The Fool Walks Constrained -- full article

Here is my Jewish Link article for this week.

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Rav Ukva’s sons had a bull which was shechted in a strange manner – beginning with an incision at the entrance of the veshet and concluding in its majority in the veshet itself (Chullin 43b). Rava, a fourth-generation Amora, declared it a tereifa by imposing the stringencies of two first-generation Amoraim, Rav and Shmuel. Rav, unlike Shmuel, held that a perforation in the minority of the veshet renders it a teraifa. Shmuel, unlike Rav, stated that the entrance of the veshet is an invalid location for shechita. Since the incision begins outside the proper area (per Shmuel) creates an invalidating perforation (per Rav), the animal is not kosher. Rabbi Abba I, a third-generation Amora who came from the Land of Israel to Bavel, heard of the matter and said that, since operating entirely within Rav’s positions or operating entirely within Shmuel’s positions, it is valid, they should tell the son of Rav Yosef bar Chama (that is, Rava) that he needs to recompense the owner of the bull.

Mar the son of Ravana¹, a fourth-generation Amora, said: I offer a conclusive refutation to the enemies of Rava (meaning to Rava) from a brayta: The halacha is always like Beit Hillel. But if one wishes to act (consistently) according to Beit Hillel may, and if one wishes to act (consistently) according to Beit Shammai may. According to the leniencies of both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is a wicked person. According to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, upon him the verse (Kohelet 2:14) states “the fool walks in darkness”. Rather, either consistently with Beit Shammai for their leniencies and stringencies, or with Beit Hillel for their leniencies and stringencies. Mar bar Ravana wants to assert the same requirement for being a consistent follower of a school even to the positions of first-generation Amoraim, Rav and Shmuel.

The Talmudic Narrator wonders how Rava could have suggested otherwise, given this brayta. Then, fifth-generation Amora Rav Tevut shows how Rava ruled entirely within a Rav framework, based on a different version of Rav’s position. I am not sure how this works with Rava’s words,”I cast upon him the stringencies of Rav and the stringencies of Shmuel, and declare it treif.” Additionally, this consistent framework within Rav, or within Shmuel, may not be so ironclad. See Eruvin 6b, about a crooked L-shaped alleyway in Neharde’a, upon which they imposed the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel. Indeed, the Talmudic Narrator (rather than the named Mar bar Ravana) raises the problem there by quoting the brayta.

Moving beyond Rav and Shmuel, see Rosh Hashanah 14a. Rabbi Akiva picked an etrog on the first of Shevat and set aside two tithes, to satisfy two Tannaitic opinions (either both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, or Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer). Again, the Talmudic Narrator raises the concern. Additionally, selected at random, in Bava Metzia 24b, Rav Asi rules like Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazer (a Tanna) in one case but not another. There must be some nuance to the consistency requirement in following a Sage’s positions.

Acting Consistently

There are different ways to understand the idea of the halacha being like Sage X, yet being able to act consistently like Sage Y, as well as the requirement to then act consistently. We might imagine that Torah in all its fine details is not something fixed, established in Heaven. Rather, possible entirely kosher variations abound, as potentialities. Let us define the Torah as an n-dimensional vector, [h₁, … h_n], where each value h_i represents a halachic position. For instance, h₁₂₃ might be that yei’ush shelo mida’at, unwitting abandonment, is ineffective – Abaye’s position in Bava Metzia 21b. The entire vector of our standard halachic system might be represented by such a vector with specific values, the DNA of the Torah. There is a Beit Hillel vector H, with its unique values, and a Beit Shammai vector S, which might have considerable overlap but with different values in certain locations. Practically, we most often rule like Beit Hillel but occasionally rule like Beit Shammai, so our vector of decided halacha is a blend, D. This brayta may say that we typically rule in D like Beit Hillel. But, perhaps because vectors S and H are the words of the Living G-d (Eruvin 13b), if someone wishes to practice consistently within that system, they may do so.

Acting inconsistently, by picking and choosing leniencies, is not valid because that is really no system. The existence of dispute does not mean that because, for any individual h_i, any value uttered by some Sage is legitimate, we can construct an optimally lenient vector. The same goes for seeking needless stringencies, which is foolish. Select a system – either D, S, or H. Perhaps this vector legitimacy only operates at the halachic system level, with the schools of Shammai and of Hillel and Tannaim being members of one or another approach.

Should this requirement for consistency apply to other Sages? Perhaps we can extend this to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, who developed different systems of hermeneutics. It seems like a stretch to apply this to Rav and Shmuel. Still, these were early Amoraim, they each founded academies (Sura and Nehardea) and had different groups of students who adopted their positions.

Alternatively, consider that while Rav and Shmuel (like Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai) don’t take sides on every halachic question, they do weigh in quite a lot, agreeing or arguing, such that their halachic subvectors are quite large. That is enough to form a halachic system in which we can seek consistency. Abaye and Rava disputes might be similar, but we needn’t necessarily require consistency in adopting all the positions of Rami bar Chama.

Alternatively, elaborating on an idea I heard from Rav Schachter, consistency is required because values in the vector are often interdependent. A Scriptural interpretation, an applied principle, or a specific understanding of a Talmudic sugya will lead to a leniency in h_i and a stringency in h_j. Mixing and matching is untrue, and ungrounded in the deeper underlying reasoning, so you are either sinning or acting unnecessarily strictly. Thus, one cannot simply adopt a position of Rav Moshe Feinstein in an isolated case without adopting his other positions. If we apply this conception to our sugya, Rava may have a valid counterpoint to Mar bar Ravana. Who says that whether the entrance of the veshet is a proper location, and whether one can begin an incision outside the proper location, are interrelated disputes? This definition of consistency is how Rashi understands our sugya, and he explains why these two disputes are indeed interrelated.

Finally, Beit Hillel are famously often lenient and Beit Shammai famously often stringent. Following one school consistently still leads to an organic halachic system with a mix of leniencies and stringencies. Adopting only stringencies or only leniencies is motivated results-seeking, which is improper for either an individual or a posek.

Chosech, Not Choshech

Applying Biblical verses to people or situations, in their plain meaning, seems more Christian than Chazalic. Calling a person who is overly stringent “a fool who walks in darkness” involves no real derasha. Even saying that the darkness is halachic uncertainty and thus the person caught in stringencies is a fool, does not seem characteristic of a derasha.

Examining the verse in Kohelet, I wonder whether the derasha is actually from the full pasuk rather than the excerpt. “The chacham, his eyes are in his head; whereas a fool walks in darkness; but I realized that the same fate (mikreh echad) occurs to all of them (yikreh et kulam).” We might explain that the chacham thinks to the source / head of halachic conclusions. The fool, walking in darkness, does not. The mikreh echad (or in hif’il form, as in Bereishit 24:12, הַקְרֵה־נָא, thus makreh echad) is the single cause or underlying rationale, so that mixing stringencies makes no sense.

I often discuss the Hidden Derasha, where Chazal subtly darshen a verse but later readers don’t realize it. There is some obscure meaning of a word, or some grammatical analysis that eludes the reader. I believe a Hidden Derasha occurs here: al tikrei choshech ela chosech. Ernest Klein, in his etymological dictionary, defines chosech, spelled with either a sin or a samech, as “to keep back, withhold, refrain, restrain”. For the sense of “ceasing”, he references the hapax legomenon in Yeshaya 14:6, בְּלִי חָשָׂךְ, “unceasing”. Jastrow defines חָסַךְ as “to diminish, deduct; to stint, withhold”. We recently encountered chisachon in Menachot 86b, where it meant stinginess. Someone who adopts all stringencies walks in constrained fashion; the intersection of all chumrot leads to nearly impossible navigation through life. The point of the derasha is that such constraint is foolish. Practically, recognizing this hidden derasha may offer direction. It is not ignorance in how to pasken / darkness leading to stringencies that is being condemned. Rather, even acting piously to adopt all stringencies, in order to fulfill every Rishon or every Acharon’s shitta, creates a situation of extreme constraint, which is foolish.

1. This is not the son of Ravina as the printings erroneously have it, so the Amora is not as late as we might otherwise imagine. Manuscripts – Hamburg 169, Munich 95, Vatican 120-121, Vatican 122, Vatican 123, Oxford: Bodl. Or. 650/85 all have Ravana.