Rabbi Yochanan Repeatedly Objects (full article)
Here is my Jewish Link article from this past Shabbos. It describes eitevieh vs. meitivi, which the former as a named person objecting to a named person. Then considers a gemara where Rabbi Yochanan repeatedly objects to Reish Lakish based on Tannaitic sources. In the first instance, Rava answers, but each time after, the gemara says “like Rava”. Tosafot wonder why the gemara bothers with the repeated objections when the answer is obvious. I answer based on scholastic generations — that Rabbi Yochanan could not have heard Rava’s answer, so these are not repeated shlugged up answers. I also look at two other sugyot where Tosafot offer an answer (the questioner wondering if the person will present an alternate answer), and offer my own answer.
In the Talmud, two words used to register an objection are אֵיתִיבֵיהּ and מֵיתִיבִי.It seems that אֵיתִיבֵיהּ means “he objected to him”, and occurs for instance in Avodah Zarah 41b, אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, Rabbi Yochanan objected to Reish Lakish. Even where the speaker, the hearer, or both, aren’t specified, as in Avodah Zarah 42a, אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: מָצָא תַּבְנִית יָד, we can perform antecedent resolution. That is, we can analyze “[he] objected to [him]” and look back to find which Sage was “he” and which Sage was “him”, based on who last spoke or which position is currently being attacked. My understanding of אֵיתִיבֵיהּ is therefore that these are true conversations between the named Amoraim of a sugya, during their scholastic generation.
Meanwhile, מֵיתִיבִי does not have a single speaker1, so there is no “he”. While it is an attack on an Amora, the ending is not tzere yud mapik-heh, so there is no “him”. An example is Avodah Zarah 40a, where Rav Pappa states a halacha about the kashrut of a minced fish dish, and the gemara raises an objection (מֵיתִיבִי) from a brayta, with no named Amoraic attacker. We might imagine that the objectors were Rav Pappa’s fifth-generation contemporaries, but perhaps more likely, this is an objection by the Talmudic Narrator, and is late Amoraic or early Savoraic in origin.
The Broken Idol
Avodah Zarah 41b recorded an Amoraic dispute. Say an idol broke of its own accord. Rabbi Yochanan forbids it and Reish Lakish permits it. To elaborate, Rabbi Yochanan forbids because, there was no act by its owner revoking its idolatrous status. To elaborate, Reish Lakish permits because presumably the owner revoked its status, reasoning that if the idol could not save itself, it has no power to save others.
Despite the reiteration of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר and רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר, I understand this elaboration as by the Talmudic Narrator, rather than the Amoraim themselves. The Narrator isn’t trying to fool us with a pseudepigraphic attribution (ascribing his own words to Amoraim). Rather, the amar is truthfully briefly quoting the Amora’s words forbidding or permitting. Just, the continuation is the Narrator’s words. Indeed, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish’s words are Hebrew, while the elaboration is in Aramaic. Often, in the ensuing debate between named Amoraim, they base themselves on Tannaitic sources, rather than invoking aspects of the attributed reasoning, so we might treat it as justified speculation, but speculation nonetheless.
Next, we have a series of אֵיתִיבֵיהּ. Rabbi Yochanan first notes the verses (I Shmuel 5:4-5) where the Dagon idol was broken into its parts on its threshold, and its priests therefore don’t tread onto its threshold. Resh Lakish replies, “(A) you think you have a proof from there? There, they abandoned the Dagon and worshiped the threshold. (B) For they said that the spirit of Dagon left the idol and rested upon the threshold.” Here is a counterexample to what I suggested in the previous paragraph, for this invokes aspects of the reasoning, about how the automatic destruction may impact the idolator’s thoughts.
There are a few answers to the matter. First, the Talmudic Narrator makes the reasoning explicit up front, and sometimes it is speculative. That doesn’t mean that it isn’t correct, or could sometimes be extracted from the named Amoraim’s back-and-forth. Second, for Reish Lakish’s response, where we expect אמר ליה in Aramaic, some manuscripts have אמר לו in Hebrew or the abbreviation א”ל. The last is also the abbreviation of אמר לך, which is the Talmudic Narrator injecting what Reish Lakish could have said to you if he were to respond. Finally, Rabbi Yochanan’s objection and (A) in Reish Lakish’s response are in Hebrew. (B) is a sudden shift to Aramaic, which often reflects the Talmudic Narrator’s injected elaboration.
Repetitive and Redundant Repetition
Rabbi Yochanan’s objections continue. A Mishnah (52b) states that a gentile can revoke the idolatrous status of his own or another gentile’s idol, but a Jew cannot revoke the status of a gentile’s idol. Why not? Let the Jew’s revocation (I think breaking it) be equal to breaking of its own accord? In Bavel rather than Israel, and in the fourth rather than second generation of Amoraim, Abaye answered on Reish Lakish’s behalf – that he merely bent it, not broke it. (The Talmudic Narrator expands in Aramaic that while such bending suffices as a nullifying action for a gentile, it does not for a Jew.) His fourth-generation contemporary, Rava, disagrees. (The gemara frames that as stating that mere bending works on a basic level.) It is rather a rabbinic decree lest he first lift it prior to nullifying it, and nullification of a Jew’s idol is ineffective.
Rabbi Yochanan then objects from a brayta about a gentile vs. a Jew who brought stones from Mercury, whose worship was throwing stones, and paved roads with them. Why should the Jew’s actions be worse than automatic destruction? The gemara answers that here, as well, it’s like Rava. Rabbi Yochanan then objects from a brayta about a gentile vs. Jew shaving down an idol to use the shavings. Again, the answer is like Rava. Rabbi Yochanan objects from a brayta wherein Rabbi Yossi recommends grinding an idol ground down and casting it to wind, but the Sages object that this may fertilize a Jew’s crops. Why should this be a problem? Again, like Rava. Finally, a brayta about a dragon figure with its head severed, where it is forbidden if it’s known a Jew severed it. Once again, like Rava.
This bothers the Tosafists, d.h. הָכָא נָמֵי כִּדְרָבָא. This requires investigation. If we are just going to repeatedly say that it is like Rava, why repeatedly pose the question. We already know Rava’s answer!
One approach can be found in Tosafot Shabbat 43a d.h. כופה עליה כלי. Abaye raised a series of objections to Rav Chisda’s position that one may invert a vessel over an egg to protect it (as explained by Rabba and then Rav Yosef) and was answered, each in its own way. Then, Rabbi Yitzchak voices a similar position. He (I believe Abaye) raised all the aforementioned objections and was answered in each case with a single answer – that we’re dealing with him needing the vessel’s place. (Once he’s permitted to move the vessel, he can place it wherever he desires.) If so, wonder the Tosafists, why not give this universal response before? Tosafot explain that the questioner certainly knew this response, but wanted to know if any other answer was available.
Similarly, in Shabbat 123b, Abaye raises a series of challenges to Rava’s position that all utensils may be moved on Shabbat. One objection is a brayta that a mortar without garlic may not be moved. The answer for Rava (perhaps not voiced by Rava himself) is that we’re dealing with moving the mortar from the sun to the shade (which is prohibited for vessels whose primary purpose is for prohibited use). Next, Abaye objects based on a brayta that a pestle upon which meat was cut may not be moved. The answer on Rava’s behalf is that once again, it was moving the pestle from the shade to the sun. Tosafot d.h. איתיביה אביי מדוכה explain that while Abaye surely knows what Rava just answered, he wanted to know if Rava would answer in another fashion.
Layers of Talmudic Sugya
Aside from Tosafot’s answer, and aside from the idea that the Talmudic Narrator’s style can be repetitive to comprehensively show how a position works with multiple Tannaitic sources, I think there’s a straightforward answer here. In Avodah Zarah, the objection verb is אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, so Rabbi Yochanan himself repeatedly attacks. Rabbi Yochanan lived generations earlier than Rava in a different country, and Rava never visited the Land of Israel2. Therefore, when Rava handily answers Rabbi Yochanan’s objection, neither Rabbi Yochanan nor his disputant Reish Lakish heard it. The question isn’t why Rabbi Yochanan asked a series of pointless questions, now that he knows the answer. The question is why Rabbi Yochanan asked redundant questions, when a single Tannaitic source would suffice to reject Reish Lakish. I think that he is showing the weight of the question – multiple earlier sources contradict Reish Lakish. Later, Rava gave a single answer, but the Talmudic Narrator interspersed Rava’s answer where relevant, following each of Rabbi Yochanan’s objections. If the repeated objection verb were מֵיתִיבִי, and posed by the Talmudic Narrator who knew Rava’s answer, then it makes sense to wonder at the pointless repetition of an already-answered question.
As for Shabbat 43a, Rabbi Yitzchak simply responded to Abaye’s objection with a universal answer, whereas it either did not occur to the other Amoraim who responded for Rav Chisda or they felt the answer to be forced. As for Shabbat 123b, as I hinted above, after Abaye’s question, there is no אמר רבא. It is the Talmudic Narrator answering about moving from sun to shade. Abaye is earlier and doesn’t know the answer. He just has a doubly-strong question, with Rava seemingly refuted by both a mortar and a pestle.
Of course, we can have מֵתִיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר in Avodah Zarah 48a, with Rabbi Eleazar ben Pedat as objector to Shmuel, not that’s not the same as מֵיתִיבִי.
Yes, in Avodah Zarah 38a, a ship lands in Acco, Rabbi Abba of Akko appointed kashrut guard, and Rava questions the action. Artscroll there suggests Rava must have visited the Land of Israel. The correct answer is that, based on manuscripts, it is plain Rabbi Abba, not Rava, and distinguished from Rabbi Abba of Akko.