
It is quite strange for second-generation Rav Yehuda bar Yechezkel to quote third-generation Ulla! Indeed, Artscroll notes in a footnote that Dikdukei Soferim approvingly registers manuscript variants that have fourth-generation Mar Yehuda instead.
So here are these manuscripts. Munich has Rav Yehuda, the others have Mar Yehuda, and JTS 15 actually fixes a Rav into a Mar.
Thus, the first instance is at the end of a line, and the second two lines down.
When Rabbi Zeira reacts, his reaction to Mar Yehuda instead of Rav Yehuda makes me identify him differently. After all, Rabbi Zeira I was the student of Rav Yehuda before he moved to the Land of Israel. If Mar Yehuda is a contemporary of Rava, then we are dealing with fourth-generation Rabbi Zeira II, in Pumbedita, who is reacting to a report from his contemporary.
Next, we have the Pappa / Pappi divergence. Consider the following text:
According to this, there are two sixth-generation Amoraim, namely Rav Yirmeya of Difti and Rav Ashi, who cite two different fifth-generation Amoraim, Rav Pappi and Rav Pappa. These two were Rava’s students, and recall that Rava was the one who argued with Rav Huna bar Chinena about the ship.
If so, Rav Pappa and Rav Pappi each might be testifying regarding their recollection of the incident, and what it was that this earlier Amora permitted. This is a dispute about history, and only one happened. Still, they might come up with different conceptual background for why he would permit while Rava forbade.
The three printings have this Pappi / Pappa / Pappa, but I don’t really care about printings. What about manuscripts?
Munich 95 is disappointingly unclear. The first instance is Pappi, but the latter two are Papp’ where the final apostrophe obscures if it is the same person. However, maybe a scribe would not obliterate information like this is it were a different name.
JTS 15 has an original flipped from the printing — thus, Pappa / Pappi / Pappi, but corrects it to Pappi / Pappi / Pappi. I believe the correction. Since Pappa is more frequent throughout the Talmud, it is an easy mistake to make for Pappi. Here is what JTS 15 looks like:
Maybe the ink got rubbed out, but more credibly, parts of the aleph were scratched out to transform it into an approximation of yud and thus Rav Pappi.
Paris 1337 from the outset has Pappi throughout.
Finally, Graz, U: Ink. III 9715.[ב], for which we have few pages, has Pappa / Pappi / Pappa.
To explain the idea of Pappi / Pappi / Pappi, both sixth-generation Amoraim are quoting their identical teacher, fifth-generation Rav Pappi, a student of Rava. However, their versions are different. Now, they heard him say different things, or they remember differently what he said. Further, Rav Ashi balances two statements of Rav Pappi to direct his practice.
We might contemplate whether this (and even the previous Rav Pappa / Rav Pappi) counts as a genuine machloket in the way that other disputes do. Rav Herschel Schachter, in one of his discussions of eilu ve’eilu, set out a theory which distinguished types of disputes. One subclass of eilu ve’eilu is one where different theories of halacha, and different explanations of underlying fact patterns, are put forth. Since both are the word of the Living God, in cases of hamotzi meichaveiro alav hara’ayah, one can point to one of the competing theories and suggest that maybe that one is correct. In contrast, if something is just a matter of empirical fact, then it does not have that eilu ve’eilu status. Rav Schachter’s examples were where one Tanna or Amora was quoted, but there are different accounts of what he said; or, where there are variant Talmudic manuscripts (or an ikka de’amrei). The gemara only said one thing, but we are just unsure of what it said. In such a case, saying that maybe the disfavored text or statement was really what was original does not count as an eilu ve’eilu. As you might imagine, I like to invoke this distinction, as I often grapple with variant texts.
So, if it is merely a matter of whose recollection was right in quoting Rav Pappi, it would not be a matter of eilu ve’eilu. Also, perhaps or perhaps not, if they are arguing about what the boat case actually was, in terms of what Rav Huna bar Chinena permitted, this might also be not an eilu ve’eilu. And what should we make of different texts, in which some have Rav Pappa and some have Rav Pappi in different parts, that guide us to either treat it like case 1 or case 2?
To make short work of Graz, U: Ink. III 9715.[ב] — I doubt it is the original, but there, Pappa / Pappi / Pappa, we have Rav Yirmeya of Difti base himself of Rav Pappa, and then Rav Ashi base himself on two different Amoraim.
Finally, is it Rava or Ravina? The passage in question, on 40a:
וְאֵלּוּ הֵן סִימָנֵי בֵיצִים: כֹּל שֶׁכּוֹדֶרֶת וַעֲגוּלְגֹּלֶת, רֹאשָׁהּ אֶחָד כַּד וְרֹאשָׁהּ אֶחָד חַד — טְהוֹרָה, שְׁנֵי רָאשֶׁיהָ חַדִּין וּשְׁנֵי רָאשֶׁיהָ כַּדִּין — טְמֵאָה, חֶלְמוֹן מִבַּחוּץ וְחֶלְבּוֹן מִבִּפְנִים — טְמֵאָה, חֶלְבּוֹן מִבַּחוּץ וְחֶלְמוֹן מִבִּפְנִים — טָהוֹר, חֶלְבּוֹן וְחֶלְמוֹן מְעוֹרָבִין זֶה בָּזֶה — זוֹ הִיא בֵּיצַת הַשֶּׁרֶץ. אָמַר רָבָא: כְּשֶׁנִּימּוֹחוּ.
The baraita continues: And these are the signs of bird eggs: Any egg that narrows at the top and is rounded, so that one of its ends is wide and the other one of its ends is pointed is kosher. If both of its ends are sharp or both of its ends are wide, it is non-kosher. If the yolk is on the outside and the albumen is on the inside, it is non-kosher; if the albumen is on the outside and the yolk is on the inside, it is kosher. If the yolk and albumen are mixed with each other, this is the egg of a creeping animal. Considering that one can easily determine the kashrut of such eggs, why are only those purchased from an expert permitted? Rava says: Rav’s ruling refers specifically to a case where the eggs have melted together and it is impossible to determine whether or not they are kosher based on these signs.
Up to this point, we had second-generation Rav Bruna quoting first-generation Rav. Third-generation Ulla raised a contradiction to Rabbi Dostai of Biri from a brayta, and he responded by suggesting to emend the brayta. Then, a Rabbi Zeira suggested not emending it. This could be third-generation Rabbi Zeira I, who would then be parallel to Ulla. Alternatively, it could be fourth-generation Rabbi Zeira II.
Now, another brayta is cited, and we need to figure out how it works with the above. If Rava, then he could be responding to an earlier figure Rabbi Zeira I, or to his contemporary Rabbi Zeira I. If it is somehow Ravina, then it could be Ravina I (Rava’s student) or Ravina II (that one’s nephew). Either way, we might read it as the Talmud’s conclusion.
While Munich 95 has Rava, all the other manuscripts have Ravina. I would favor Ravina here: