Variations in a "Vehilcheta"
At the close of a sugya in Bava Batra 156b, in which Rav Nachman weighs in we are told the practical halacha.
וְהִלְכְתָא: תּוֹךְ זְמַן, כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּגִידֵּל בַּר מְנַשֶּׁה.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to the age when a minor can sell property inherited from his father, during the time, i.e., during his twentieth year, is considered as before the time when it is permitted, and he cannot sell until the end of his twentieth year. And the halakha is in accordance with the ruling that Rava sent to Giddel bar Menashe, that a child who has reached his majority and understands the nature of business negotiations can sell land.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּמָר זוּטְרָא. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּאַמֵּימָר. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל – בְּכוּלְּהוּ.
The Gemara continues: And the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Mar Zutra, that one who is not fit to sell land is also not fit to bear witness with regard to land. And the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Ameimar, that an orphan under the age of twenty can bestow gifts from the property he inherited from his father. And the halakha is in accordance with the statement that Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says with regard to all the matters that he mentioned.
This is an example of what I like to call a patient vehilcheta, which doesn’t only discuss the halachic conclusion of the immediately proximate sugya, but for a whole bunch of them going back. Essentially, it stacked up the halachic judgements for a while.
Another example of this is in Kiddushin. To quote myself about ruling like Rabba, when there might have been a general rule anyway to rule like him over Rav Yosef:
Regardless, on Kiddushin 9a, we encounter וְהִלְכְתָא: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְהִלְכְתָא: שִׁירָאֵי לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן. These are rulings for several disputes, namely the most recent one on 9a, then 7b, 8a, and 8a-b.
…
Why list Rabba unnecessarily? Consider the וְהִלְכְתָא sequence, addressing disputes in 9a, then 7b, 8a, and 8a-b. The 9a was resolved as אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, a position rather than name, since its shorter than saying רַב סַמָּא בַּר רַקְתָּא. Also, it addresses the immediately preceding dispute. A Talmudic Narrator then decided that while he’s reciting halachic resolutions, he may as well address others, so jumps back to 7b and covers each dispute in order. Even if explicitly ruling like Rabba is unnecessary, it might be drawn along with the others. Regarding stating the position rather than “Rabba”, it’s quite a jump back, so it might be unclear. Further, Rabba described a derasha mechanic (בָּא זֶה וְלִמֵּד עַל זֶה), not a position, in Kiddushin 4a, with Abaye arguing, so just “like Rabba” might be confusing.
We should not necessarily treat all vehilchetas as halachically binding. At least sometimes, they seem to be post-Talmudic, copied from other works like the Behag — where Rishonim (like Tosafot) might well disagree (and do). They might reflect one commentator’s thoughts on the matter, as we find the Rif adds these in his own work. They might also reflect a summary of what seems to have been the conclusion in the preceding debate. But if so, practically ruling means going back to the preceding Amoraic debate (and also potentially weighing in other factors, like positions taken elsewhere, like Niddah 45b about תוך זמן כלפני זמן), not the pronouncement from On High that the halacha is X.
In this one, I noticed one variant text that drastically changes how we are paskening. Again, our version of the vehilcheta was:
וְהִלְכְתָא: תּוֹךְ זְמַן, כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן. That describes the position, but it is essentially like Rava quoting Rav Nachman, as opposed to Rava bar Rav Sheila quoting Rav Nachman. On 155b:4, using Sefaria numbering. (Though as above, there are other, earlier, Amoraim who take positions about it.)
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּגִידֵּל בַּר מְנַשֶּׁה - we rule like what Rava sent to Giddel bar Menasha. That is 155b:6.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּמָר זוּטְרָא. We rule like Mar Zutra. This is 115b:10, what he clarified within Rav Huna beReih deRav Yehoshua. Rav Ashi attacked his idea, but Mar Zutra successfully defended.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּאַמֵּימָר. We rule like Ameimar. This is 155b:12. And he defends successfully against an attach by Rav Ashi.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל – בְּכוּלְּהוּ. We rule like Rav Nachman citing Shmuel “in all of them”. This is 156a:3. The “all of them” here are the different domains his statement applies — בּוֹדְקִין לְקִדּוּשִׁין, לְגֵרוּשִׁין, וְלַחֲלִיצָה, וּלְמֵיאוּנִין.
I noticed that one manuscript had a different version of this vehilcheta, with less items but possibly more comprehensive.
Namely, Vatican 115b has this.
It seems to be the complete list, but much of it is a marginal note insertion. Thus:
That is, it only has items 4 and 5, which are the most recent ones. So, it isn’t a patient accumulation.
Then, on the side, probably copied from what exists in other manuscripts, are items 1, 2 and 3.
Another aspect of this is that “the halacha is like Ameimar in all these shmaytata.” That means, not just the Ameimar position on the current daf, but going back a while. We can wonder if it is original, or influenced by holding like Rav Nachman bechulhu. But what are the various sugyot in which Ameimar has weighed in, up to this point?
Well, we are on 156, so we should go backwards, but not too far. Maybe so long as the Ameimars appear densely, but as soon as there is a gap, we can stop.
That would mean from Bava Batra 145 and on, not going back to 127:
