We Learn Them From Pit (article summary)

Here is the article from this past Shabbos, at the Jewish Link, flipdocs, and paid Substack. A brief summary follows. I also add a critical point, how we might otherwise understand Rav, and how that works in the various sugyot.

Essentially, there is a pivotal sugya which is really hard to find, since gemaras are inconsistent in the words describing the concepts in an argument between Rav and Shmuel. Masoret HaShas is useful for this, or else just learning through all of Bava Kamma until you encounter it. This is the dispute whether owned non-abandoned property left in the public domain that does damage is a subcategory / learned from Pit or from Ox. If the former, one is exempt from paying for damages to vessels.

We have space here, so here is the guts of that sugya, on Bava Kamma 28a-b:

מַתְנִי׳ נִשְׁבְּרָה כַּדּוֹ בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהוּחְלַק אֶחָד בַּמַּיִם אוֹ שֶׁלָּקָה בְּחַרְסִית – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמִתְכַּוֵּין – חַיָּיב, בְּאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין – פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: If one’s jug broke in the public domain and another person slipped in the water from the jug and was injured from the fall, or if he was injured by the shards of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the owner of the jug acted with intent, he is liable, and in a case where he acted without intent, he is exempt.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁטִּינְּפוּ כֵּלָיו בַּמַּיִם,

(A) GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They taught that the owner of the jug is liable only when the clothes of the one who slipped were soiled by the dirty water.

אֲבָל הוּא עַצְמוֹ – פָּטוּר; קַרְקַע עוֹלָם הִזִּיקַתּוּ.

(B) But if the person himself was injured, the owner of the jug is exempt, as it is the ground that caused his injury, not the jug or the water.

כִּי אַמְרִיתַהּ קַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, אָמַר לִי: מִכְּדֵי אַבְנוֹ וְסַכִּינוֹ וּמַשָּׂאוֹ – מִבּוֹרוֹ לָמַדְנוּ, וְכוּלָּן אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהֶן: ״שׁוֹר״ – וְלֹא אָדָם, ״חֲמוֹר״ – וְלֹא כֵּלִים.

(C) Rav Yehuda continued: When I stated this ruling of Rav before Shmuel, he said to me: After all, we derive the cases of damage caused by leaving one’s stone, one’s knife, or one’s load in the public domain from the case of one’s pit, and I therefore read, i.e., apply, with regard to all of them the inference of the Sages from the verse: “And an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the one who dug the pit is liable only if what incurred damage is an ox, but not a person, or a donkey, but not vessels.

(D) וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן קְטָלָא, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן נְזָקִין – אָדָם חַיָּיב, וְכֵלִים פְּטוּרִין.

And this statement applies with regard to a situation where the person is killed, i.e., if one fell into a pit and was killed, the person who dug it is exempt from paying restitution, since the verse refers exclusively to an animal that was killed. But with regard to damage, the digger of the pit is liable to pay restitution for injury to a person, but exempt from paying restitution for damage to vessels, for which no distinction between death and injury can be applied. Therefore, the ruling in the case of the jug that broke in the public domain should be the opposite. The owner of the jug is liable to pay restitution for injury caused to another, as Shmuel holds that he is liable even if the injury is caused by the impact with the ground, but that he is exempt from paying restitution for the damage done to the clothes of the one who slipped.

(E) וְרַב – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּאַפְקְרִינְהוּ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא אַפְקְרִינְהוּ – מָמוֹנוֹ הוּא.

The Gemara asks: And how would Rav answer this difficulty? The Gemara answers: This presumption that liability for damage caused by one’s stone, knife, or load is derived from the category of Pit, thereby exempting him from payment for damage to vessels, applies only in a case where he renounced ownership of them. But in a case where he did not renounce ownership of them, it is considered to be like any other case where his property causes damage. Therefore, he is liable to pay for damage caused to the vessels.

מֵתִיב רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: ״וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה שּׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר״; ״שׁוֹר״ – וְלֹא ״אָדָם״, ״חֲמוֹר״ – וְלֹא כֵּלִים. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: נָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר וְכֵלָיו וְנִשְׁתַּבְּרוּ, חֲמוֹר וְכֵלָיו וְנִתְקָרְעוּ – חַיָּיב עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, וּפָטוּר עַל הַכֵּלִים. הָא לְמָה זֶה דּוֹמֶה – לְאַבְנוֹ וְסַכִּינוֹ וּמַשָּׂאוֹ שֶׁהִנִּיחָן בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְהִזִּיקוּ.

(F) Rav Oshaya raises an objection from a baraita discussing Pit: It is derived from the verse: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the digger is liable to pay restitution only if what incurred damage is an ox but not a person, or a donkey but not vessels. From here the Sages stated that if an ox with its equipment fell into a pit, and the ox was wounded and the equipment broke; or if a donkey with its equipment fell in, and the donkey was wounded and the equipment tore, then the one who dug the pit is liable to pay restitution for any injury sustained by the animal but exempt from paying restitution for the damaged equipment. To what case is this similar? It is similar to the case of his stone, or his knife, or his load that he left in the public domain, and they caused damage.

The gemara continues with its analysis for a few more lines, but I’ll omit because it isn’t necessary to the present discussion, and because that is all Talmudic Narrator.

I would argue that only A, B, C, and F are in the proto-sugya involving named Amoraim. That means that (4), the answer on behalf of Rav, that owned property damaging in the public domain by people stumbling over them are considered Ox, is Stammaic, from the Talmudic Narrator(s).

Now Adding: I would work to understanding Rav and Shmuel’s opinion in a different way, if possible. Such a that a pit in particular (kills or) damages the body of what falls in it, with vessels being inconsequential. If you have something that only damages vessels, like dirty water, that would not be ignored as a tafel. Then Rav isn’t talking about ownership at all, as the Stamma proposes. Or, there may be some other resolution. The term lamadnu suggests to me that Rav agrees these are derived from Pit.

Now, on to my summary of the rest:

1. In Bava Kamma 31a, a brayta discusses a line of potters, each stumbling on the one before them (except for the first who stumbles on nothing) and incurring damage to both body and property. Rava explains the halacha, I think explaining that brayta.
   
   Within named Amoraim, the interpretation Rava’s statement, of the liability of בֵּין בְּנִזְקֵי גוּפוֹ, בֵּין בְּנִזְקֵי מָמוֹנוֹ when B stumbles on A is that we are dealing with damage caused BY A’s body or BY A’s property.
   
   The named Amoraim are fifth-generation Amoraim, Rav Ada bar Ahava II and Ravina I who are Rava’s students, and Rav Ada bar Minyumei who is also fifth-generation. These Amoraim work to understanding Tannaitic sourced in line with fourth-generation Rava’s description of the halacha.
   

2. The Stamma objects to this interpretation because of a brayta’s wording, and interprets Rava’s words (without needing to explicitly edit them, though it might have seemed so) that we are dealing with damage TO B’s body and damage to B’s property.
   
   This explanation works fine, except that the (same?) Talmudic Narrator says it works fine with Shmuel, where owned property (A’s body which cannot be abandoned) damage is Pit, so there is no liability for B’s property. But what about Rav, who holds it is Ox, such that there would be liability?
   

3. This is strange because we do indeed rule like Shmuel, in monetary matters. Why should we consider this a question? See Rashba who addresses it for one sugya.
   
   Nevertheless, the Stamma retracts, bringing us to the explanation by Rava’s students, named Amoraim.
   

4. A survey of the other instances in which this idea is brought up, in various language. Each time, the objection is within the position the Stamma attributes to Rav. Thus, we have:

   1. Bava Kamma 48a: Rava discusses an ox crouching. Rav Pappa defines this as crouching to defecate, which damages a passing person’s clothing. This works for Shmuel, but not Rav, for the feces are owned so one should be liable! The gemara answers that he presumably abandoned the feces.
      
      Now Adding: I don’t know that he abandoned the feces, and elsewhere we see someone putting it in the public domain and wanting to retain ownership. With the alternate explanation, Rav might say that soiling clothing is primary, just like the water.
      

   2. Bava Kamma 3a. Rav Pappa had said a subset of subcategories were unlike their primary categories. The gemara searched for such examples, and came to avno sakino umasa’o, which are not holes, but things that take up space and damage. If abandoned, both Rav and Shmuel compare to Pit. If owned, for Shmuel, this is like Pit, for Rav, like Ox. So the search continues.
      
      Now Adding: I’d say it is like Pit regardless. But that we could mention Dirty Water and Feces for Rav, which are like Pit but nonetheless one is liable for vessels, since that damage is primary.
      

   3. Bava Kamma 48b. A Mishna about an ox falling into water. Rava says if it contaminated at the time of the fall it is liable. If later, polluting it, he’s exempt, because the ox attains the status of Pit. The Stamma objects that this works for Shmuel, but what of Rav, since the ox hasn’t been renounced? The Stamma then emends Rava’s statement.
      
      Now Adding: Given our alternate understanding of Rav, which has nothing to do with ownership, Rav would again be a problem here for that is the primary way a rotting carcass would damage water.