It Matters Which Rabbi Avin
In yesterday’s daf (Kiddushin 44b), we read the following engaging tale of what happened in Rabbi Yochanan’s study hall.
רַבִּי אַסִּי לָא עָל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר הָאִידָּנָא בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַף אֲנָא לָא עֲיַילִ[י], רַבִּי אָבִין הוּא דְּעָיֵיל וַאֲמַר: חַבְרוּתָא כּוּלַּהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. וּצְוַוח רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ כִּי כְרוּכְיָא: ״וְיָצְאָה. וְהָיְתָה״, וְלֵיכָּא דְּאַשְׁגַּח בֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר סַמְכָא הוּא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, כְּמִין יַמָּא לְטִיגְנֵי הוּא.
The Gemara relates: One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira and said to him: What was said today in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I too did not go, but Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie sided with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. And Reish Lakish screamed at them like a crane: Doesn’t the verse state: “And she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? But no one paid any attention to him. Rabbi Asi said to him: Is Rabbi Avin reliable? Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Yes, in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time was only like the interval between catching a fish from the sea and bringing it to a frying pan [tignei].
This, by the way, is one important reason to know who says a statement. Thus:
Reason #1: To know whether the person is reliable. How clever are they? How well can they recall traditions with precision? (Elsewhere, Rabbi Zeira dismisses traditions from a blind Amora because he cannot be entirely sure who said it.) Here, Rabbi Avin is perhaps not so reliable in general, but in this case is reliable, because it happened just that day.
Plain Rabbi Avin is a third-generation Amora, one of Rabbi Yochanan’s major students. According to Rav Aharon Hyman in Toledot Tannaim vaAmoraim, he is the same as Ravin. So, he is the one constantly bringing reports from Rabbi Yochanan to Bavel, alongside Rav Dimi. Often these reports are different. Concern about his accuracy, pro or against, seem important.
The gemara continues with this:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אֲנָא, לָא רַבִּי אָבִין בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְלָא רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר כָּהֲנָא, אֶלָּא רַבִּי אָבִין סְתָם. לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִירְמֵא דִּידֵיהּ אַדִּידֵיהּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: When I quote this statement, I do not state it in the name of Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but in the name of Rabbi Avin, without specification. The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were to raise a contradiction between one of his rulings and another one of his rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e.g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin.
You can read about Rabbi Avin bar Chiyya here - he was a third-generation student of Rabbi Zeira, so perhaps that is why Rabbi Zeira said that he went, and was also able to vouch — or not vouch — for him. Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, third and fourth-generation, was his colleague, as Rav Hyman writes. In Temura 20b, they interact:
בעא מיניה רבי אבין בר חייא מר' אבין בר כהנא הפריש נקבה לאשם בנה מהו שיקרב לעולה ותיפשוט ליה מדר' יוסי ברבי חנינא דאמר מודה רבי אליעזר לא שמיע ליה
§ Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya inquired of Rabbi Avin bar Kahana: If one designated a female animal as a guilt offering and it gave birth to a male, what is the halakha with regard to whether its offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering? The Gemara questions the necessity of this inquiry: And let him resolve the inquiry from the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Rabbi Elazar concedes that if one designates a female animal as a guilt offering, the offspring is not sacrificed as a guilt offering, as there is no guilt offering status for animals that are the same sex as the mother, and likewise it is not sacrificed as a burnt offering, as the mother was designated as a guilt offering. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya never heard that statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina.
(though this “inquiry” might imply a slightly different relationship between them.)
What the gemara proposes here, why we should care who precisely said it:
Reason #2: To contrast his rulings against one another.
Either to note that something is, or is not a contradiction. I would add that often we can build up a profile of a Tanna / Amora’s statements, to find some consistent theory behind them. And this might also be called לְמִירְמֵא דִּידֵיהּ אַדִּידֵיהּ.
But, if we want a good contrasting example, we are going to encounter one fairly soon, on Kiddushin 53a. Rabbi Yehuda had taken a position in the Mishnah, against Rabbi Meir, as to whether a kohen could betroth with “his” portion of a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan (an Amora) said that Rabbi Yehuda effectively retracted after they had a formal vote. Rav said that Rabbi Yehuda did not retract. Abaye offers a proof to Rabbi Yochanan’s position based on a brayta which is a Sifra, showing that the kohen has absolutely no portion. This proof ends:
״אִישׁ״ אִישׁ חוֹלֵק, אֲפִילּוּ בַּעַל מוּם, וְאֵין הַקָּטָן חוֹלֵק וַאֲפִילּוּ תָּם. סְתָם סִפְרָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְהוּא קָאָמַר דְּלֵית בַּהּ דִּין חֲלוּקָהּ כְּלָל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The baraita expounds this verse further: It states: “One as well as another [ish ke’aḥiv],” which teaches that with regard to priests, a man [ish] who is an adult receives a share even if he is blemished, but a priest who is a minor may not receive a share even if he is unblemished. This baraita is found in the Sifra, a collection of halakhic midrashim on the book of Leviticus. And who is the tanna to whom unattributed statements in the Sifra are assigned? It is Rabbi Yehuda, and here he says that no law of receiving a share applies to it at all, which means that priests cannot exchange one portion of any type of offering for another portion, so they cannot use it to betroth a woman. Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his opinion and subscribes to the opinion that a priest does not own the portion of the offerings he receives.
So, knowing that Rabbi Yehuda authored Sifra allows us to contrast his statements.
This type of thing — that the Amoraim care about proper attributions, and that knowing who said what is important to the arguments in the gemara — is readily apparent once you read a lot of gemara.
That is one reason that I disagree with what Rabbi Louis Jacobs wrote in Form and Structure of the Babylonian Talmud, about pseudepigraphic attribution being present, somewhat and certainly more than is commonly appreciated.
He writes:
We could take up the “latter instances” and see if we agree with how they are being understood, and whether they are an exception rather than a rule. (I’ve done some of this myself but haven’t written them up.) By the way, the footnotes are this:
which indeed form a
Reason #3: Give proper credit, don’t plagiarize, it gives the person who said it benefit even after death.
But that is not the only reason for giving attribution, and why Amoraim like Rav Yosef, Rabbi Zeira, and now Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak were concerned who said it. There is, rather, an important function in knowing the speaker, in terms of the discourse itself. And, rather than extrapolating from a few examples (which again, we can discuss) to say that there was widespread lack of concern with simply making up who said something, I would say that adderaba, many Amoraim were very precise in their attributions, knowing that inaccurate credit could corrupt the analysis.