Rav Amram's Objection: Learning from Mammon

On Sunday’s daf, Bava Metzia 18, the Talmudic Narrator restricted Rabba’s statement, that we worry about two people with the same name only where there are caravans, by saying that this was only where it was established that there were two Yosef ben Shimons in that town. The restriction was based on the Talmudic Narrator’s interpretation of a story which occurred in Rav Huna’s court, where Rabba was a research assistant and was instructed by Rav Chisda to research the topic for Rav Huna, who would question him.

The primary sugya is not there, though. The Talmudic Narrator simply cited it as evidence. Instead, the primary sugya is yesterday’s daf, Bava Metzia 20, where most details and the follow-up happens, with Rav Amram challenging Rabba, Rabba calling him and idiot, the pillar in the study hall splitting, and each saying that that supported himself.

As part of that follow-up discussion, we have this (20b):

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב עַמְרָם לְרַבָּה: הֵיכִי פָּשֵׁיט מָר אִיסּוּרָא מִמָּמוֹנָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּרָדָא, ״שְׁטָרֵי חֲלִיצָה וּמֵיאוּנִין״ תְּנַן.

Rav Amram said to Rabba: How can the Master resolve the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce, which is a ritual matter, from the mishna, which discusses monetary matters? Rabba said to him: Fool, we learned in the mishna that this halakha applies in the case of documents of ḥalitza and documents of refusal as well, which are ritual matters.

One way of understanding the objection of learning prohibitive matters from monetary matters, אִיסּוּרָא מִמָּמוֹנָא לָא יָלְפִינַן, is that these are different realms, so different rules of evidence may well apply. Another way of understanding it is that the laws regarding money are more lenient that prohibition, so we cannot deduce from money to prohibition. Rabba’s proof was returning acts of the court, which were monetary, but the case in Rav Huna’s court was a get. Tosafot write:

איסורא מממונא - וא"ת טפי אנן מחמירין בממונא דהא אין אנו הולכים בממון אחר הרוב ובאיסורא אזלינן בתר רובא אפי' היכא דאיכא חזקה דאיסורא כנגד הרוב ולא חיישינן שמא במקום נקב קא שחיט וי"ל דמ"מ באשת איש החמירו דמים שאין להם סוף לא תנשא לכתחילה אע"פ שרובם מתים ועוד יש לומר דמדאורייתא לא חיישינן לשני יוסף בן שמעון אבל מדרבנן חיישינן משום לעז ובממונא לא שייך לעז לכך פריך שפיר היכי פשיט מר איסורא מממונא:

That is, they object that there’s a principle that we don’t go after the majority in monetary matters, but do do so for prohibitions, even where there is a chazaka to prohibit working against the majority, which shows that money is more stringent. And they give an answer, that despite this, by concerns about adultery, we are more stringent. (The objection seems more general than adultery, about prohibition from money in general.)

I would answer the question otherwise. The idea that אין הולכים בממון אחר הרוב is actually a matter of dispute, where Shmuel says* we don’t while Rav says* that we do. Practically, we rule like Shmuel (as we do generally in monetary matters) but that doesn’t mean that Rav doesn’t say what he does.

Now, recall that this incident happened in Rav Huna’s court, and Rabba was researching for Rav Huna. And Rav Huna is generally assumed to always accord with Rav, as the gemara asserts and I’ve discussed in the past. Therefore, within Rav / Rav Huna, we do go after majority by both money and prohibition.

Indeed, the questioner, Rav Amram, is Rav Amram I, who is Rav’s student and often cites him. I don’t think he is Rav Amram II, the student of third-generation Rav Sheshet, because Rav’s student Rav Huna is still around to discuss. Since Rav Amram is Rav’s student, he should operate within Rav’s framework, so Tosafot’s objection is not such an objection.

If we adopt what I am proposing, then once we reject Rav in favor of Shmuel, maybe we would say that we can learn issur from mammon! The Talmudic Narrator employs it in Berachot 19b.

Finally, I put an asterisk above in what Rav and Shmuel say. That is just to note that they don’t say it explicitly. Rather, they argue in practical cases, such as Bava Batra 92a:

גְּמָ׳ אִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שׁוֹר לַחֲבֵירוֹ וְנִמְצָא נַגְחָן, רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת; וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר, יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ: לִשְׁחִיטָה מְכַרְתִּיו לָךְ.

GEMARA: An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who sells an ox to another and the ox is found to be one that habitually gores. Rav says: This is a mistaken transaction, since the buyer can claim that he bought the ox specifically for labor, and an ox that gores is not suitable for this function. Therefore, the seller must take back the ox and reimburse the buyer. And Shmuel says: The sale is not voided, as the seller can say to him: I sold it to you for slaughter, and the fact that it gores is immaterial.

and the gemara analyzes this dispute. At the end of it, the Talmudic Narrator offers a distinction on their behalf:

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְאִישְׁתַּלּוֹמֵי מִינֵּיהּ.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to discuss the case where the seller does have sufficient funds for the buyer to be reimbursed by him.

רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי זֶה מִקָּח טָעוּת – בָּתַר רוּבָּא אָזְלִינַן, וְרוּבָּא לְרִדְיָא זָבְנִי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר לָךְ: כִּי אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא – בְּאִיסּוּרָא, בְּמָמוֹנָא – לָא.

The Gemara explains the logic of each opinion: Rav says: This is a mistaken transaction, as in cases of uncertainty we follow the majority, and since the majority of people purchase oxen for plowing, it is presumed that this buyer also purchased the ox for plowing. Accordingly, since the ox he received was not suitable for plowing, the sale is void. And Shmuel could have said to you: When we follow the majority, that is only with regard to ritual matters, but with regard to monetary matters, such as this, we do not follow the majority. Accordingly, there is no basis for voiding the sale.

Despite the rav amar, he does not explicitly say it. We can tell this from context, that this is explaining Rav as analyzed earlier. And this is clear with the parallel that shmuel amar lach, Shmuel would say to you.

Now, just because the Talmudic Narrator said something doesn’t mean that it is wrong. Much of gemara is taking a case given in the Mishnah and Amoraim offering bases for the Tannaitic dispute. The Narrator was very smart and had encyclopedic Talmudic knowledge, even if sometimes employing analytic methodologies which perhaps we could argue with. So, maybe this taps into the legitimate basis of the Rav / Shmuel dispute. But we can be open to other possibilities.