The Hidden Drashot of Midvar Sheker Tirchak

There was an awesome brayta which spanned Shevuot 31. It seemingly just set up a bunch of scenarios of things someone should not do, and then explained מדבר שקר תרחק, “distance yourself from falsehood”, to teach “No! You should not do this.”

OK, maybe it was as simple as that, and people need that message, but I don’t think so. I don’t think braytot, and derashot, are that simple. You wouldn’t have: “Maybe if he really angers you, you can kill him? Therefore it says, lo tirtzach. And maybe if he ate that yogurt you’d been saving for lunch? Therefore it says, lo tirtzach.”

Instead, despite seemingly identical derashot ending in “distance yourself from falsehood,” many of them, maybe all of them, are distinct from one another. Also, it may weigh in on deontological vs. consequentialist vs. virtue ethics. Let us explore. Beginning on 30b.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲשֶׂה סָנִיגָרוֹן לִדְבָרָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that a judge should not engage in advocacy [saneigeron] for his own statements and devise various pretexts to justify his erroneous rulings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).

Yes, you shouldn’t lie. But what tells us that a judge should not try to tilt in favor of poor arguments? It is the juxtaposition. Shemot 23:6-23:7:

לֹ֥א תַטֶּ֛ה מִשְׁפַּ֥ט אֶבְיֹנְךָ֖ בְּרִיבֽוֹ׃

You shall not subvert the rights of your needy in their disputes.

מִדְּבַר־שֶׁ֖קֶר תִּרְחָ֑ק וְנָקִ֤י וְצַדִּיק֙ אַֽל־תַּהֲרֹ֔ג כִּ֥י לֹא־אַצְדִּ֖יק רָשָֽׁע׃

Keep far from a false charge; do not bring death on those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.

Translate מִשְׁפַּ֥ט אֶבְיֹנְךָ֖ as your poor ruling, and לֹ֥א תַטֶּ֛ה means that you should not tilt in its favor. This is juxtaposed to midvar sheker tirchak.

I am not entirely happy with my explanation of the next, but I do have something partial. I would ascribe this to my own lack of midrashic sophistication, rather than to the lack of a derasha happening here.

וּמִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יֵשֵׁב תַּלְמִיד בּוּר לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

And from where is it derived with regard to a judge that a student who is an ignoramus should not sit before him to discuss the proceedings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” When an ignorant student engages in the proceedings, he is apt to cause the judge to err in judgment.

What I do know is that tirchak can mean conceptual distancing, physical distancing, or social distancing. In many of these derashot, the word tirchak is the opposite of יִצְטָרֵף, to join in physical or social proximity. Here, a student is not part of the formal panel of judges, but a fit student can sit before them and make suggestions. Here, we should physically distance this student, because it may lead to falsehood and a false judgement.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לַחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁהוּא גַּזְלָן, וְכֵן עֵד שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁהוּא גַּזְלָן – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִצְטָרֵף עִמּוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived that a judge who knows that another judge is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a judge; and likewise, a witness who knows that another witness is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a witness; from where is it derived that he should not join him in judgment or testimony? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

Here, either the judge would join / יִצְטָרֵף as one of a panel of three judges, or a witnesses as a set of witnesses. This is social joining. The opposite is that tirchak, they should separate.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ בַּדִּין שֶׁהוּא מְרוּמֶּה, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: הוֹאִיל וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין – אֶחְתְּכֶנּוּ, וִיהֵא

From where is it derived that in a case where a judge who knows that the witnesses testifying before him are lying even though he is unable to prove it through their cross-examination and with regard to the verdict the result will be that it is fraudulent, that he should not say: Since the witnesses are testifying and I cannot prove their deceit, I will decide the case based on their testimony, and let

קוֹלָר תָּלוּי בְּצַוַּאר עֵדִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחַק״.

the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

This seems focused on the conclusion, the devar sheker. We might imagine that there are deontological ethics in play. There are rules, and there is a bureaucracy. You need to follow the rules and play your part, and you don’t need to worry about the fact that other actors are perverting the end result. No, you should still pay heed to the final result here, the devar sheker. You know the din will be sheker, or meruma.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְרוֹאֶה זְכוּת לֶעָנִי וְחוֹב לֶעָשִׁיר – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתּוֹק? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

I’m not sure what’s happening here, but here, it is the student who would violate by not joining in some fashion by speaking up. We might also consider the juxtaposition in the verses:

לֹ֥א תַטֶּ֛ה מִשְׁפַּ֥ט אֶבְיֹנְךָ֖ בְּרִיבֽוֹ׃

You shall not subvert the rights of your needy in their disputes.

מִדְּבַר־שֶׁ֖קֶר תִּרְחָ֑ק וְנָקִ֤י וְצַדִּיק֙ אַֽל־תַּהֲרֹ֔ג כִּ֥י לֹא־אַצְדִּ֖יק רָשָֽׁע׃

Keep far from a false charge; do not bring death on those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.

that the student is subverting the rights of your needy in his dispute. So, the juxtaposition might be a nevertheless. It is only from a devar sheker that the student should tirchak, distance himself, but for a devar emet, not so. Indeed, the follow-up up not bring death to the innocent is also a juxtaposition.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁרוֹאֶה אֶת רַבּוֹ שֶׁטּוֹעֶה בַּדִּין, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אַמְתִּין לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּגְמְרֶנּוּ; וְאֶסְתְּרֶנּוּ וְאֶבְנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלִּי, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקָּרֵא הַדִּין עַל שְׁמִי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

Here, the hopeful student is one who wishes to ascend to be a dayan, a judge in his own right, and thus yitztaref. But, because of the false matter, the right thing to do it tirchak, state it now and don’t be part of the set of judges.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ רַבּוֹ: יוֹדֵעַ אַתָּה בִּי שֶׁאִם נוֹתְנִין לִי מֵאָה מָנֶה אֵינִי מְבַדֶּה; מָנֶה יֵשׁ לִי אֵצֶל פְּלוֹנִי, וְאֵין לִי עָלָיו אֶלָּא עֵד אֶחָד – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִצְטָרֵף עִמּוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).

Is the teacher really asking that the student lie? If so, it is tirchak as opposed to yitztaref in a social grouping of false witnesses. And even though this is obvious, and there is a separate Biblical violation of testifying falsely, it still is an application of the principle, as we loop through all the interpretations and applications of tirchak.

Further, the point here is to take a stand against the consequentialist ethical approach. Even though you know that the conclusion will be the just conclusion, it still is a devar sheker in the process, so you should not do it.

Still, this is too much for the Talmudic Narrator, so, as an interjection to the brayta…

הַאי מִ״דְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״ נָפְקָא?! הָא וַדַּאי שַׁקּוֹרֵי קָא מְשַׁקֵּר, וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר״! אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: וַדַּאי חַד סָהֲדָא אִית לִי, וְתָא אַתָּה קוּם הָתָם וְלָא תֵּימָא וְלָא מִידֵּי, דְּהָא לָא מַפְּקַתְּ מִפּוּמָּךְ שִׁקְרָא – אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָסוּר, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

The Talmudic Narrator seems fairly aware of the types of derashot being made here. He turns social proximity and distancing into physical proximity and distancing. Literally distance yourself, so that you don’t create this false impression.

Next, we have a case of trying to achieve a seemingly just end, namely imposing an oath upon your fellow for another matter, by cleverly navigating the court system and overclaiming. Your fellow will admit to what he owes, truthfully, and that is modeh bemiktzat. And then, via gilgul shevua, he’s have to swear to something else. Since he won’t do it, he’ll instead truthfully admit to that other item and you’ll collect.

מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אֶטְעָנֶנּוּ בְּמָאתַיִם – כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוֹדֶה לִי בְּמָנֶה, וְיִתְחַיֵּיב לִי שְׁבוּעָה, וַאֲגַלְגֵּל עָלָיו שְׁבוּעָה מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

So there’s a lot of truth telling, but the setup is false. Don’t manipulate the court system in this way! I am not sure what derasha in particular happens here. Maybe the mi of mi-devar sheker, where only a portion is a devar sheker. Or something akin involving modeh bemiktzat hata’aneh.

The matching case is where your fellow already has begun manipulating the court system in this way, so there is a devar sheker already in play. Can you counter with your own dishonesty?

מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה וּטְעָנוֹ מָאתַיִם, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אֶכְפְּרֶנּוּ בְּבֵית דִּין וְאוֹדֶה לוֹ חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא אֶתְחַיֵּיב לוֹ שְׁבוּעָה וְלֹא יְגַלְגֵּל עָלַי שְׁבוּעָה מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

He would not be swearing falsely, which is Biblically forbidden in a way that would bring a korban. Rather, he’ll merely register a false claim in court, yet admit and give the money outside of course. I think the drasha here might be מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר — even if the matter arises from a preexisting devar sheker, still, תִּרְחָק, distance yourself.

Next, there’s a case of collusion for a true matter.

מִנַּיִן לִשְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁנּוֹשִׁין מָנֶה בְּאֶחָד, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא אֶחָד בַּעַל דִּין וּשְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוֹצִיאוּ מָנֶה וְיַחְלוֹקוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

So the borrower indeed borrowed the money, but there are no witnesses to collect. By pretending that there’s only a single lender, the other two lenders can act as witnesses. This is a just outcome, but it involves sheker. Because that is sheker, they should distance rather than join together. Thus, tirchak, distance themselves from this collusion / from two joining together as witnesses.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לִשְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לַדִּין, אֶחָד לָבוּשׁ סְמַרְטוּטִין וְאֶחָד לָבוּשׁ אִיצְטְלִית בַּת מֵאָה מָנֶה, שֶׁאוֹמְרִין לוֹ: לְבוֹשׁ כְּמוֹתוֹ אוֹ הַלְבִּישֵׁהוּ כְּמוֹתְךָ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״. כִּי הֲווֹ אָתוּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: שְׁלוּפוּ פּוּזְמוּקַיְיכוּ וְחוּתוּ לְדִינָא.

There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.

What is motivating this one? Here, there actually is truth. This is how each litigant typically dresses. And we are disguising the rich man as a poor man, or a poor man as a rich man, so that they are equal in the eyes of the law, and the eyes of the judge. That is, we are trying to achieve a just and true ruling, and avoid the false matter of verdict compromised by poor or good impressions.

I think that, again, the juxtaposition to the preceding verse is in play:

לֹ֥א תַטֶּ֛ה מִשְׁפַּ֥ט אֶבְיֹנְךָ֖ בְּרִיבֽוֹ׃

You shall not subvert the rights of your needy in their disputes.

מִדְּבַר־שֶׁ֖קֶר תִּרְחָ֑ק וְנָקִ֤י וְצַדִּיק֙ אַֽל־תַּהֲרֹ֔ג כִּ֥י לֹא־אַצְדִּ֖יק רָשָֽׁע׃

Keep far from a false charge; do not bring death on those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.

So that you don’t unwittingly subvert the rights of your needy in his dispute, take this action to distance the devar sheker.

Next,

מִנַּיִן לְדַיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵי בַּעַל דִּין (חֲבֵירוֹ) קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא בַּעַל דִּין חֲבֵירוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

Because of the devar sheker that may emerge by undue influence, distance this litigant until the other litigant arrives. This seems to echo the next item, and Tosafot write שלא ישמע דברי בעל דין. בפ"ק דסנהדרין (דף ז:) מפיק ליה משמוע בין אחיכם, that it is derived elsewhere from another verse. Maybe this is erroneous duplication, and the derasha is indeed from elsewhere. Or perhaps these are all aggregated here and ascribed to this one verse, hinting at different laws in different ways.

Finally,

מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יַטְעִים דְּבָרָיו לַדַּיָּין קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא בַּעַל דִּין חֲבֵירוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי מִ״לֹּא תִשָּׂא״ – ״לֹא תַשִּׂיא״.

From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: “You shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report” (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.

This is the same distancing of the litigant, except here it is informally hearing his claims.

Anyway, again, what I was trying to demonstrate here is that these different laws are not all simply “don’t lie” / “distance yourself from falsehood.” Rather, we are looping through possibilities and scenarios, and seeing how we can analyze the pasuk in different ways.