Continuing where we left off the other day, about Sages who maintained that one can transfer an entity that hasn’t yet entered the world, the top of Kiddushin 63a shows how Rabbi (Yehuda HaNasi) maintains the same:
עצם הגישה לדקדוק כבעל כללים מחייבים היא גישה מודרנית, אין אנו מוצאים בשום מקום אצל חכמינו (כוונתו לחז"ל) כלל דקדוקי או בכלל תפיסה דקדוקית מוחלטת, מלה זו נאמרת דוקא כך ולא אחרת. הלשון הקדומה לא צייתה לכללי דקדוק באופן מוחלט, אלא להיפך: כללי הדקדוק נוצרו מתוך רצון ליצור אחידות בהסתמך על רוב ההופעות[8], אך המקרא כולו אינו מציית לכללי דקדוק, כך גם הנביאים והכתובים, וכמובן גם המשניות והתלמוד.
......
דברי היעב"ץ בודאי נכונים מבחינה היסטורית, שהדקדוק לא היה מצוי אצל חכמינו בעלי המשנה והתלמוד, ולכן קשה מאד להניח שכל תורתם בנויה על רעיונות הדקדוק שהיו זרים להם. ראה גם בשו"ת התשב"ץ (ח"א לג): "ר' אלעזר הקליר שהיה מגדולי התנאים מצאו בפיוטיו כמה שגיאות לפי הדקדוק, לפי שאין זה פוגם מעלת החכם אם אינו יודע דקדוק הלשון והמלות". לא נראה בדברי חכמים ובדרשותיהם שהביאו כללי דקדוק לשם ביסוס הדרשא, והרי בידינו חומר רב מאד של דרשות. בשום מקום לא מוזכרים כללים כאלו, ומדוע לא ניסו חכמים ללמד את תלמידיהם כיצד דורשים את התורה? לעומת זאת, בנושאי מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן וכללי דרשות ישנו חומר רב.
2. That said, I think that all generalizations are false*. So to say that Chazal NEVER used their sense of dikduk to compel one interpretation over another. Again I am in a hurry and on the spot, but I fuzzily recall a few gemaras where named Amoraim appealed to what it must mean because it said this and not that. Doesn't mean that they got the dikduk right, but they were focused on these things.
For instance, there is Rabba Tosefa'a. In Bava Batra 64a, and in Moed Katan 4a, he is extremely precise of what the meaning of specific terms (in braytot) mean. E.g. madlin doesn't mean drawing water but pulling vegetables.
I can't retrieve examples right now regarding pesukim, but I think they do exist, at least involving some Tannaim and Amoraim.
3. In terms of laws of dikduk vs. middot shehatorah nidreshet, formal grammatical terms might not have existed yet. But as native speakers of two or more Semitic languages, and people who read all their texts extremely closely, it might have developed independently and without formal instruction, or absorbed by way of repeated example.
4. Indeed, I've seen many derashot which I suspect are deeper than the typical presentation, and these are patterned on grammatical rules. I really think that I am right. And I really think that while I see a relatively small sample that others don't see (because of relatively greater grammatical sophistication than the typical reader, willingness to look in the pesukim, and a measure of creativity), I am also blind to many others, because of my own limitations.
And yes, as you are pointing out as an issue -- these are based on creativity and dikduk, and do NOT fit into the typical middot, even though there are these published collections of middot. To this, I would say:
a) it is much harder to teach creativity than to teach klal and prat and klal, which is more formulaic and able to be applied by anyone. and the language of grammatical terms didn't exist back then, and it was something much more organic and internalized by native speakers, not something that was formalized by rules.
b) as with much research in the area, I'll assert what I did to Ezra about Kugel's book. It is partly a case of garbage in / garbage out. Most people, researchers included, don't see the complexity of a myriad of derashot. Instead, it is classified as "oh, here they did a ribuy". Here, there was an extra vav. When the dataset of derashot is explained in this surface manner, one can generalize and draw conclusions about what Chazal did or did not do. Both those conclusions may be wholly inaccurate. First, let 100 people spend 100 years trying to explain each derasha in its full complexity and creativity. Then, with that annotated dataset of derashot, let us try to figure out trends of interpretation.
I'm in a rush, so I read your excerpts only quickly, but here are my thoughts.
1. I think I mostly agree, assuming I understand him correctly. See my discussion with Ezra Brand. That is, I don't think they were necessarily grammarians, talking about klalei hadikduk, and were compelled (מוחלטת) towards a specific interpretation. Rather, they used rules of dikduk to open up avenues of alternative explanations. (כללי הדקדוק נוצרו מתוך רצון ליצור אחידות בהסתמך על רוב ההופעות).
I'd add that the existence of a possible path of interpretation, specifically which accords with an improbable interpretation, would be taken as a reason to adopt it. Because there are all sorts of ways to phrase it, and Hashem selected one, so on the level of derash, this improbable meaning is an intended message. In that way, it is compelled.
There are others who might say that Chazal had a firm sense of dikduk, and if they are saying something improbable, it is because the rules of dikduk PRECLUDE that seeming peshat explanation. This might be the Malbim, or HaKsav vehaKabbalah. Or the whole, semi-modern approach (and book series) What Is Bothering Rashi. That operates on assumption that Rashi is always peshat (when really, he might be simply curating aggadah 80% of the time), so we need to figure out why these (clearly midrashic) interpretations are really peshat.
I expand on my rejection of that idea in the following parshablog post:
My example in this Substack post tries to figure out the potential that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw, not that he felt forced into this explanation. To some extend, though, yes, what Rashi writes that "eved" has to mean someone still a slave might be aligned with being compelled into a particular explanation.
Really enjoy these explanations of drashos! Nevertheless, what do you think of what Rabbi Inbal argues here, that Chazal didn't follow klalei dikduk? https://rationalbelief.org.il/%d7%9b%d7%90-%d7%9e%d7%97%d7%a7%d7%a8-%d7%94%d7%93%d7%a8%d7%a9%d7%95%d7%aa/
עצם הגישה לדקדוק כבעל כללים מחייבים היא גישה מודרנית, אין אנו מוצאים בשום מקום אצל חכמינו (כוונתו לחז"ל) כלל דקדוקי או בכלל תפיסה דקדוקית מוחלטת, מלה זו נאמרת דוקא כך ולא אחרת. הלשון הקדומה לא צייתה לכללי דקדוק באופן מוחלט, אלא להיפך: כללי הדקדוק נוצרו מתוך רצון ליצור אחידות בהסתמך על רוב ההופעות[8], אך המקרא כולו אינו מציית לכללי דקדוק, כך גם הנביאים והכתובים, וכמובן גם המשניות והתלמוד.
......
דברי היעב"ץ בודאי נכונים מבחינה היסטורית, שהדקדוק לא היה מצוי אצל חכמינו בעלי המשנה והתלמוד, ולכן קשה מאד להניח שכל תורתם בנויה על רעיונות הדקדוק שהיו זרים להם. ראה גם בשו"ת התשב"ץ (ח"א לג): "ר' אלעזר הקליר שהיה מגדולי התנאים מצאו בפיוטיו כמה שגיאות לפי הדקדוק, לפי שאין זה פוגם מעלת החכם אם אינו יודע דקדוק הלשון והמלות". לא נראה בדברי חכמים ובדרשותיהם שהביאו כללי דקדוק לשם ביסוס הדרשא, והרי בידינו חומר רב מאד של דרשות. בשום מקום לא מוזכרים כללים כאלו, ומדוע לא ניסו חכמים ללמד את תלמידיהם כיצד דורשים את התורה? לעומת זאת, בנושאי מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן וכללי דרשות ישנו חומר רב.
...
He goes on to discuss this issue more
2. That said, I think that all generalizations are false*. So to say that Chazal NEVER used their sense of dikduk to compel one interpretation over another. Again I am in a hurry and on the spot, but I fuzzily recall a few gemaras where named Amoraim appealed to what it must mean because it said this and not that. Doesn't mean that they got the dikduk right, but they were focused on these things.
For instance, there is Rabba Tosefa'a. In Bava Batra 64a, and in Moed Katan 4a, he is extremely precise of what the meaning of specific terms (in braytot) mean. E.g. madlin doesn't mean drawing water but pulling vegetables.
I can't retrieve examples right now regarding pesukim, but I think they do exist, at least involving some Tannaim and Amoraim.
3. In terms of laws of dikduk vs. middot shehatorah nidreshet, formal grammatical terms might not have existed yet. But as native speakers of two or more Semitic languages, and people who read all their texts extremely closely, it might have developed independently and without formal instruction, or absorbed by way of repeated example.
4. Indeed, I've seen many derashot which I suspect are deeper than the typical presentation, and these are patterned on grammatical rules. I really think that I am right. And I really think that while I see a relatively small sample that others don't see (because of relatively greater grammatical sophistication than the typical reader, willingness to look in the pesukim, and a measure of creativity), I am also blind to many others, because of my own limitations.
And yes, as you are pointing out as an issue -- these are based on creativity and dikduk, and do NOT fit into the typical middot, even though there are these published collections of middot. To this, I would say:
a) it is much harder to teach creativity than to teach klal and prat and klal, which is more formulaic and able to be applied by anyone. and the language of grammatical terms didn't exist back then, and it was something much more organic and internalized by native speakers, not something that was formalized by rules.
b) as with much research in the area, I'll assert what I did to Ezra about Kugel's book. It is partly a case of garbage in / garbage out. Most people, researchers included, don't see the complexity of a myriad of derashot. Instead, it is classified as "oh, here they did a ribuy". Here, there was an extra vav. When the dataset of derashot is explained in this surface manner, one can generalize and draw conclusions about what Chazal did or did not do. Both those conclusions may be wholly inaccurate. First, let 100 people spend 100 years trying to explain each derasha in its full complexity and creativity. Then, with that annotated dataset of derashot, let us try to figure out trends of interpretation.
Thanks.
I'm in a rush, so I read your excerpts only quickly, but here are my thoughts.
1. I think I mostly agree, assuming I understand him correctly. See my discussion with Ezra Brand. That is, I don't think they were necessarily grammarians, talking about klalei hadikduk, and were compelled (מוחלטת) towards a specific interpretation. Rather, they used rules of dikduk to open up avenues of alternative explanations. (כללי הדקדוק נוצרו מתוך רצון ליצור אחידות בהסתמך על רוב ההופעות).
I'd add that the existence of a possible path of interpretation, specifically which accords with an improbable interpretation, would be taken as a reason to adopt it. Because there are all sorts of ways to phrase it, and Hashem selected one, so on the level of derash, this improbable meaning is an intended message. In that way, it is compelled.
There are others who might say that Chazal had a firm sense of dikduk, and if they are saying something improbable, it is because the rules of dikduk PRECLUDE that seeming peshat explanation. This might be the Malbim, or HaKsav vehaKabbalah. Or the whole, semi-modern approach (and book series) What Is Bothering Rashi. That operates on assumption that Rashi is always peshat (when really, he might be simply curating aggadah 80% of the time), so we need to figure out why these (clearly midrashic) interpretations are really peshat.
I expand on my rejection of that idea in the following parshablog post:
https://parsha.blogspot.com/2006/12/parshat-mikeitz-what-is-bothering.html
My example in this Substack post tries to figure out the potential that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw, not that he felt forced into this explanation. To some extend, though, yes, what Rashi writes that "eved" has to mean someone still a slave might be aligned with being compelled into a particular explanation.
Thanks, this is fascinating! Drashos have always been the most perplexing part of Gemara for me, and I am glad to get insight into them.